THE CASE AGAINST NIXON
MORRIS H. RUBIN

INSIDE KHRUSHCHEV'S RUSSIA
SIDNEY LENS

KENNEDY'S LIBERALISM
JAMES MacGREGOR BURNS

THE ELUSIVE FARM VOTE
DONALD R. MURPHY

KEYS TO THE CAMPAIGN
PHILIP E. CONVERSE

Office memo

"You've got a lot of nerve," writes a subscriber from Friendship, Arkansas, "asking me for money. But I like a magazine with lots of nerve. And I don't know of any publication more courageous than *The Progressive*. So here's a check for $10, and may Our Magazine keep up the fight for many a year to come."

There are several thousand readers who share our Arkansas subscriber's feeling that *The Progressive* is "Our Magazine." It is they who make up the Membership of the non-profit foundation which publishes *The Progressive*. And were it not for their magnificent loyalty, backed up with cash, *The Progressive* would have died long ago.

No publication of the character of *The Progressive* comes anywhere near making ends meet. But while every other magazine in the field can call on a wealthy "angel" for the necessary subsidy to sustain publication, *The Progressive's* financial needs have been met for more than a decade by the modest contributions of generous and devoted subscribers.

Happily, our losses are relatively small, and they are made up each year largely by subscribers of modest means. A typical source of Membership support is indicated in this letter from Mrs. C. O. Grant of St. Louis.

"For seven years my husband and I have been working his way through school, and he finally has his doctor's degree. All this time we managed to squeeze out enough money to keep our subscription to *The Progressive* going, but never had enough really to help you out. Now, with a genuine job in sight, we are making our first contribution, and will continue to help as long as help is needed."

Or Stanley Hanis of San Francisco, who wrote: "I have a limited amount of money to spend on causes, as so much of my income must go for essentials. But this year my wife and I moved *The Progressive* into the 'essentials' column, along with food and payments on our home and shoes for the kids. From now on, if you fail to get a Membership contribution from us you'll know it's because we've stopped eating, too."

Members like the Grants and the Hanises are now building a $30,000 fund to tide *The Progressive* over the coming year. But it takes a large number of five and ten—or two or three—dollar contributions to add up to that much money. The Members need and welcome help from any reader who has not yet become a Member of *The Progressive*.

We urge every reader who can possibly muster even the most modest amount to turn to Page 43 and use the coupon there to enroll as a Member of *The Progressive*.

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Because of a flood of requests, we have just gone to press with a reprint of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s "The Big Issue" from the September issue. Prices are on Page 45.

VOLUME 24 NUMBER 10

The

FOUNDED IN 1909 BY ROBERT M. LaFOLLETTE, Sr.

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THE PROGRESSIVE makes no attempt to exact complete conformity from its contributors, but rather welcomes a variety of opinions consistent with its general policies. Signed articles, therefore, do not necessarily represent the opinion of the management of the magazine.

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PROGRESSIVE

"YE SHALL KNOW THE TRUTH
AND THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE YOU FREE"

The Heart of the Matter

WHEN THE Eighty-sixth Congress convened in January, 1959, Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson accepted the mandate of the extraordinary liberal sweep at the polls two months before with these words: "This is the starting of a new era . . . In all the history of the Senate never has one party won so many seats at a single election as we have won. We have by our majority here an obligation to lead. We shall honor that mandate."

The Eighty-sixth Congress concluded its labors last month. It left behind a record so dismal that both parties fell at once to wrangling over responsibility for the wreckage. The liberal landslide of 1958 had become the reactionary rout of 1960. The chronicle of the Eighty-sixth Congress is littered with pledges betrayed and obligations dishonored.

The cheerless climax came at the bobtail session in August. Senators and Representatives returned to Washington with gleaming new platform pledges minted only a few weeks earlier at their national conventions. But these new promises were soon struck down in a smog of partisan oratory and buried six feet deep in hypocrisy.

Republicans blamed the Democrats and Democrats the Republicans. Both were right. It was the Bourbon coalition of Northern Republicans and Southern Democrats that destroyed the hopes of 1958. Sometimes the coalition mustered enough votes; often it was obliged to invoke the legislative instruments of paralysis which the rules of Congress provide; but always it won. The Democratic leadership had marked four bills as constituting a minimum program of action. All four were killed—although the Democrats have nearly a two to one majority in both Houses of Congress.

Civil rights legislation was not considered at all—despite the fact that both parties had just adopted the most liberal civil rights planks in their history. Senator Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois, the Republican leader, slyly sought to embarrass the divided Democrats by introducing a measure that would have established a permanent President's Commission on Equal Job Opportunity and provided Federal funds to assist areas desegregating their public schools. The humbug involved in Dirksen's action is easily detected: he had voted against both proposals only a few months before.

Democratic leaders found themselves in a painful squeeze. They had just adopted a glittering array of promises in the field of civil rights. But they knew that to permit debate on the Dirksen bill would involve the Senate in a destructive filibuster that could end only 1) by exposing anew the fatal split in the Democratic Party on civil rights, and 2) by consuming so much time that it would be impossible to act on the "must bills" they were presenting. The Democrats voted, with only four of their number dissenting, to table the bill, a move which shut off debate for the session. By their action the Democrats partially succeeded in preventing the intra-party squabble they had feared, but they failed miserably in their other objective—to pave the way for favorable action on aid to education, minimum wage liberalization, housing, and broadening of social security to provide medical care for the aged. The Democrats, moreover, weakened their position among many Americans who, while recognizing the fraud of the Republican strategy, were disturbed by the decision of the Democrats to deny consideration of civil rights.

Senator John F. Kennedy, who had voted to table the Dirksen bill, sought to salvage what he could from a nasty situation by pledging to throw the power of the Presidency behind early Congressional action on the entire Democratic plank on civil rights if he is elected. Militant White House support—so consistently lacking during the eight years of the Eisenhower Administration—could prove decisive in the quest for meaningful civil rights legislation.

Kennedy's principal goal in the bobtail session was enactment of legislation that would increase the minimum wage from $1 to $1.25 per hour and broaden the law's coverage to include 4,000,000 additional workers. He skillfully piloted the measure through the Senate, but the Tory coalition of Republicans and Democrats in the House held out for a bill that would increase the minimum wage to only $1.15 and extend coverage to only 1,400,000 workers. Rather than accept this reduced version, Kennedy let the legislation die in the hope that Democratic victory in November would heighten the prospects for passage of the more liberal proposal.

Liberal forces lost again to the bipartisan coalition in the struggle over medical aid to the aged. The bill they supported, introduced by Senator Clinton Anderson, New Mexico Democrat, was a modified version of the Forand bill. It would have provided comprehensive medical benefits, under social security, for those over sixty-eight. The measure was defeated 51 to 44 as nineteen Democrats, nearly all from the South, lined up with the Republicans. Only one Republican, Senator Clifford P. Case of New Jersey, voted with the forty-three Democrats.

In the end, Congress passed a niggardly substitute patched together by the coalition forces in Senator Harry

Byrd's Senate Finance Committee. This measure rejects the concept of social insurance for medical care. It provides only for Federal assistance to the states to increase medical aid for the aged who are on relief and others who can prove their poverty. The urgent problem of medical care for the great majority of our older persons was left untouched.

The two other "must bills"—Federal aid for the construction of schools and a comprehensive housing program—were done to death by the strangling tactics of six members of the House Rules Committee. The school construction measure had passed each house in somewhat different form, but the Rules Committee vetoed the will of the majority by refusing to let it go to conference for adjustment of differences. The housing bill had passed the Senate and cleared a House committee, but six members of the Rules Committee—two Democrats and four Republicans—would not let it go to the floor for action.

The bobtail session of Congress, graced by the presence of the two candidates for President and one of the candidates for Vice President, was billed as an historic duel of political personalities. It was a flop in that sense too. Kennedy worked ably and earnestly against hopeless odds to achieve his objectives, but he displayed little of that driving militancy for which some had hoped. Nixon stayed out of sight, hoping he would not have to break a tie that would put him on record. The Senate did not disturb his cozy evasion. It was Johnson whose stature suffered most. His almost legendary reputation as a majority leader who gets things done took a severe jolting. Johnson has long shown his gifts in the tactics of maneuver. Essentially a political broker, he trades skillfully in concessions and specializes in compromise. In the bobtail session the situation called for standing firm and fighting it out on issues. For this he showed few qualities of leadership.

In every significant contest during the Eighty-sixth Congress it was either the defection of Southern Democrats to the Republican cause or the crippling conduct of Southern Democrats in the key committees of the House and the Senate that betrayed the progressive mandate of the 1958 elections. What purpose is served in voting Democratic, many liberals wonder, if the tyranny of a Howard Smith in the House Rules Committee, a Harry Byrd in the Senate Finance Committee, and a James Eastland in the Senate Judiciary Committee can crush, time after time, the progressive program of the great majority of Democrats? Of what value are the inspiring planks of the new Democratic Party platform when one recalls that bills embodying many of these noble pledges have been killed, in this recent session as in others, by the choking tactics of the party's Southern minority?

This is the heart of the matter for those committed to a program of liberal action. These are some of the doubts that disturb many independent liberals as the 1960 Presidential campaign swings into its final month.

Senator Kennedy can do much to resolve these doubts, we believe, by announcing to the nation his determination, if elected, to break the iron grip of the Tories in his own party. Kennedy's record of liberalism is solid in its own right, but as the new leader of his party and its candidate for President he owes it to the liberal majority to proclaim his intention to break the stranglehold of the reactionary minority.

Two of his progressive colleagues have already spoken up. Senator Joseph S. Clark of Pennsylvania has called for a sweeping reorganization of Senate Democratic leadership in the next session of Congress and has urged the adoption of a requirement that chairmen of Senate standing committees and a majority of the Democratic members of each committee—assuming that the Democrats control the Senate again—favor the party's platform planks relating to the legislation their committees handle.

Senator Paul H. Douglas of Illinois, in a recent telecast, appealed to Kennedy to go to the people and expose the "unholy coalition" in Congress. The Democratic Presidential nominee, he said, should publicly lay the blame where it belongs and call openly for the break-up of the coalition. "I don't think the Democratic Party can long tolerate having this condition exist," he said. "I think it is clear the South does not want to belong to a national party."

Americans for Democratic Action, which supports liberal Democrats but will back liberal Republicans when it finds them, recently issued a statement through its chairman, Dr. Samuel H. Beer, Harvard political scientist, urging action to crack the power of the coalition by liberalizing the rules of Congress.

"We are convinced," Dr. Beer emphasized, "that even a liberal mandate in the election will not mean the enactment of a liberal program unless those who receive it are committed to restoration of the democratic process in Congress.

"The Democratic platform pledges action to assure that majority rule prevails in both Houses of Congress. This pledge can be implemented only by rules changes which assure that sabotage will not occur at any stage of the legislative process."

Dr. Beer proposed five major amendments to the rules. One need not necessarily accept them as the last word in reform to recognize that they are headed in the right direction. The proposed changes are:

¶ The selection for committee assignments of only those legislators committed to carrying out those portions of their party platforms over which the committee has jurisdiction.

¶ Action to assure that measures reported by legislative committees will reach the floor for debate.

¶ Adoption of rules to assure that legislation will not be killed in legislative committee by filibuster or arbitrary action of the chairman.

¶ Rule revision to assure that a majority in the Senate will be able to bring legislation to a vote after a reasonable opportunity for debate.

¶ Action to assure that after each House has passed legislation on the same subject, it will have the opportunity to resolve its differences with the other in conference, and that the conferees will truly represent the majority will of each House.

Here are the guidelines to a program that would make Congress far more responsive to the will of its own majority and the will of the people

than the present rules which vest ultimate power in the hands of a tight little tyranny. Senator Kennedy's continuing advocacy of liberal legislation is fine as far as it goes, but the most brilliantly conceived progressive program will avail us nothing if Smith, Byrd, Eastland, and Company continue to exercise their arbitrary veto power. This is an issue on which Kennedy must speak up boldly. If he does, we suspect a great many liberals might shed their apathy and become active participants instead of indifferent bystanders in the Kennedy campaign.

The 'Jewish Vote'

Is there a "Jewish vote"? Most Jewish leaders insist there isn't. The American Jewish Committee, for example, recently issued a statement sharply denying the existence of a "Jewish bloc vote," and Vice President Nixon and Senator Kennedy promptly concurred in that conclusion. American Jews, the statement asserted, are influenced in elections by "the positions that parties and candidates take on domestic and foreign issues which affect the welfare of all Americans." As evidence that Jews do not even unite behind the candidacy of a fellow Jew, the Committee recalled the New York Senatorial election of 1956 when Mayor Robert Wagner, a Catholic, received greater support from Jewish voters than did Senator Jacob Javits, a Jew, who was elected that year.

While it is true that there is no monolithic Jewish leadership to mobilize bloc voting among Jews, it is equally true that there is a discernible pattern showing that most Jews tend to vote alike. Will Maslow, executive director of the American Jewish Congress, recently cited polls and other studies which showed that Jewish voters were attracted to candidates with liberal and internationalist views.

It is this outlook that had led Jewish voters to contribute heavy majorities to the Democratic Party during the past three decades. But this may not hold so decisively in 1960, according to a comprehensive survey of current Jewish attitudes in New York recently completed by Homer Bigart for the New York *Times*. Bigart found "marked apathy" among Jewish voters. In early September, he wrote, "This group, if it is a group, continues to regard both Vice President Nixon and Senator Kennedy with varying degrees of distrust."

Kennedy and the Jews

Democratic leaders are especially disturbed over the indifference among many Jewish voters because, in pivotal New York State, the more than 2,400,000 Jews constitute nearly fifteen per cent of the population and they have long been counted on to provide a substantial majority of their number for the Democratic Party. What are the sources of the coolness to Kennedy?

Bigart found some Jews disturbed because they feel Kennedy was not militantly identified with the struggle against McCarthy and McCarthyism. Others said they were troubled over Kennedy's Catholicism. One official of a Jewish agency put it this way: "Any Catholic who is a good Catholic might find the church's views in conflict with what he might otherwise concede as being in the public interest."

But by far the greatest cause of uneasiness over Kennedy is the belief, widely circulated among Jews, that the candidate's father, Joseph P. Kennedy, is, or has been, anti-Semitic. The belief is based on the alleged existence of a letter in which the elder Kennedy is supposed to have indicated approval of the Hitler regime while serving as Ambassador to Britain at the time of Munich. The letter purportedly written by the Ambassador, Bigart wrote, was said to have "discounted the necessity of a firm stand by the United States against Hitler and suggested that the Roosevelt Administration overrated the influence of the American Jewish community."

No such letter was ever turned up. A spokesman for that Jewish watchdog, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, said the agency knew nothing about the existence of the letter and suggested that the rumors were based on some captured documents from the German Foreign Office. These documents were not written by Ambassador Kennedy, but by Herbert von Dirksen, the German envoy to London at the time.

In his reports to the German Foreign Office, von Dirksen described conversations with Kennedy in 1938. In his first meeting with the American Ambassador, von Dirksen wrote home, Kennedy expressed sympathy for the Germans and said that the overwhelming majority of Americans wanted peace and friendly relations with Germany.

"The Ambassador," von Dirksen wrote, "then touched upon the Jewish question and stated that it was naturally of great importance to German-American relations. In this connection it was not so much the fact that we wanted to get rid of the Jews that was so harmful to us, but rather the loud clamor with which we accompanied that purpose. He himself understood our Jewish policy completely; he was from Boston and there, in one golf club, and in other clubs, no Jews had been admitted for the past fifty years."

The elder Kennedy, who is spending the campaign in the south of France, dismissed the Dirksen dispatches as "complete poppycock" when the captured Nazi documents were published by the State Department in 1949. He said von Dirksen "must have been trying very hard to set himself right in Germany by telling the German Foreign Office the things he thought they'd like to hear."

Whatever the truth may be, it is undisputed that John Kennedy is paying for what his father is thought to have said nearly a quarter of a century ago. One New York Democratic

Congressman told Bigart: "I have a feeling Kennedy is going to be in real trouble with the Jewish voters." Another, Abraham J. Multer, said he hoped voters "will realize that we don't visit the sins of the father upon the son—assuming there were any sins." This seems to us the only fair and decent approach to the problem.

Nixon and the Jews

If the Jews seem cool toward Kennedy, they hardly seem much enthused about the prospect of having Nixon in the White House. "You hear some talk now of Jews defecting to Nixon," said one Jewish spokesman identified with the attempt to nominate Adlai E. Stevenson, "but I predict they'll shrink back in 'terminal horror' when they confront that Republican lever."

The reasons for rejecting Nixon that turned up most frequently were his lack of liberalism and his identification with what were described as "McCarthyite tactics." In the whispering campaign imputing anti-Semitism to the Vice President the most persistent and widely circulated story dates from his 1950 campaign for U.S. Senator against Helen Gahagan Douglas. Nixon is supposed to have reminded California audiences that Mrs. Douglas "was married to a man named Melvyn Douglas, whose real name is Hesselberg."

The story is not true. The Anti-Defamation League turned a seven-man team loose on the rumor in 1952, the year Nixon first ran for Vice President. It spent five months investigating. It concluded Nixon never uttered the remark attributed to him and, moreover, that he had "manifested no anti-Semitism in the fight."

Responding to questions raised with the League about the attitude of Nixon and Kennedy toward Jews, Henry Edward Schultz, national chairman of the Anti-Defamation League, said: "We believe both men to be wholly free of anti-Semitic bias. Nor is there any question that the two Vice-Presidential candidates are free of such bias."

Low Road

Vice President Nixon's campaign conduct thus far shows marked improvement over his behavior in the past. The tidying-up process, however, does not extend to his lieutenants, some of whom are traveling the low road Nixon used to travel himself. Two recent incidents illustrate how the techniques of the "old Nixon" have been transferred to the team.

Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, one of Nixon's principal hatchet artists and a leading member of the Republicans' "truth squad," recently rose in the Senate to complain that the Kennedy Foundation, a private agency controlled by the Senator and given to good works, had unfairly competed with the State Department in picking up a $100,000 check for the transportation of African students to American universities. This was done, Scott charged, to deprive the Administration of credit for a good deed and to enable Kennedy to curry favor with Negro voters.

The truth, as finally revealed by the State Department itself at the demand of Senator William Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, showed that the Department had refused repeatedly to provide the funds or arrange for the use of Air Force planes, and that it reversed itself only after a campaign aide of Nixon's had exerted extraordinary political pressure. Far from offering the transportation fund as a way of helping Senator Kennedy with Negro voters, the Kennedy Foundation had stipulated that its role was to receive no publicity whatever.

The second illustration represents an even more flagrant violation of ethical conduct. Reporting on an article in the *Saturday Evening Post* by Stewart Alsop, *Battle Line*, official publication of the Republican National Committee, attributed to Alsop the theory that Senator Kennedy's father "has financed and masterminded his son's drive for the White House, as a recompense for his own thwarted Presidential ambitions."

Battle Line proceeded to omit the following sentence from Alsop's article: *"The only thing wrong with the mastermind theory is that it simply isn't true."* (Emphasis added.)

The brazen omission of the significant sentence was intended to convey an impression directly opposite from that meant by Alsop. Nor was this all. The Republican publicists took so many liberties with the truth that the editors of the pro-Republican *Saturday Evening Post*, which is supporting Vice President Nixon, took the unusual step of publicly denouncing the G.O.P. version for containing "a number of distortions and quotations out of context."

Retreat at San Jose

The United States succeeded last month in wringing from its Latin American neighbors a resolution roundly condemning Communist meddling in the Western Hemisphere. The New York *Times* hailed the Declaration of San Jose as a "notable victory" for the United States and most other newspapers played much the same tune. But the editorials did not square with the news stories. The hard facts showed that the United States had been obliged to execute a major retreat at San Jose.

The major goal of the U.S. delegation to the conference of foreign ministers of the Organization of American States was condemnation of Castro's Cuba. But our Latin American neighbors would have none of it; the resolution adopted made no mention of Cuba. The Mexican delegation issued a special statement calling the world's attention to the fact that "in no form does the resolution constitute a condemnation or threat against Cuba, whose aspirations for economic improvement and social justice have the strongest support of the government and people of Mexico."

Why? Why did a conference our government hoped would condemn Castro's Cuba end without mentioning that country? The answer is simply that most Latin Americans are far less interested in Cuba's relationship with the Kremlin than they are in Castro's great social reforms of which they, too, dream for their own countries. The feeling is widespread throughout Latin America that we are too quick to pin Red labels on Castro's program, too slow to understand and identify ourselves with the social revolution of his country.

Many thoughtful Latin Americans complain bitterly that we have turned our back on their deep aspirations for social advances and have sought only to make them military partners in our cold war alliances against Communism. Recently, in a conversation with Senator Wayne Morse of Ore-

gon, the President of Colombia, Albert Lleras Camagro, underscored this Latin mood when he said:

"Our greatest need is land reform, yet the United States will not lend us a single penny for land reform. You'll give us dollars for jet fighters and tanks, but if revolution breaks out in the rural areas and spreads in the hills, all your jets and tanks will be useless. Cuba taught you that."

Many Latin Americans are disturbed, also, by what they fear is the development of an inflexible hardness in the United States toward Castro's Cuba. They were shaken when they learned of the response of the United States to Cuba's offer to negotiate with this country. At the San Jose conference, Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa concluded an otherwise harsh tirade against the United States with a surprise offer to negotiate all outstanding differences. But American officials, the Associated Press reported, dismissed the proposal "as a propaganda gesture designed to becloud the issues." This off-the-cuff rejection of an offer of negotiation is not only morally and politically indefensible, but self-defeating, too, for it plays squarely into the hands of the men in the Kremlin bent on making Cuba the propaganda base for operations in the Western Hemisphere.

The Big Get Bigger

"The crack-down by trust-busters," said a recent issue of the business journal, *Financial World*, "has had little effect so far on the merger trend, which continues to gain momentum." There was a time when mergers consisted largely of two or more firms of small to moderate size joining together to strengthen their position in a competitive market. But the significance of the current trend is that increasingly mergers follow the pattern of already giant corporations swallowing up smaller ones.

Data published by the National Industrial Conference Board, an employers' research agency, reveals several aspects of this trend:

¶ In 1958, 1,116 business units were absorbed by 812 companies; in 1959, the number rose to 1,480 firms acquired by 985 companies.

¶ More than half of the acquiring companies had assets greater than $10 million each.

¶ Forty-two per cent of companies in the hundred million dollar class bought up other firms during 1959.

¶ In the past decade, the number of corporations with assets of more than a billion dollars soared from twelve to twenty-seven.

To join the "Hundred Largest Club," a corporation now needs $378 million in assets, two and a half times the $141 million of 1949.

It seems to us the trend in both the quantity and the nature of business mergers is related to two other trends: the rate of business failures and the rate of business bankruptcies, both of which have more than doubled since 1952.

One of the better-known confidential Washington business services summed up the direction of American business by bluntly stating that "the bigs are gaining at the expense of the smalls. The trend continues . . . and a mere deploring does not stop it." Another commentator, William Shakespeare, made a more telling—and more poetic—judgment: "It is excellent to have a giant's strength but it is tyrannous to use it like a giant."

Peace, and Rumors of Peace

Wars, and rumors of wars, have become such a steady, and heady, diet of American newspaper readers that editors seem reluctant to find space for news of peace or hopeful prospects of peace.

Thus, few American dailies took the trouble to report that India and Pakistan had settled a twelve-year-old dispute over the waters of the river Indus, which flows through both nations. This is exciting news—the kind the world has been waiting for. But when it happens nobody—or almost nobody—pays any attention.

Perhaps it was because an agreement concerning the use of the water of some muddy old river seemed trivial. But the settlement of the Indus River basin dispute can be described as nothing less than momentous:

¶ The treaty is the result of twelve years of off-and-on-again discussions between two nations still steeped in the bitterness of a religious civil war.

¶ The agreement was negotiated by the World Bank, which until recently has been a relatively neglected stepchild of the United Nations. The Bank will play a major role in the ten-year, one-and-a-third-billion-dollar development that will result from the water treaty.

¶ The settlement opens the way to the irrigation of thirty million acres of land on the India-Pakistan border—more than all the irrigated land in the United States.

¶ The additional prospect of a negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute opens the door to an easing of the enormous military expense which has seriously hampered the desperately needed economic development of both nations.

The long-range importance of the Indus River treaty can scarcely be exaggerated. It is one of the most hopeful—if least publicized—accomplishments of our time.

Statistical Affluence

It has already become a part of contemporary American folklore that ours is The Affluent Society. Statistics are readily produced to prove that the United States has the capacity, within this generation, not only to wipe out poverty but to guarantee to all its citizens a standard of living—in material comfort, health, and education—beyond anything the human race has ever experienced. Collectively—and this is the most common way of citing our well-being—we are the world's most wealthy nation of all time.

But we don't live collectively. We live singly or in families. And the presence of poverty and the disparity of wealth among individuals and families within our so-called Affluent Society is glaringly revealed when an occasional knife tears through the all-inclusive fabric of national statistics.

A recent tear came in the form of a report by the Department of Labor which presented a "model budget" designed to provide a city worker, with a wife and two children, "a modest but adequate level of living." The budget is based on current costs in twenty representative cities, East and West, North and South. In round numbers, the budget averages out at $6,000 a year— *an amount above the income of roughly seventy-five per cent of last year's Federal income taxpayers.*

The "average" income in 1959—$6,520—was comfortably above the Labor Department's budget. But "averages" are dangerously deceptive. According to Department of Commerce reports, there were more than fifty-five million individuals and families in the United States whose incomes were below this figure, most of them drastically lower.

The fifth of the population with the lowest incomes received less than five per cent of total family income. The fifth in the highest income bracket received more than forty-five per cent. In dollars, the lowest fifth averaged a $1,460 income, while the highest fifth received an average of $14,250—ten times more than the lowest income group.

To point the disparity in income even more sharply, the top five per cent of families enjoyed more than twenty per cent of total family income, an average of $25,280 per family.

Since 1945, the proportionate improvement in income of the lowest fifth has dropped off, in comparison with the preceding decade. Between 1945 and 1958, the average real income rise of the neediest fifth of our families was a meager $80. For the top five per cent, it was $1,800.

"The test of our progress," said Franklin D. Roosevelt, "is not whether we add to the abundance of those who have much; it is whether we provide for those who have little."

By any reasonable standard, we are failing that test. The seventy-five per cent of American families whose income falls below the Department of Labor's "model budget" must feel like second-class citizens of The Affluent Society. The seven and a half million families who "enjoy" an income of less than $2,000 a year must feel like aliens.

Horn of Plenty

The total investment in America's agricultural industry is equal to four-fifths the current assets of all corporations in the United States. Agriculture employs sixteen million people off the farm in addition to the more than seven million workers on farms and ranches. We have grown from a nation in which one of every four workers was required to produce food (as in Russia today) to one in which each farmer is efficiently producing food for twenty-four consumers.

These are random bits of information plucked from a fascinating new 736-page book, *Food, the Yearbook of Agriculture, 1959,* available from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D.C., for $2.25. *Food* is overflowing, as is America's food supply itself, with facts about every conceivable aspect of food—nutrients, needs, quality, preparation, costs, trends, and even recipes.

American agriculture is rich, efficient, productive beyond the world's dreams, and becoming more productive at an accelerating rate. Yet, paradoxically, the farmer himself is economically sick, and his plight is getting worse rather than better. Some of the grains of information gleaned from *Food* may provide insight into, if not solutions for, this most baffling of all American economic problems.

¶ We are eating better all the time: in 1959, as compared with 1935, each of us ate 160 pounds of meat instead of 127; thirty-five pounds of poultry as compared with sixteen; 428 pounds of dairy products as against 393.

¶ Most people of the world spend half their income for food. We spent only twenty-one per cent of our income for food last year, leaving more for housing, medical care, education, and recreation.

¶ Of every $20 we spend for groceries, $1.50 to $2 goes for packaging.

¶ Income has risen faster than the cost of groceries. An hour's work in a factory buys more food today than in 1929: seventeen pints of milk instead of eight; three dozen rather than fifteen oranges; more than two pounds of round steak versus one pound four ounces.

¶ Food prices have risen less since 1947 than most other consumer items in the cost-of-living index.

But while the nation enjoys the benefits of a lavish agricultural economy, the farmer is paying an unfair proportion of the bill. The farmer's share of the food dollar in 1959 was only thirty-eight cents, down from forty cents in 1940, and from fifty-three cents in 1945. Of twenty cents paid by the consumer last year for a loaf of bread, the farmer received less than three cents.

¶ Per capita income of the farm population was $965, compared with non-farm income of $2,216.

Caught in the squeeze of higher costs and lower prices, farmers have closed part of the gap by increasing production efficiency at an unprecedented rate—two and a half times that of industry generally. One hour of farm labor now produces four times as much food as in 1920. Furthermore, it is expected that in 1975, the predicted population of 230 million people will be fed from the same acreage now under cultivation.

Who Owns the Corporations?

It has become fashionable in the advertising and public relations activities of large corporations to emphasize the widespread ownership of stock in these giant industries. The implication is that General Motors, American Telephone and Telegraph, and General Electric are not really colossal near-monopolies administered by a small, tightly-held board of directors for the benefit of a handful of investors, but rather large-scale, friendly businesses of which almost everybody owns a slice. This comforting image has little relationship to reality.

It is perfectly true that some of the largest corporations number their stockholders in the hundreds of thousands. But it is also true that eighty-six per cent of American families own no corporate stock.

A report of the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center shows that intensive advertising by business and stockbrokers has considerably enlarged the circle of stock-holding families in recent years—although as yet only one in seven families is included. But these new holdings are spread deceptively thin: Three-fifths of all stockholders own less than $5,000 each in stocks, and a great number of these hold only a few token shares in a single corporation. At the other end of the scale, one in fifty families owns more than $25,000 in stock.

As we reported here in July, the overall trend since 1949 has been toward fewer people holding a greater share of all the nation's wealth. The richest two per cent own more than a third of all our country's wealth, while the poorest third possesses only one per cent.

THE CASE AGAINST NIXON

by MORRIS H. RUBIN

I do not like thee, Dr. Fell,
The reason why I cannot tell;
But this I know, and know full well,
I do not like thee, Dr. Fell.

THE quatrain above turns up occasionally in the biographical literature on Vice President Richard Milhaus Nixon. It is used to convey the notion that while a great many Americans do not like Nixon, they are unable to account for the cause of their dislike. Recently, for example, the *Wall Street Journal* complained that its reporters "have turned up with a surprisingly large residue of 'I don't know why but I just don't like him' feeling." A New York *Times* survey earlier in the year yielded much the same result.

Among those who do have a reason for their rejection of the man, the word tricky turns up most frequently. One of his friends among the Washington correspondents, Richard Wilson, wrote in *Look* some time ago that the biggest problem facing Nixon "is to overcome the impression in some groups, particularly those who think of themselves as intellectuals, that some undefined tricky quality in Nixon makes him unsuited for the Presidency." Wilson added: "Those who like Nixon recognize that many people have formed this impression of him, but they cannot understand why."

An understanding of why "many people" think of the Vice President as "tricky Dick" is not too difficult to come by, it seems to me. The "undefined tricky quality" gets itself defined in the process of reading the record, and I suspect that a considerable number of Americans are more familiar with at least portions of Nixon's record than the pundits who fall back on the Dr. Fell rhyme may realize.

Most Americans would agree, I think, that Nixon is intelligent, industrious, and resourceful, but many of those who reject him are convinced that he has channeled these qualities into a pattern of political behavior that relies mostly on maneuvers and manipulation—a kind of political sleight-of-hand that frequently results in words and deeds of doubtful morality, especially as they tend to range him on both sides of controversial issues. He is cunning rather than creative, quick to reach conclusions but incapable of developing convictions. Despite his obsequious efforts to please everyone, he remains for many a mechanical man with a forced smile and contrived manner. He has an uncanny capacity for igniting conflict and on major public issues dragging debate to the gutter of bitter personal squabbling.

The late Senator Robert A. Taft had grave misgivings about Nixon on some of these counts. In his recent biography of the Vice President, *The Facts about Nixon,* William Costello wrote:

"Some of Nixon's excesses have been excused by friends on the plea that he is ambitious. Senator Robert A. Taft, a public servant whose conscience yielded nothing to his political ambitions, was one who rejected that defense. After the 1952 convention, in conversation with Joseph Polowsky, a friend and supporter, Taft spoke of Nixon regretfully as 'a little man in a big hurry,' noted that he had a 'mean and vindictive streak' when frustrated, and summed up his personality as one tending to 'radiate tension and conflict.' The Senator expressed a fervent hope that circumstances would never permit Nixon to accede to the Presidency."

The "undefined tricky quality," of which *Look's* Wilson wrote, becomes readily definable when one examines Nixon's career in detail. I for one emerged with the conclusion that there is not one Nixon, but two Nixons, who have a habit, when dealing with controversial issues, of trying to keep both sides happy and provide everyone with something favorable to quote. Thus:

- There is the Nixon whom Wilson characterized as a "liberal Republican" but there is also the Nixon the *Wall Street Journal* embraces as a "conservative Republican."
- There is a Nixon who was pro-McCarthy, but the trail also leads to a Nixon who was anti-McCarthy.
- There is the Nixon who criticized the war in Korea, but there is the Nixon who insisted that war in Korea was the only way to stop Communism.
- There is the Nixon who advocated sending American boys to fight in Indo-China, but there is also the Nixon who argued, afterward, that the Eisenhower Administration deserved credit for standing against the shedding of American blood in Indo-China.
- There is the Nixon who spoke up for increased foreign economic aid, but there is the ubiquitous twin who pointed with pride because the Republicans had achieved "economy" in reducing the appropriation for foreign economic aid.
- And then there are the most irreconcilable of the Nixon twins—the Nixon who argu for "the moral values that have made us great" and

the Nixon who has made duplicity and distortion the hallmarks of his political campaigns.

Perhaps no phase of Nixon's career has done more to earn him the soubriquet of "tricky Dick" than his conduct as a political campaigner. Anyone who reads the record, it seems to me, cannot escape the conclusion that he has violated every principle of decency and fair play. Wilson, his admirer, wrote of the "vigor of his attack" and his "heavy blows." But they were dirty blows, packing a poisonous dose of slanderous innuendo. If the blows had vigor, it was the vigor of a tricky viciousness, not the vigor of a militant, forthright fight for principle.

This is a harsh judgment, I know, but the record confirms it.

It was in his first venture in politics as a young man of thirty-three in 1946, that Nixon developed the technique of campaigning that was to be his badge of identification in subsequent campaigns. The technique consisted largely of impugning his opponent's integrity and loyalty, not by direct accusation supported by facts, but by a subtle and slippery combination of words and ideas in a single sentence or paragraph that would leave his audience with the impression that he had proved his opponent guilty of dishonesty and disloyalty.

Jerry Voorhis, who had served five terms as Democratic Congressman in the district, was Nixon's 1946 opponent. Voorhis, an earnest, hard-working, dedicated New Dealer, was unassailably anti-Communist. There was literally nothing in his record that disclosed the slightest sympathy for any Communist ideology or method. *People's World*, the West Coast Communist paper, complained bitterly that *"Voorhis is against unity with Communists on any issue under any circumstances."*

Nixon knew Voorhis' record, but he consistently refused to fight him on the issues and refused to discuss the Voorhis record in behalf of the New Deal. Instead, Nixon sought repeatedly to pin the red label on Voorhis by building his campaign around the slogan: "A vote for Nixon is a vote against the PAC [and] its Communist principles." The fact that the Political Action Committee had refused to endorse Voorhis precisely because he was so unequivocally anti-Communist did not in the slightest deter Nixon from referring repeatedly to "the PAC candidate and his Communist friends."

In this first of his campaigns the youthful Nixon embarked on a stratagem that he was to employ in every campaign thereafter—holding himself up as the man to save the country from those who would strangle it with socialism. "A vote for Nixon," he would cry, "is a vote against socialization of free American institutions . . . [Voorhis] has consistently supported the socialization of free American institutions." Never in the campaign did Nixon attempt to document this false accusation.

But this was only a beginning. Four years later, when he ran for the Senate against Helen Gahagan Douglas, Nixon sharpened his technique. Again his principal weapon was a calculated campaign to pin the red label on an opponent whose anti-Communist credentials were unassailable and whose record in Congress had been denounced by the Communists as that of a "capitalist warmonger."

In this campaign the principal piece of Nixon campaign literature was the "pink sheet." It began with these words: "Many persons have requested a comparison of the voting records for Congresswoman Helen Douglas and the notorious Communist Party liner, Congressman Vito Marcantonio of New York."

Nashville Tennessean

We Have to Face the Possibility

Now, Marcantonio was indeed a follower of the Communist Party line, as Mrs. Douglas was clearly not. The attempt to find "a comparison" was an obvious maneuver to smear her by planting false impressions in the voters' minds, by fraudulently associating her record with that of a notorious Communist Party liner.

Observe now how Nixon's "pink sheet" threaded its way through a jungle of innuendo, half-truths, and downright distortion:

"Mrs. Douglas and Marcantonio have been members of Congress together since January 1, 1945. During that time Mrs. Douglas voted the same as Marcantonio 354 times. While it should not be expected that a member of the House of Representatives shall always be in opposition to Marcantonio, it is significant to note, not only the *great number of times* which Mrs. Douglas voted in agreement with him, but also the issues on which almost without exception they always saw eye to eye, to wit: Un-American activities and internal security."

Then, after exploring some of these votes and shamelessly referring to "the Douglas-Marcantonio Axis," as though its case were proven, the "pink sheet" exhorted its readers:

"Remember! The United States Senate votes on ratifying international treaties and confirming Presidential appointments. Would California send Marcantonio to the United States Senate?"

The official record reveals the extent of the deceit involved in this kind of Nixon campaigning. In the first place, of the 354 votes which found Mrs. Douglas and Marcantonio voting the same way, most were on relatively minor, non-controversial matters on which there was substantial agreement among all factions. Nixon himself frequently voted on the same side as did Marcantonio in many of these instances—112 times, to be exact.

Editorial Research Reports, a highly respected reference source, determined that there were seventy-six "outstanding" roll call votes in the House during the five-year period covered by the "pink sheet." On sixty-six of these Mrs. Douglas and Marcantonio voted the same way but

so did *a majority of the House itself, Republicans and Democrats alike,* in some cases; or a majority of the Democratic members in other cases.

As for the thirteen occasions on which the Douglas and Marcantonio votes coincided but were not part of either a House or Democratic majority, nine dealt with such issues as housing, rent control, price controls, and the like. Only two were concerned with matters of "internal security" and here Mrs. Douglas voted the sentiments of countless anti-Communist American liberals. She voted against the Mundt-Nixon Communist Control bill and against overriding President Truman's veto of the Communist Subversive Control bill. On the first she had the company of fifty-seven other Democrats and Republicans and on the second forty-seven others of both parties. On issues of foreign policy, Mrs. Douglas voted with the majority adhering to the bipartisan program on all occasions but one. She voted against the Greek-Turkish aid bill because she felt that the United Nations ought to decide the issue of aid to Turkey and because she wanted aid to Greece to carry the requirement that the Greek government agree to hold free elections soon.

Nixon defeated Mrs. Douglas—in large measure because he succeeded in making the big lie prevail.

Two years later Nixon was campaigning for another office—this time for the Vice Presidency as General Eisenhower's running mate. Here again the familiar pattern appeared. Nixon's principal mission in the campaign was to plant and spread doubt of the loyalty and patriotism of those who opposed him. Adlai Stevenson, he cried, had disqualified himself for public trust by going "down the line for the arch-traitor of our generation"—Alger Hiss.

The simple facts were these: Stevenson, while governor of Illinois, had been requested to testify regarding Hiss' reputation during the latter's trial for perjury. Stevenson refused because of the burden of official duties. He was then requested to give a sworn statement, which he did. He had known Hiss only slightly. Asked to say whether Hiss' reputation for "integrity, loyalty, and veracity" was



"See the Difference?"

"good or bad," Stevenson replied that Hiss' *reputation* was good. And indeed it had been, as witness the fact that John Foster Dulles had hired Hiss and parted with him most reluctantly, and that two justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, Stanley Reed and Felix Frankfurter, testified, as did Stevenson, that his *reputation* was good.

And yet in Nixon's campaign strategy this simple act of testifying truthfully as to Hiss' reputation became "a belief in Hiss' loyalty, veracity, and integrity," and this in turn became so monstrous a crime and so complete a process of going "down the line for the arch-traitor of our generation" as forever to disqualify Stevenson for "public trust." Sometimes in that campaign Nixon would even indulge in such shoddy language as calling Stevenson "Adlai the appeaser, who got a Ph. D. from Dean Acheson's College of Cowardly Communist Containment."

Nor was this all. Although Nixon and his apologists have denied that he accused President Harry Truman of being a "traitor," the truth is that he artfully conveyed that impression to countless Americans by his sleight-of-hand juggling of words. The Associated Press reported Oct. 27, 1952, for example, that "Senator Richard M. Nixon told a Texas-Arkansas crowd that President Truman and Adlai E. Stevenson are 'traitors to the high principles' of the Democratic Party. He said they tolerated and defended Communists in the government." On another occasion Nixon charged that "Mr. Truman . . . for political reasons covered up [the] Communist conspiracy [in the United States] and attempted to halt its exposure."

It is somewhat startling to observe how official Republican leadership responded to the charge that Nixon had accused former President Truman and the Democratic Party of treacherously permitting Communists to undermine our government. It was in *defense* of Nixon that Chairman Leonard Hall of the Republican National Committee cited the following Nixon statement made in Utica, N.Y., October 18, 1952:

"I charge that the buried record will show that Mr. Truman and his associates, either through stupidity or political expediency, were primarily responsible for the unimpeded growth of Communist conspiracy within the United States. I further charge that Mr. Truman, Dean Acheson, and other Administration officials for political reasons covered up this Communist conspiracy and attempted to halt its exposure."

As Paul Butler, then chairman of the Democratic National Committee, said, "If that's not calling Mr. Truman a traitor [accusing him of covering up a Communist conspiracy for political reasons], what is?"

Frequently during this and the 1954 campaign Nixon's language was so harsh and sweeping that his campaign aides were obliged to take newsmen aside afterward to modify or clarify what their candidate had intended to say. Thus, in Oil City, Pennsylvania, in 1952, Nixon said that President Eisenhower would have only one test: "Is it good for America?"

"Compare that," he said, "with Harry Truman, Harry Vaughan, RFC Dawson, O'Dwyer, and all the rest of these crooks and these incompetents."

When reporters asked James Bassett, Nixon's press secretary, if Nixon had intended to call the President of the United States a crook, Bassett's bland response was that there were crooks and incompetents in the Administration, but that Truman was one of the incompetents. This may have been what Bassett thought Nixon meant to say, but clearly it wasn't what Nixon did say.

Scandal brushed briefly against Nixon during the 1952 campaign. A

startled nation was informed by the press that between November 1950 and August 1952, a powerful group of wealthy California business interests had contributed $18,235—an average of $870 per month—for the direct support of Nixon and his family. President Eisenhower shared the nation's concern, but after an extraordinarily clever television presentation to the nation—as slick a performance as was ever devised on Madison Avenue for soap or cereals—Nixon earned from the President the exuberant applause: "He's my boy." An analysis of the Nixon speech and the relevant facts of his political career hardly seem to justify the President's delight. For example:

● Nixon insisted that "not one cent" of the money "ever went for my personal use." But the fact has been established that it was precisely this fund which enabled Nixon to make the down payment on his Washington home.

● Nixon said that "Never . . . have I made a telephone call . . . nor have I gone to a [government] agency" in behalf of a contributor. But the official records show that Nixon interceded with the Justice Department on behalf of Dana Smith, the businessman who headed the fund, in a tax case involving a possible $500,000 to $600,000 rebate.

● Nixon claimed that the fund was used for "expenses I didn't think should be charged to the taxpayers of the United States." But Nixon failed to say that the fund was used for things that could not by law be charged to the taxpayers anyway—such as personal plane trips for Nixon and the printing of Nixon's personal Christmas cards.

● Nixon argued that "no contributor to any of my campaigns has ever received any consideration . . ." If this is true, it is a remarkable coincidence that Nixon's voting record in Congress bore a striking resemblance to the needs and desires of those who supported him. As Dana Smith put it: "[Earl] Warren has too much the social point of view for the people behind Dick. We couldn't go for Warren, but Dick did just what we wanted him to." It is clear from the record that Smith knew what he was talking about. For example:

One—Real estate men gave thirty-six per cent of the fund. (Throughout his record in the House and Senate Nixon voted consistently for the position of the real estate lobby: he voted against public housing, farm housing, middle income housing, and slum clearance, and he led the fight to kill public housing in Los Angeles.)

Two—Manufacturing and distribution interests gave nineteen per cent of the fund. (Nixon voted to save U.S. corporations 500 million dollars by delaying a tax increase for three months; voted for Taft-Hartley; voted to outlaw industry-wide bargaining for labor; voted to exclude one million workers from minimum wage coverage.)

Three—Oil interests gave nineteen per cent of the fund. (Nixon voted to give the offshore "tidelands," which the Supreme Court had held to be Federal lands, to the coastal states.)

It was in the 1954 campaign that Nixon began to use the venal device of claiming there were secret blueprints and secret memoranda which proved that the Democrats, if returned to control of Congress, would socialize the nation's economy and work with the Communists.

When the Eisenhower Administration took over from the Democrats, Nixon charged, "We found in the files a blueprint for socializing America. This dangerous, well-oiled scheme contains plans for adding forty billion dollars to the national debt by 1956." It included plans, he asserted, "for socialized medicine, socialized housing, socialized agriculture, socialized water and power, and socialized atomic energy."

The New York *Times* reported, but many American dailies failed to include this highly significant bit of intelligence: "Mr. Nixon's press officer said later—[too late to get into the original news story]—that the Vice President was not referring to any specific documents in using the term 'blueprint,' but was using figurative language to describe the philosophy and proposals of President Truman."

So it turned out there was no blueprint at all. Still, Nixon continued to tell audiences throughout the country that the Republicans had discovered this "blueprint"—and there was no further reference to figurative language.

In a speech at Butte, Montana, October 22, 1954, Nixon announced to his audience that he had in his possession a "secret memorandum" to California Democrats, directing them to "fight out the issues within the ranks of the Democratic Party." This secret document, he charged, proved that the Communist Party was "determined to conduct its program within the Democratic Party." Nixon did not then, nor on any other occasion when he mentioned this "secret memorandum," unzip his briefcase to show it to his audience or the press. It simply did not exist.

It was also during this campaign of 1954 that Nixon took a straightforward statement by Adlai Stevenson and sought by cunning use of language to leave an impression quite opposite from that clearly intended by Stevenson. Speaking in Beverly Hills, Nixon said:

"Mr. Stevenson has been guilty, probably without being aware that he was doing so [a recurring Nixon device—to seem to be charitable while cutting a man's throat], of spreading pro-Communist propaganda as he has attacked with violent fury the economic system of the United States and praised the Soviet economy. He said recently, 'While the American economy has been shrinking, the Soviet economy has been growing fast, which is one of the most important facts in the world situation. In the long run it is probably a more important fact than the development of Soviet military power.'

"Whatever Mr. Stevenson's purpose

may be, such statements of praise for the Soviet economy do the cause of the free world great damage. His dislike for our own economic system is his own business, but when he links such criticism with praise of the rapid growth of the Soviet economy he is performing a great disservice to us and the rest of the free world."

Now, when Stevenson made his original comment, which Nixon tore out of context, he was *not* praising the Soviet system or expressing dislike of our own, but he was noting, and expressing grave concern over, the undisputed fact that the Soviet economy was expanding greatly while ours, in the brief period of business recession in 1954, had been contracting. Far from "performing a great disservice to us and the rest of the free world," Stevenson was alerting the nation to a grave challenge by expressing the statesmanlike conviction that the United States needed to expand its economy to meet the challenge of Soviet growth, and that in this era economic power might well be more important than military power in the struggle between East and West. From this clear position expressed by Stevenson, Nixon tortured words and distorted ideas in order to leave with his audience the charge that Stevenson preferred the Soviet economy to our own.

A curious footnote to this shabby performance by Nixon is the fact that nearly four years later the Vice President adopted precisely the same position that he found so pro-Communist when taken by Stevenson. Speaking to the American Newspaper Publishers Association in April, 1958, Nixon said: "The Soviet economy is growing faster than ours. We must recognize that economic competition between the free world and the Communist world may well decide the world conflict . . . We hear much today of the great strength of the Soviet Union. I have never been one to discount this strength. It would be fatal to under-estimate it . . . We cannot afford to stand still."

A striking example of the Vice President's slippery method of campaigning revolved around Nixon's constantly repeated claim throughout the campaign of 1954 that "the Eisenhower Administration has kicked out the Communists and fellow travelers and security risks not by the hundreds but by the thousands." In a speech, at Rock Island, Illinois, October 21, 1954, he used a specific figure—6,926 security risks fired from Federal service by President Eisenhower; among that number, he charged, were "members of the Communist Party."

When Democrats replied that Nixon was a liar in charging that Communists had been kicked out by the thousands and that only a few of the thousands were suspected of being subversives, Nixon aides suavely explained he meant to emphasize the words "security risks," which, of course, includes those who talk too much or drink too much without having the slightest association with Communists or fellow travelers.

The official records show that Nixon's claims were false—and it is difficult to believe that Nixon was unaware of the facts. The truth is—and again it is difficult to believe that Nixon did not know it—that the Eisenhower Administration *was unable to uncover a single Communist in the entire Federal establishment.* Philip Young, the Eisenhower-appointed chairman of the Civil Service Commission, testified he knew of *no government employe who had been fired for being a Communist or fellow-traveler.* Some time later, Young revealed that an analysis of the 3,746 employes—half the number cited by Nixon—who were dismissed or who resigned for security reasons from the inauguration of the Eisenhower security program until mid-1955 showed fully 41.2 per cent *had been appointed to their posts by the Eisenhower Administration.* Subsequently a Senate investigating committee reported that fifty-three per cent had been hired by the present Republican Administration.

Herblock in the Washington Post

"Well, Look Who's Here"

But facts that belied his charges did not deter Nixon from his mission as Republican hatchet-man in the 1954 campaign. He not only claimed credit for firing non-existent Communists and fellow-travelers in the Federal service, but he warned that if a Democratic Congress were elected "the security risks which have been fired by the Eisenhower Administration will be hired back." This prediction was preposterous, of course, for except for its own staff, Congress does not make appointments to the Federal civil service, nor does it prescribe the security regulations which govern the executive department in its hiring of employes. The Democrats did in fact capture Congress, but of course there was no re-hiring of "security risks."

Here, clearly, is an unchanging pattern of behavior from 1946 through 1954 that embodies most of the worst ingredients of McCarthyism. In fact, Nixon's use of the big lie, the sly innuendo, and guilt by association to club his opponents with the charge of being disloyal, treasonable, or "soft on Communism" antedates the outbreak of the epidemic of McCarthyism. Joseph R. McCarthy was still an unknown candidate for a first term in the Senate when Nixon pinned the red label on so dedicated an anti-Communist as Jerry Voorhis.

Nixon's relationship to McCarthy, like so many other phases of the Vice President's public career, is hard to define. He flitted about from one position to another, helping McCarthy on some occasions, criticizing him, mildly, on others. Nixon was largely responsible for the Eisenhower Administration policy—or lack of policy—on McCarthy. Martin Merson, in his *Private Diary of a Public Servant,* made it clear that Nixon not only was telling appointed officials how they should behave with McCarthy, but that it was necessary to get

his permission on whether an Administration official should or should not bother McCarthy with the request for an appointment.

When McCarthy usurped the functions of the State Department and negotiated an agreement with Greek shipping interests on the China trade, Harold Stassen threatened to kick up a fuss and oppose McCarthy for "undermining the State Department." It was Nixon who persuaded Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to repudiate Stassen with a statement lauding McCarthy's "contribution to the American cause." As Robert Donovan of the New York *Herald Tribune* reported in his semi-official *Eisenhower: The Inside Story*, "almost before the echoes of his testimony had died away he [Stassen] was cut off from the rear. At Nixon's suggestion Dulles received McCarthy at the State Department and assured the Senator that he had acted in the national interest."

It was Nixon, too, who arranged that chicken dinner in the spring of 1954 at which Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens capitulated to McCarthy's demands—although Nixon, to be sure, could not foresee that the public humiliation of Stevens would boomerang into the Army-McCarthy hearings which engrossed the nation that year.

It was Nixon, again, who tendered a helping hand to McCarthy in the hour of his greatest reverse. It was Nixon who amended the "Resolution of Censure" adopted by the Senate to read simply "Resolution." This alteration is of more than academic interest, for nowhere but in the title had the word "censure" appeared.

In his *Eisenhower: The Inside Story*, Donovan makes it clear that President Eisenhower had no conscious strategy in relation to McCarthy, but that it was Nixon who kept him from taking a decisive stand on the occasions of the greatest McCarthy provocation. Donovan confirms the fact from official papers that there were bitter quarrels in the White House over McCarthy. Thus, when in November 1953, McCarthy attacked Administration foreign policy, "he [President Eisenhower] was torn by conflicting advice. His friend and former political lieutenant, Paul G. Hoffman, chairman of the board of the Studebaker-Packard Corporation, for instance, was urging him to let McCarthy have it with both barrels. Contrary advice come from the Vice President." It was Nixon's advice that prevailed.

In his book, *Nixon*, Ralph de Toledano, friend and admirer of both Nixon and McCarthy, points out that "Nixon felt a certain responsibility for McCarthy or for any other individual who took up the fight against Communism." Nixon made his own files available to McCarthy and "McCarthy gratefully accepted," we are told.

Nixon eventually broke with McCarthy, but again for curiously Nixonian reasons. It was McCarthy's ineptitude, not his immorality, that disturbed the Vice President. It was the political huckster rather than the man of "deep religious conviction" who was troubled enough to jettison the Senator from Wisconsin. For, as his admiring biographer tells us, Nixon said: "McCarthy's intentions were right, but his tactics were, frankly, so inept at times that he probably did our cause more harm than good." This is Nixon's most withering comment on McCarthy and McCarthyism—"inept."

One of the most significant aspects of Nixon's political career is his unpopularity with his fellow Republican leaders in California, many of whom regard him as tricky, unde-

pendable, and overly ambitious. In 1955, Senator William F. Knowland, California's senior Senator, said: "I do not consider a Pepsodent smile, a ready quip, an actor's perfection with lines, nor an ability to avoid issues as qualifications for high office."

Knowland had seen Nixon in action at close range during the maneuvering which led to General Eisenhower's choice of Nixon for his running mate in 1952. The California delegation to the Republican National Convention was pledged to the then Governor Earl Warren. Warren's great hope at the convention was based on the prospect of a deadlock between the two principal contenders, Eisenhower and Taft. The California strategy, agreed to by all delegates, including Nixon, was that this large delegation show no preference for Eisenhower or Taft because to do so might throw the convention to the one preferred and rob Warren of any opportunity to make a real fight for the nomination.

Although Nixon had agreed to this approach, he proceeded to send thousands of letters to California Republicans requesting them to indicate whom they would prefer if Warren could not have the nomination. Warren and his supporters regarded this as a wholly disloyal performance. So great was the outcry that the results of the Nixon-conducted ballot were not disclosed to the public.

Later, Nixon boarded the Warren campaign train at Denver to inform delegation leaders that there was just about no chance for a deadlock. As *Life* reported in 1954 in a debate on Nixon's qualifications, "Warren's friends felt that this was deliberate sabotage. These actions, followed by Nixon's nomination for the Vice Presidency, convinced them that Nixon had not merely failed to honor his pledge to work for Warren, but had in fact worked against him in hope of political reward from the pro-Eisenhower forces."

Knowland, chairman of the delegation, had had similar opportunities to advance his own political fortunes at the convention. He was several times approached by emissaries of the late Senator Taft offering him the Vice Presidential nomination if he would exert his influence to move the California delegation to Taft. But Knowland, an honorable conservative, refused to be a party to such a scheme. As *Life* observed, "Having thus honored his own pledge, his friends say, [Knowland] found Nixon's purely nominal support of Warren, if not downright dis-

loyalty toward him, all the more offensive."

Nixon's nimbleness in political infighting showed up again two years later when California Republican leaders were choosing a vice chairman of the California State Central Committee. The three factions of California Republicanism, headed by Nixon, Knowland, and Governor Goodwin Knight, agreed on the selection of Knight's friend, Howard Ahmanson. With assurances from all concerned that the election would go as planned, Knight left on a yachting trip honeymoon. Immediately thereafter, Nixon's followers began soliciting Central Committee members in an effort to defeat Ahmanson. Knight rushed back from his honeymoon. Knowland flew to California from Washington. The Nixon maneuver was smothered, but again it left a bad taste in the mouths of those who had worked closest with Nixon in his home state.

Nixon has frequently said that a candidate's record of voting on the major issues ought to be the dominant consideration in determining "how he might approach an international or a national problem." But when one seeks to apply that test to Nixon's voting record, he finds himself stumbling through a wilderness of contradictions.

The overriding fact that emerges from an examination of hundreds of roll calls in which Nixon was recorded in the House and the Senate is that, as James Reston wrote for the New York *Times*, "You can prove anything by Nixon's voting record." The reason is not hard to come by. William Costello summed it up, in his heavily documented *The Facts about Nixon*, when he wrote: "Almost from the start Nixon showed a grasp of the opportunistic art of voting on one side of the fence while a bill was being amended and perfected, and then switching to the other side or being conveniently absent when the measure came to a final vote."

Nixon's speeches often betray this same quality. Thus, in a major address in Chicago earlier this year, he extolled the achievements of the Eisenhower Administration, but he was quick to carve out a spacious escape corridor in each instance. Two examples:

- American agriculture under the Eisenhower Administration, the Vice president said, has become the most productive on earth, *but* "there is no higher priority than a complete overhauling of obsolete farm programs."
- The American educational system is now the best in the world, he argued, *but* "inadequate classrooms, underpaid teachers, and flabby standards are weaknesses we must constantly strive to eliminate." (Hardly a week later, Nixon broke a Senate tie vote and killed a measure providing for Federal aid to education.)

Still, despite the twists and turns that clutter up the record, it is possible to piece together a discernible pattern in Nixon's career. That pattern reveals a reasonably consistent devotion to the demands of the nation's special interests—the real estate lobby, the private power trust, the oil crowd, and the country's most affluent taxpayers.

Thus, in the field of taxation, he voted twice during his first year in the House for income tax reductions favoring those in the higher brackets. A year later he voted the same way. In 1950 he opposed higher corporation taxes. When he went to the Senate in 1951, he supported a ninety-day tax windfall of $500,000,000 for corporations, and that same week he voted against plugging the largest loophole in the Federal tax system, the oil depletion allowance.

Nixon's position in the critical area of taxation remains unchanged. Recently, for example, *Business Week* reported that the Vice President "favors cutting taxes on business to get more growth." Two years ago, *U.S. News & World Report*, commenting on a speech by Nixon in Boston, reported: "Nixon proposes tax relief for business and for individuals in the upper income brackets." He would "reduce rates on corporations and high income people." At the same time Nixon advocated a "general sales tax" of one and one-half per cent which would be "added to the factory price of manufactured products"—regarded as one of the most regressive of all sales taxes.

In the field of housing and rent control, Nixon sided invariably with the real estate interests. Although one of its sponsors was "Mr. Republican" himself, Nixon opposed the Taft-Wagner-Ellender public housing bill in 1948. The following year he maintained his opposition to Federal housing legislation for low-income Americans by voting against an omnibus public housing, slum clearance, and farm housing program. When he went to the Senate, he supported crippling amendments to the public housing program in both 1951 and 1952.

Nixon's record in the utility area discloses an almost unbroken series of votes in behalf of the private power interests. Twice, in 1948 and 1952, he opposed authorization for the Tennessee Valley Authority to construct supplementary steam plants for power production. On one or two occasions he cast a vote for REA legislation, but mostly he was aligned with those who would curtail rather than expand one of the most useful and successful programs in our time. He voted to limit the extension of the Southwest Power Administration, and he opposed funds for power development and tranmission lines in the Missouri Valley and at Bonneville.

The same pattern holds for the oil interests. In 1948 and again in 1952 he approved the cession of the tidelands oil properties to the states. In 1949 he responded to the wishes of the oil industry by voting to exempt the independent producers of natural gas from regulation by the Federal Power Commission.

Nixon often speaks in a friendly

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tone of the need for social welfare legislation. On a few occasions he has voted that way, but the rest of the record is negative. Thus, he voted for several measures broadening social security, but reversed himself by opposing the inclusion of 750,000 additional workers in the system. Three times in 1949 he voted for crippling amendments to the social security program. He went down the line in 1949 for legislation that withheld the benefits of the seventy-five cent minimum wage law from an additional million workers. In 1947 he voted against a $75 million increase in the school lunch program. He voted to saddle organized labor with the Taft-Hartley Law and against giving farmers the Brannan Plan.

Nixon's voting record as a legislator ended, of course, when he became Vice President, but he has had seven opportunities to break ties during his incumbency as presiding officer of the Senate. The issues at stake involved major conflicts between the liberal and conservative blocs and dealt with significant controversies on Federal aid to education, agriculture, veterans, and organized labor. "In each case," the New York *Times* reported recently, Nixon "has reflected the Eisenhower Administration's policy against more liberal proposals sponsored by the Democrats."

In the critical field of foreign affairs Nixon sometimes speaks up in the language of liberal internationalism, but it is difficult to evaluate the record itself, again because of his habitual practice of leaning now one way and now another. Nixon supported the Marshall Plan but ducked the vote on Point Four appropriations. He seemed to favor the liberalized tariff program, but voted for crippling amendments. He turned up on both sides of American policy regarding Korea and Indo-China.

Thus, on August 31, 1953, speaking before the American Legion Convention in St. Louis, Nixon said that in his decision to halt Communist aggression in Korea, former President Truman was right and "deserves the credit for it. Let's recognize right now that the decision to go into Korea was right because the Communists had to be stopped." But a year later, in his 1954 election eve speech, he charged that the Truman Administration's "wrong policy" had "resulted in a war, a war in Korea that cost us 140,000 American boys as casualties."

Similarly, on April 16, 1954, speaking to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington, Nixon said: "If, to avoid further Communist expansion in Asia and Indo-China, we must take the risk now by putting our boys in, I think the executive branch has to take the politically unpopular decision and do it, and I personally support such a position." A fortnight later, Nixon was quoted by the New York *Herald-Tribune* as saying that the Administration must avoid sending American troops to fight in Indo-China or anywhere else "if we can." In later speeches, he praised the Administration for avoiding hostilities in Indo-China although he had told the newspaper editors that he personally supported intervention with American boys.

Perhaps the crispest analysis of this curious political behavior came from Richard H. Rovere writing in *Harper's:*

"What stands out in any consideration of the whole record is the flexibility that suggests an almost total indifference to policy. Nixon appears to be a politician with an advertising man's approach to his work. Policies are products to be sold the public—this one today, that one tomorrow, depending on the discounts and the state of the market. He moves from intervention to anti-intervention with the same ease and lack of anguish with which a copywriter might transfer his loyalties from Camels to Chesterfields."

It is often argued in the Vice President's behalf that he has reformed, that there is now a "new Nixon." It is certainly true that he has been tidying up in preparation for his candidacy for the Presidency. But the calculated good behavior of a man on trial can hardly wipe out fourteen years of habitual malpractice.

Nor has Nixon wholly abandoned his old techniques. Something of the "old Nixon" turns up in his handling of the "religious issue" in this campaign. "I shall never mention it," the Vice President said a while back in discussing the subject of religion. Since then, on numerous occasions, he has loudly protested that "religion is not an issue," thus bringing the subject back to the headlines every time he raises it.

In his acceptance speech in Chicago, Nixon showed the same ambivalence on major issues that has characterized his public utterances for fourteen years. He lashed out at the Democratic platform: "I happen to believe that their program would be disastrous for America; it would wreck the economy; it would dash our peoples' hopes for a better life. And I serve notice here and now that whatever the political consequences, we are not going to try to outpromise our opponents in this campaign."

A few paragraphs later, however, Nixon was doing precisely that—outpromising the Democrats. For older citizens he proposed adequate protection against the hazards of ill health and "a greater opportunity to lead a useful and productive life by participating to the extent they are able in the nation's exciting work rather than sitting on the sidelines." American youth was promised "the best education system" and the opportunity for all to go to college regardless of financial circumstances. Wage-earners were promised increasingly higher wages "in honest dollars" and better social security than ever before. As for civil rights, Nixon promised the greatest progress since the days of Lincoln, while farmers were assured that at long last they would receive their fair share of "America's ever-increasing prosperity."

The principal difference between the Democratic platform and the Nixon speech, in the fields covered by both, is that the former consists of a series of specific pledges while Nixon's promises are clothed in the sweeping generalizations that have characterized most of his major addresses during his political career.

Nixon's views have changed to some extent in recent years, but the reasoning is often obscure and the new position undefined. A few years ago, for instance, he hailed Ezra Taft Benson as "the greatest Secretary of Agriculture in our country's history." This year, however, mindful of Benson's unpopularity in the farm belt,

the Vice President dropped the word that "it has been well known that the Secretary and I have had some very basic disagreements." It was not "well known" at all; and weeks afterward there was still nothing to indicate what these "very basic disagreements" were about.

Nixon's midnight meeting with New York's Governor Nelson Rockefeller on the eve of the Republican National Convention shows the "old Nixon" very much in the saddle. Two examples:

One—When he left to confer with Rockefeller, Nixon was firmly on record as favoring the continuation of the moratorium on nuclear testing. Rockefeller, however, persuaded him to reverse his position by agreeing that the Republican platform should flatly urge that the government "resume immediately underground nuclear testing for purposes of improving methods of detection." But within forty-eight hours Nixon had reversed the reversal of his position. Arriving in Chicago, he retreated from his new stand almost immediately: "Because there is still a chance," he said, "that an agreement may be worked out, I do not believe that we should rock the boat on those negotiations by what we say in the platform." As Douglass Cater, *The Reporter's* gifted Washington correspondent, pointed out, Nixon "offered no explanation for his part in the boat-rocking only two days before."

Two—Several weeks before his meeting with Rockefeller, the Vice President had publicly ridiculed as "growthmanship" the belief held by Rockefeller and a number of Democratic liberals that the national economy must expand by about five per cent a year to achieve healthy progress and stay well ahead of the Soviet Union. But when he signed the memorandum with Rockefeller, Nixon permitted inclusion of the fact that two years earlier he, Nixon, had spoken favorably of a five per cent rate of annual growth. This device was used to convey the impression that Nixon concurred with Rockefeller. But, again, Nixon wiggled free from something that might commit him to a specific goal. Asked a few days later by newsmen about the goal of a five per cent increase, the Vice President replied with characteristic evasiveness:

Herblock in the Washington Post

"Seldom Has a Candidate Had So Much Experience at Not Being Responsible for Decisions"

"I would not say that was my goal. I would say that my goal, and I think the only proper goal for those who do not buy the theory of government-manipulated growth . . . is a maximum growth rate. It might in some instances be three per cent, in some instances four, in some instances five."

The "old Nixon" was much in evidence at the Chicago convention. At one point, for example, Nixon and Rockefeller stood together before a battery of television cameras discussing the Republican plank on civil rights. The New York governor carefully analyzed the various provisions, after which it was Nixon's turn to say something. He seemed to hesitate for a moment, and then he added the clinching argument: "There's mileage in it."

Nixon's campaign literature argues extravagantly that the "new Nixon" is a man of vast experience at the top levels of policy-making as the result of his nearly eight-year tour of duty as Vice President, but the record hardly confirms this conclusion. It is true that he has traveled widely, but the "new Nixon," much like the "old Nixon" that Senator Taft knew, has continued to "radiate tension and conflict" almost everywhere he has gone. It is a striking fact that not a single improvement in the concept or conduct of American foreign policy has resulted from Nixon's journeys abroad.

Nor has the Vice President played an influential role in the inner councils of the Eisenhower Administration. In his *Eisenhower: The Inside Story*, Donovan reported that Nixon had participated in Cabinet sessions significantly enough to be quoted only about twenty or more times. Still more revealing is that on those occasions only four of his comments dealt with substantive matters, while all the rest were concerned with political angles and public relations problems. A few weeks ago, when he was pressed by newsmen to give an example of a major idea of Nixon's that he had adopted, President Eisenhower replied: "If you give me a week, I might think of one. I don't remember."

The case against Nixon seems overpowering. He is indifferent to means, and committed to one end only—political power for its own sake. To achieve power, he has corrupted the truth, smeared his opponents, betrayed his friends, invoked ugly innuendo and the furtive accusation as his major weapons of political warfare, and relied heavily on a capacity for slippery evasion of commitment that enables some of his supporters to hail him as a conservative and others to embrace him as a liberal. It is his own record that demonstrates most persuasively that Richard M. Nixon is not fit to hold the office of President of the United States.

I do not like thee, Richard Nixon,
The reason why's not hard to fix on:
It's the public interest you play tricks on.
I do not like thee, Richard Nixon.

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KENNEDY'S LIBERALISM

by JAMES MacGREGOR BURNS

A YEAR AGO, while talking with Senator John F. Kennedy on the terrace of his Hyannis Port home, I prodded him a bit about the nature of his liberalism. Had he not swung to a strong progressive position rather late in his public career? He looked speculatively off toward the ocean. Yes, he said, he had come by his liberalism in slow stages. He had not got it early, in big gulps, as had so many of his generation. He said this not in a critical tone, but almost wistfully, as though he envied those who had made up their minds so easily, so early.

I often think of his remark as I listen to progressives wondering whether Kennedy is a "real" liberal. In my judgment, he is. History, indeed, may record that, until now, he is the most progressive candidate ever nominated by a major party.

Such a strong statement demands a definition of terms. By progressivism I mean a disposition to use government as a means of broadening individual opportunity and advancing social welfare at home. I mean the willingness to use generously and imaginatively the nation's economic and ideological power to achieve international stability and economic progress abroad. By progressivism I mean also opposition to use of government—or of any other means—to stifle the free flow of ideas.

In the first sense—the use of government to expand opportunity and social welfare—Kennedy has always been a progressive. Unlike most Americans, he did not grow up in an environment that scorned the role of government—quite the contrary. His Irish immigrant forebears had turned to government for aid in the harsh new world of proletarian Boston; they sought and won jobs in the municipal services, such as the police and fire departments; they saw the need for governmental protection of those most exposed to the ravages of illness, slums, low wages, high prices. It is significant that Joseph Kennedy, the candidate's father, though conservative in many respects, never had the repugnance for social welfare programs that characterized many of his anti-New Deal business friends.

John Kennedy demonstrated this kind of progressivism from the very beginning of his political career. Campaigning for Congress for the first time in 1946, he got an eyeful of the ugly slums, shabby urban areas, and dilapidated schools throughout Boston's Eleventh Congressional District. That same year, before winning office, he publicly battled leaders of veterans groups who were opposed to public housing, and soon after taking his seat in the House he bitterly denounced the American Legion, of which he was a member, for playing the real estate lobby's game in opposing housing legislation. "The leadership of the American Legion," he asserted in attacking one of the most powerful pressure groups in the nation, "has not had a constructive thought for the benefit of the country since 1918!"

During his first year in Congress, Kennedy fought the Hartley bill as one that would "strike down in one devastating blow" the union shop and industry-wide bargaining. He upheld President Truman's unsuccessful veto of the Taft-Hartley bill. He opposed reduction in school lunch appropriations, a District of Columbia sales tax, the weakening of rent control, tax relief for the oil industry. He supported broadened social security, higher minimum wages, liberalized immigration laws, and bigger housing programs.

There is no point in detailing Kennedy's social welfare positions in Congress through the next thirteen years, because the pattern is absolutely consistent. He had "plus" scores on all major social welfare legislation on the scorecards of labor and liberal journals. To be sure, he did vote against a number of farm and resource bills or appropriations because he felt—wrongly, I think, in some cases—that they were boondoggles. It was only with the passage of years and the broadening of his national perspective that he understood that farm and resource programs were the rural counterparts to the urban progressivism of social welfare programs. Still, he supported the great bulk of the Truman and subsequent farm and resource legislation.

In his early foreign policy positions Kennedy's liberalism was somewhat more mixed, but not enough to obscure a basic internationalism that has been growing in depth and consistency in more recent years. During his second term in the House he voted to recommit the Trade Agreements Extension Act, in part because of the impact of the trade program on Massachusetts employment. But he voted for final passage of the bill. During the same term he offered an amendment reducing economic aid to Africa and the Near East, and he favored cutting economic aid to Europe. But he strongly supported the basic Truman foreign policies; where he mainly differed with the Administration was not over the major thrust of the program but over methods of administration. He said that the European nations should intensify their own efforts to strengthen military defenses against the Soviets, but he did not believe that for that reason the United States should reduce its own military commitment abroad. Never was he any kind of isolationist, even in those early days, when one might

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have expected him to be somewhat under the influence of his father.

As for civil liberties, Kennedy did not encounter enough issues in the House to test his basic position. He hotly criticized the Supreme Court for setting aside a perjury citation by the House Labor committee, of which Kennedy was a member, against Harold Christoffel, leader of the Communist-dominated strike against Allis-Chalmers in 1941. But from various comments he made during these years, Kennedy's main position on civil liberties—to the extent that he had one—seemed to be that the really important concern of his constituents was not airy academic abstractions about civil liberties, but rent control, social security, and other economic and social matters. He was not against civil liberties—they had simply not assumed a significant place in his list of priorities. It was in this respect that Kennedy departed most sharply from the basic liberal heritage.

During his six years in the House —and perhaps during the first two or three years in the Senate—John Kennedy was essentially a "bread-and-butter" liberal and an internationalist who differed with certain emphases and procedures in Administration foreign policy, whether Democratic or Republican. His later years in the Senate, especially from about 1955 on, saw a steady swing to a consistently liberal stand in all three basic areas discussed above.

On urban progressivism he maintained his social welfare position, but he gained a broader comprehension of the need for rural progressivism too. He still had reservations about high support prices for Western farmers—prices that increased costs of feed for dairy farmers in New England—but he now went down the line for resource development programs. The most conspicuous—certainly the most courageous—of his actions on this score was voting for the St. Lawrence Seaway over the anguished protests of the port of Boston, which feared Seaway competition. His support for the Seaway signified, among other things, the distance Kennedy had traveled from his Boston forebears; his paternal grandfather, "Honey Fitz" Fitzgerald, had traveled the world boosting the port of Boston, and Kennedy himself had first won office with the help of votes of Boston longshoremen.

It was in the field of foreign policy, however, that Kennedy moved most firmly and imaginatively to a liberal, internationalist position. Not only did he give solid support to economic and military aid measures, but he struck out on his own on frontiers that most politicians avoided. In July, 1957, he amazed veteran politicos in Washington with a long, carefully prepared, and biting attack on French policy in Algeria, ending with the suggestion that President Eisenhower try to achieve through the offices of friendly countries a solution that would in effect recognize Algeria's independence. Not only Secretary of State John Foster Dulles but also Dean Acheson and other Democrats proceeded to rap the young man's knuckles.

During the next two years he was in the advance guard of the small band of Senators calling for a reassessment of some of our stale foreign policies. He co-sponsored a five-year Development Loan program that was incorporated, in part, in mutual security legislation. In sharp contrast to his position as a Representative, he now urged more emphasis on economic aid and less on military. In the face of protests from hysterically anti-Soviet Polish leaders in Massachusetts, he urged closer economic and cultural relations between the United States and Russian-dominated Poland. He showed special concern for India and Africa, and became chairman of Foreign Relations Committee subcommittees dealing with these areas. During 1959 he proposed long-term, intensive aid to India as a means of making that country a showplace of economic development achieved through democratic means. He urged more intelligent and generous policies toward Latin America. He favored withdrawal of United States forces from Quemoy and Matsu.

The sternest test of Kennedy's liberalism in the Senate was civil rights in 1957. Whether he passed that test depends on one's judgment as to whether, in this case, the ends justified the means. Under the regular procedure, the civil rights bill passed by the House would have been sent to the Senate Judiciary Committee, under the chairmanship of Mississippi's Senator James O. Eastland, chief gravedigger for civil rights measures. A number of Senate liberals proposed to invoke an obscure Senate rule and bypass the Eastland committee. Kennedy demurred. He believed that liberals, in evading ordinary parliamentary procedure, would establish a precedent that might make great difficulties for them in the future. But Kennedy strongly backed the bill itself—especially the vital Title III, which authorized the Attorney General to use injunctive power to enforce school desegregation and other civil rights. He not only voted for this section but took the floor to defend his position vigorously. The real issue facing the Senate, he declared, was whether the Senators would stand for or against the Supreme Court decision on school desegregation. "My own endorsement of that decision, and its support in the state I have the honor, in part, to represent, has been too clear to permit me to cast a vote that will be interpreted as a repudiation of it."

Negroes were annoyed by Kennedy's deference to old Senate procedures, Southerners by his outspoken support of Title III. This was not the first time that Kennedy had baffled both sides of a burning issue—the most notable previous case was McCarthyism. It is clear now, as I indicated in *The Progressive* last month, that Kennedy definitely favored the censure of McCarthy in 1954 and would have voted for censure if he had been in the Senate rather than on a hospital bed almost completely isolated from politics. It is also clear that his opposition to McCarthy—like the censure resolution actually passed by the Senate in December, 1954—was based on the narrow grounds of McCarthy's violation of Senate procedure and dignity rather than on the essential grounds of his attacks on individual liberties and his irresponsible exercise of his Senatorial powers. What many Americans saw as a supreme moral issue Kennedy saw as a threat to the proper procedures and decorum of the Senate.

But here again Kennedy moved swiftly from this rather tepid position

to one of vigorous defense of civil liberties. He has demonstrated this shift most clearly in his opposition to a proposal that employers as well as union leaders sign non-Communist affidavits if they wished to use the services of the National Labor Relations Board—*neither* employers nor employees should sign, Kennedy felt—and in his vigorous leadership for repeal of a provision requiring students to sign a loyalty oath if they wished to be eligible for Federal loans or grants.

In the last two or three years, in short, Kennedy has become one of the most consistent liberals in the Senate, especially in foreign policy but also in social welfare issues, civil liberties, and civil rights. What is the significance of this?

Some would explain it away. Kennedy has shifted to a strong liberal position, they argue, because (1) when he became ambitious for the Presidency he realized that the only road to the White House was the liberal road; because (2) he swallowed the liberal line uncritically and tagged along with the whole New Deal-Fair Deal line as a means of avoiding hard decisions and fresh thinking; and (3) for both of these reasons.

The first argument has some merit; obviously politicians who want to get ahead size up audience reaction ahead of time. But everything depends on what kind of audience a man is trying to satisfy. Considering the support that Kennedy received from Southerners in his convention battle for the Vice Presidential nomination with Estes Kefauver in 1956, one might have expected him to seek the same support in his quest for the Presidential nomination in 1960. But he did not. By the spring of 1960 he could predict, quite correctly, that he was going into the convention with virtually no Southern support at all. If Kennedy had followed Democratic Party precedent he would have lined up a combination of Southern and Northern delegate strength, as Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Adlai Stevenson had done. Hence he would have solicited Southern backing by softer stands on civil rights, minimum wage legislation, and other delicate issues between North and South. But he deliberately spurned this traditional pre-convention strategy and gambled on support from the North. This is not the action of a man who takes a policy stand simply because it might help his political advancement.

As for the argument that Kennedy was avoiding creative thinking and action, there may be something to that, too. No busy politician in our time is going to re-think on his own all the policy positions of his party or of the liberal heritage. But here again Kennedy seems less guilty of stereotyped thinking than many of his contemporaries who have been successful in politics. Indeed, he has always had a positive aversion to stereotypes, whether of the liberal or conservative variety. And he has shown a capacity to approach old problems with fresh ideas, as in the case of Algeria, India, the satellites, and Quemoy and Matsu.

Perhaps the most striking example of Kennedy's refusal to be a victim of liberal stereotypes and traditional thinking was the little-known fight he conducted in 1956 against an attempt by conservatives to alter the workings of the Electoral College. In that year Southern Dixiecrats and conservative Republicans teamed up to abolish the "winner-take-all" nature of the Electoral College system. Most liberal political scientists—myself included—were so eager to get rid of some of the archaic and dangerous features of the Electoral College that we were willing to go along with the proposal. But Kennedy, along with Paul Douglas and a few other Senators, insisted on reading the fine print. It developed that the proposed constitutional change would have placed disproportionate voting power in rural areas and reduced the strength of the city vote, particularly the influence of big minority groups, such as Negroes and labor, in the big urban states; it would have gerrymandered the Electoral College in a conservative rural direction much as Congress is gerrymandered today.

Kennedy not only opposed the proposal; he directed the floor fight against it. He had no large library of liberal thought from which to draw his arguments; he was almost completely on his own. He won the contest in a brilliant display of parliamentary leadership, argumentative skill, knowledge of the immense complexities of the subject, and sheer tenacity. Of course, some cynics would argue that he was simply preparing for the day when he would run for President or Vice President, as an urban Catholic, but this would suggest a Machiavellian astuteness and long-range planning on the part of Kennedy that he simply did not possess.

My own hunch is that there is a much simpler and better reason for Kennedy's shift to liberalism. He has learned his liberalism the slow, hard way, through years of legislative homework, through endless committee hearings and executive sessions, through extensive travel, through long discussions and correspondence with liberal leaders, through exposure to the Washington political cosmopolitanism that stands in such contrast with Boston parochialism. He has built his liberalism piecemeal as he has tackled specific problems of domestic and foreign policy. Kennedy may envy those who gained their liberalism in strong, sudden drafts, but is his liberalism to be doubted because he reached it by another, more twisting, more difficult route? It might well be that his liberalism is all the more lasting and solid simply because it is laboriously constructed on the firm underpinnings of observed conditions and on fourteen years of grappling with legislative detail.

The most recent test of—and the great monument to—Kennedy's progressivism is the platform the Democratic Party adopted in July in Los Angeles. I can state with some certainty that the Kennedy forces were sure several weeks before the convention that they would win the nomination. Hence they were in a position to take such action on the platform as would strengthen their position in the fall Presidential campaign against Nixon. If Kennedy had any misgivings about the liberalism of the platform, he could easily have had it dampened down. He evidently had none. It was his own man, Chester Bowles, who chaired the platform committee; it was a committee that Kennedy dominated, through his strength in the convention, that drew

up the most progressive platform in the history of either major party. The 1960 Democratic platform is an amazingly liberal platform, both in its general objectives but most significantly in its specifics. It is a Kennedy platform.

The campaign of 1960 is the culmination of Kennedy's deepening intellectual engagement with liberalism. The engagement was long in the making, but all the stronger as a result. It would be tragic if liberals neglected their own engagement with Kennedy's brand of liberalism because of false fears aroused by a few of Kennedy's waverings and indecisions years back in a different world.

Henry Cabot Lodge

Made in the United Nations

by DAVID C. WILLIAMS

HENRY CABOT LODGE is a living testimonial to the growing potency of the United Nations—a prize exhibit in the "before and after" tradition of advertising.

In 1952 he was the only prominent Republican defeated for re-election, losing his Senate seat to John F. Kennedy. Now he is the hand-picked running-mate for Republican Presidential candidate Richard Nixon—chosen, from among many aspirants, on the hard-headed calculation that he would add most strength to the ticket. And the first post-convention Gallup Poll seemed to confirm this calculation: it showed Vice Presidential candidate Lodge edging out both Nixon and Kennedy in "E.Q." (enthusiasm quotient), and running a country mile ahead of his Democratic opposite number, Senator Lyndon Johnson.

Seven and a half years as American ambassador to the United Nations have done a lot for Lodge politically. They have also contributed substantially to his own education. Yet, when Lodge was appointed, it seemed little more than a consolation prize — he had badly wanted to be Secretary of State—and a genteel form of exile. He himself attached much more importance to his status as a "personal member" of the Eisenhower Cabinet than to his United Nations post. He regarded the United Nations primarily as a forum for waging verbal war against the Russians; secondarily as an assembly in which to roll up topheavy majorities for candidates or resolutions backed by the United States. When photographers sought to take a picture of him with the Soviet delegate, he brusquely refused, saying: "Don't you know there's a new Administration in Washington?"

An old newspaperman and incurable headline-hunter, he proclaimed his determination to hit back immediately at any Soviet attack on the United States. Sometimes this was appropriate and necessary. More often, interminable exchanges of the "your slums are worse than ours" variety bored and irritated the delegates of other nations. But they ensured that, in the American press at least, each Soviet thrust put Lodge into the headlines the same day.

His egotism, arrogance, and aloofness—qualities which had made him a rather lonely member of that normally chummy club, the United States Senate—had the same initial impact upon the representatives and personnel of the United Nations. For his staff, and for the State Department officials dealing with United Nations affairs, they made life miserable. "Spoiled brat" was the kindest of many epithets they applied to him.

He took it almost as a personal affront that policy directives came to him—a member of the Cabinet and a personal friend of the President—from the office of the Assistant Secretary of State for U.N. Affairs. To this was added a paranoiac suspicion that State Department officials, as holdovers from the Truman Administration, were out to do him in. Knowing that the directives, though sent over Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' name, were actually drafted by some subordinate official, he would seek at the slightest provocation to identify the culprit, even when the directive was intended to save Lodge from making a fool of himself by shooting from the hip, as he too often did.

Washington was then, as it is now, full of ardent cold warriers in the various intelligence agencies dreaming up new ways to bait the Russians. When these proposals involved making use of the United Nations, they went to the office of the Secretary of State for U.N. Affairs, where most of them wound up in the wastebasket. Their frustrated authors, however, soon realized that they had a more appreciative audience in Lodge, and began sending them direct to him. His reactions were compounded of ecstasy and anger. They seemed to him wonderful ideas, which some malevolent saboteur had been keeping from him.

Although Lodge still has a weakness for propaganda gimmicks, he is more discriminating than he used to be. He has been criticized for the appearance of the wives of the RB-47 crew at the Security Council session on this subject. Privately he maintains that it was not his doing but that of Air Force Intelligence—and that he was furious when he heard of it.

Yet Lodge's tactics of baiting the Russians were rather successful in terms of one of his primary initial objectives—that of winning over such perfervid critics of the United Nations as the Hearst newspapers and the American Legion. Indeed, he played William Randolph Hearst,

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Jr., so skilfully that the publisher never realized that he had been hooked; Hearst wrote last year:

"He [Lodge] was kind enough to say that, in his opinion, the editorial support of the Hearst newspapers had played a decisive role in changing the attitude of the American public toward the United Nations, from a sparse forty per cent who thought it was doing a good job a few years ago to a solid ninety per cent in support of it at the present time."

Lodge made it no secret that he regarded the United Nations as only a way-station to higher office. He was mentioned from time to time for top Washington posts, and his own hopes ran as high as the Presidential nomination in 1956, in case Eisenhower did not run.

But nothing materialized, nor was his impact upon the Administration substantial, in spite of his close personal friendship with the President. In foreign policy he was out-gunned by the redoubtable Dulles, who was not disposed to share his responsibilities. (In John R. Beal's *John Foster Dulles*, so largely shaped by its subject that it is virtually an autobiography, Lodge is mentioned only once, and then incidentally.) In domestic affairs, Lodge, like other "Eisenhower Republicans," suffered from the dominance of Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey and the desertion from their ranks of the President himself.

So Lodge stayed on at his United Nations post and tried to make the best of it, to his own great benefit. For, as time went by, he became identified less with the drifting, lackluster Administration and more with the growing, developing United Nations. And Lodge was growing with it.

At the beginning, he was hardly aware of the constructive work of the United Nations' specialized agencies and did not much like what little he knew of them. A passage from an article written by Lodge in 1954 illustrates his early attitude:

"Serious harm has been done the United Nations by extreme enthusiasts who expect it to produce steak dinners and college educations and free elections [everywhere] . . . These optimists do not stop to worry about how this is to be done, except possibly through some combination of Uncle Sam's bankroll and elocutionary abacadabra, in unspecified amounts."

Lodge is now a whole-hearted convert to technical and economic aid through the United Nations. In a speech early this year, typical of many he has delivered recently, he listed nine advantages of the multilateral approach, refuted the most common arguments against it, and declared: "It is in the United States' interests to use the multilateral aid of the United Nations to the maximum, and I believe this will be done increasingly in the future."

Over the years, his relations with the other delegates, even India's prickly V. K. Krishna Menon, have measurably improved. While his willingness to be photographed with the Russians has varied with the international and political climate (this August, as a photographer approached while he was chatting with Russia's deputy foreign minister, Vasily Kuznetsov, he unostentatiously turned his back to the camera), his private contacts with them have been much more cordial. Last December, for example, he gave a carefully unpublicized party for the Soviet delegates and their wives, at which he danced with the latter and raised his baritone voice in duet with Kuznetsov.

When Lodge first came to the United Nations, he seemed to regard its permanent staff as a collection of time-serving "do-gooders," who owed their "excessive" salaries largely to the American taxpayer. Relations between him and Dag Hammarskjold did not start out amiably, but they developed a genuine respect for each other during the Suez crisis, and he has since become one of the Secretary-General's most ardent supporters.

Even with the State Department his attitude is less frosty than it was, although its officials still complain of his tendency to push too hard, often with the purpose of thrusting himself into the limelight. "Predatory" is the adjective one official uses.

Lodge continues to answer the Russians, using short sentences, simple words, and, where possible, visual aids, all tailor-made for the television audience. But he has come to realize that this is far from sufficient. Last year he said:

"It is not enough simply to react against something bad. Nor is it enough merely to be physically strong, vital though that is.

"You have to be for something good and your strength has to be at the service of that good cause."

Fine words, but the United States has only once risen to this height in the past seven years of the United Nations, with President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" address to the United Nations General Assembly in December, 1953.

That speech is still remembered for the thrill of excitement it sent through the halls of the United Nations. But no other bold initiatives followed it, and the International Atomic Energy agency itself has failed to live up to the early and high expectations.

Great things have been done in the United Nations during the past few years, but they have not been done through the leadership of the United States or its Ambassador. Leadership came first from Canada's Lester Pearson and Dag Hammerskjold, and, since Pearson's removal from the scene, from Hammarskjold alone.

It was Pearson who negotiated the "package deal" of December 14, 1955, admitting sixteen Communist and non-Communist nations and taking the first giant step toward converting the United Nations from an exclusive club of World War II victors into a global forum. It was Pearson and Hammarskjold who improvised the United Nations Emergency Force to deal with the Suez crisis. It was the Secretary-General who, in the Lebanon-Jordan crisis of 1958 and the Laos crisis of 1959, rescued the United States from the unhappy consequences of its own blunders. It was Hammarskjold who inspired action this year to prevent the Congo crisis from spiraling into a world conflict.

Even with regard to Hungary, Lodge's performance was less than impressive. Joseph P. Lash, the capable United Nations correspondent of the New York *Post*, accused the Eisenhower Administration of seeking to put the Hungarian issue "under the United Nations' rug until after election day." These are strong words, but the timetable of November, 1956, tends to bear them out.

At four o'clock in the morning of

Friday, November 2, during an all-night meeting of the General Assembly on the Suez crisis, the Italian delegate urged immediate consideration of the plea which had been received from Budapest for United Nations protection of Hungary's independence. Speaking for the United States, Secretary of State Dulles declared that the Hungarian question was on the agenda of the Security Council. At the Council meeting that afternoon Ambassador Lodge was not ready to propose action, saying: "We must now get all the facts."

The next day Lodge presented a resolution, but failed to press it to a vote. As late as six p.m., six hours before the Russian attack on Budapest, he rejected pleas by France, Britain, Australia, and other nations for immediate action.

At midnight the first news of the Russian thrust was received. Lodge conferred with the President of the Security Council and agreed to have it meet at ten a.m. The Australian delegate, appalled by the delay, succeeded in having the meeting set at three a.m. After the expected Soviet veto in the Council, the Assembly finally got a chance to act on Sunday afternoon. Two precious days were lost during which United Nations representatives might have reached Budapest at the invitation of the last independent Hungarian government.

Lodge bitterly resents any criticism on this score; and, of course, no one can be positive that the presence of United Nations observers would have deterred the Russians. Nevertheless, it is significant that Khrushchev himself has since acknowledged that there had been a sharp division of opinion within the Kremlin about what to do with regard to Hungary.

The pattern of too little and too late has been a persistent one in American policy at the United Nations, as elsewhere. Even with the handicap of a somnolent Administration in Washington, a United Nations Ambassador with gifts which Lodge does not possess—deep intelligence, creative imagination, forward-looking statesmanship — could have done more. The correspondent of the London *Economist* wrote recently:

"Although Mr. Lodge is well-known and a sympathetic speaker, those who have worked with him at the United Nations have doubts about his fundamental ability."

There are men in public life who have suffered from the same handicap, but have made up for it by surrounding themselves with able staff members and welcoming new ideas from the many research agencies and non-governmental organizations which take a serious interest in public affairs. Lodge tended for a long while to surround himself with "yes-men," and while he has more recently begun to appreciate the importance of a skilled staff, he tends to treat his aides as subordinates carrying out orders rather than sources of intellectual inspiration. He gives little serious attention to expert studies or the recommendations of non-governmental organizations, viewing them as impractical rather than appreciating their essential function of the pioneering exploration of new lines of policy.

Lodge has been so closely identified with the United Nations that many people forget how long he has been on the national stage. He first appeared in Washington in 1937 as a thirty-four-year-old Senator and "the handsomest thing on two legs." In the pre-war years he was a moderate liberal in domestic affairs, a strong advocate of military preparedness, and (as befitted the grandson of the Senator Lodge who prevented the United States from joining the League of Nations) a confirmed isolationist. It is a rather endearing fact about a man not otherwise notably lovable that, while he has acknowledged that his own pre-war isolationism was "one hundred per cent wrong," he has loyally maintained that his grandfather's position on the League was correct.

Returning to the Senate in 1946 with a distinguished war record, he became a disciple of the late Senator Vandenberg and a strong internationalist. On the Marshall Plan, Point Four, and immigration legislation, his record, as measured by the liberal scorecard of Americans for Democratic Action, was almost perfect. Except for civil rights, his position on domestic affairs was rather more conservative than before the war, although with a strong enough streak of liberalism to put him squarely in the progressive wing of the GOP.

In his acceptance speech at Chicago, Vice President Nixon spoke of Lodge as "a man who shares my views on the great issues." Judged by the ADA record for the two years (1951-2) that they sat together in the Senate, one or the other must have changed. Nixon is recorded as wrong on eighteen out of twenty-five votes, while Lodge is listed as right on fifteen out of twenty-five.

Certainly Lodge never beat the anti-Communist drum with Nixon's vigor. Like many another man, he wavered. In 1950, two months after Senator Joseph McCarthy launched his attack upon "Communists in the State Department," Lodge said:

". . . the sole purpose of all loyalty investigations must be to ferret out disloyal persons. It must never allow itself to be used to carry out some hidden purpose of creating a political result here at home . . . If such a purpose exists, it merits unreserved condemnation."

That "unreserved condemnation" was not forthcoming. Later that same year, Lodge was one of two dissenters from the report of the Tydings subcommittee declaring that McCarthy's charges were entirely false. He wrote that, while "many charges have been made which have not been proven," the Tydings investigation was "superficial and inconclusive."

Lodge endorsed McCarthy for re-election in 1952. As United Nations Ambassador, his first official act was to take out insurance against the Wisconsin Senator by requiring a complete FBI check of all Americans employed at the United Nations and in his own mission. Within the Administration, he sided at first with those advising the President to go easy on McCarthy, then switched as he realized the harm he was doing to America's reputation at the United Nations.

On record and on character, if not on ability and intelligence, Lodge is better qualified to be President than Nixon. If he looms somewhat larger than real life, it is because he has had the privilege and the opportunity to work for seven and a half years in a great and growing world organization, and to associate with men of a stature not equaled or even approached by those who have dominated the Eisenhower Administration.



Keys to the Campaign

by PHILIP E. CONVERSE

It is tempting to say, with the vote returns long in, that the outcome of the 1956 Presidential election could have been foreseen with unusual precision. It was, after all, a rematch between the 1952 opponents, and a rematch played out under the same ground rules. It seems hardly surprising that Eisenhower won a second time.

But with two new candidates taking the stage in 1960, uncertainties multiply. Our only idea of the relative popularity of the candidates comes from the many straw polls gathered in past months; and there is a strange fluidity of opinion displayed in these polls. If we were to trust polls whole-heartedly, we would conclude that the simple timing of the election is a decisive factor. It seems that an aspirant who could win by a landslide in June might lose by a margin equally great if the election were held a few weeks later.

Yet there seems to be more pattern and continuity to election trends than this picture would suggest. The wide swings of opinion registered in the early polls are ironed out as the election approaches, so that the popular outcome bears a closer relation to the preceding election than would be expected from the early polls. There is reason to believe that the voter may answer a hypothetical question about his vote intention with a much freer spirit months before the actual balloting than he feels in his final choice in November. In the polling booth he will be more deeply affected by his own habitual patterns of decision.

What are these habitual forces? One of the most influential seems to be a simple sense of loyalty to one of the two political parties. Some well-rooted preference for a party is admitted by a large majority of Americans, so large that, if we set aside persistent non-voters, the proportion reaches nine out of ten.

Such party loyalty takes a variety of forms. For some, it is the logical conclusion of an ideological commitment. Other voters may support a party as a family tradition, an allegiance inherited much as church membership is inherited. Some voters may be sincerely concerned that the nation's affairs will not be handled properly unless their chosen party is in office. Others root for their party in the same spirit as they root for a favorite team in a spectator sport. Evidence shows that, whatever the variation, this preference is much more stable for the average voter over the years than are, for example, his opinions on "major" issues of policy.

A sense of loyalty to a party is not, of course, proof against an occasional vote for the opposing party. Naturally, some voters identify themselves with the fortunes of a party more strongly than others. The weakly identified partisans are more inclined to defect from time to time than the strongly identified. Nonetheless, it is clear that the voter is disposed to stick with his habitual party unless he feels there are striking reasons he should do otherwise. Thus the party with the more numerous adherents enjoys an important head start as the voter makes up his mind about each new election. The party which finds itself in the minority is placed on the defensive and must depend upon unusual circumstances to achieve a victory.

The many voters who are so strongly attached to one of the parties that they are unlikely to defect form the stable core of votes for each party. The minority of voters who feel relatively little attachment to either of the parties, and who thereby tend to shift with ease from party to party over the course of several elections, form an important "floating vote." The number is small—at most, twenty or thirty per cent of the electorate—but quite enough to dictate the outcome of most elections if sufficient floaters move toward the same party at the same time.

It is a paradox that these floating voters, who hold the balance of power, are more often than not the citizens who are least interested in and least knowledgeable about politics. There is a general tendency among all but the most experienced practical politicians to overestimate what the public knows about politics. This misperception becomes extreme when we discard the core of interested voters usually committed to a party, and look solely at the factors which motivate the floating voter in his political decisions.

Voters like the floaters who notice what is happening in politics only briefly in the heat of a campaign find most policy debates unintelligible. Many of them can express great enthusiasm over a candidate without any knowledge of his position on current issues. Political decisions in this layer of the electorate are left to turn upon the most gross facts of political life, such as war, depression, and corruption in government, or upon homespun items about the candidates which require no political sophistication to evaluate.

Such a profile of the electorate suggests three important types of Presidential elections. When no unusual circumstances surround an election,

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the casual, floating voter is less motivated to go to the polls, and those who do vote are not driven in uneven proportions toward one of the two parties. The result is an election of modest turnout in which the popular vote directly reflects the fundamental division of party loyalists current in the nation. We may call this type a *maintaining* election, since it simply prolongs a status quo between the parties. It is likely that many Presidential elections, and nearly all off-year Congressional elections, are of this party-bound, maintaining type.

A *deviating* election is one in which transient and unusual circumstances, such as the discovery of widespread corruption in government, tend to favor the minority party, the party currently out of office. Casual voters, more likely to be impressed by dramatic events of the moment than by the evolving issue positions of the parties, are drawn into the active electorate in unusual numbers and vote in large proportions for the party temporarily favored. The result is an election of high turnout and a victory for the minority party. But in such an election the basic division of party loyalties is not disturbed and reappears clearly in ensuing elections when the unusual circumstances have disappeared from the scene.

Then there is a third type of election which reveals the long-term trends in party strength. At rare intervals, events which induce party defection are of such magnitude that the core voters as well as the floating voters are affected, and a genuine shift in the underlying division of party loyalty occurs. Such an election may be called a *realigning* election. It is certain that such shifts are provoked only rarely and by national crises of the first order. The Civil War and the great depression of the 1930's undoubtedly led to massive realignments of party loyalties. Perhaps the panic of 1893 led to a lesser realignment in 1896, preparing the period of Republican domination which largely endured until the depression.

The 1932 realignment provides the backdrop for the 1960 election. It is a well-documented fact that voters of Democratic inclination currently outnumber Republicans by a ratio approaching three to two. Some of the Democratic margin is "wasted" by a staggering domination of four Democrats to each Republican in the South. Outside the South the Democratic majority is weaker, but it remains a four to three advantage. Therefore, in any maintaining election, with casual voters staying away from the polls or dividing randomly between the parties, there will be a national Democratic majority.

One of the most significant political phenomena of the 1950's is that President Eisenhower's tremendous personal popularity has failed to restore the balance of party loyalties in a way favorable to the Republican Party. Eisenhower is, of course, a great popular hero, and many Democrats have been happy to vote for him. But the Eisenhower years provide a classic example of the deviating election: the Democrats and the floating vote lured to Eisenhower have not taken on Republican loyalties. Our continuing study at the University of Michigan has measured the basic division of party loyalty in the nation almost yearly since 1952, and during each of these eight years the Democratic advantage has remained almost identical with the majority shown before Eisenhower's first victory.

Indeed, it is the unusual counterpoint between Eisenhower popularity and a Democratic majority which has given the past decade its most unique characteristic: a Republican capturing the White House by sweeping margins, but saddled more often than not with a Democratic Congress. Even with Eisenhower at the head of the ticket in 1952 and 1956, control of Congress was in doubt. In the off years, when the active electorate was reduced to the party faithful, the Democrats won handily.

Which type of election outcome can we foresee for 1960? If a true realigning election depends upon a major national disaster, as appears to be the case, we can rule out this possibility almost categorically. The question becomes, then, whether the Presidential race in 1960 will produce a third consecutive deviating election, or will devolve to a more normal maintaining type. On this question hinges the occupancy of the White House.

Since the maintaining election is characterized by an absence of special circumstances exciting the public, and usually shows only an average, if not subnormal, turnout at the polls, it is in this sense a "quiet" election. Unfortunately, we cannot classify such an election in advance simply on the basis of campaign furore. In 1948 Harry Truman conducted a campaign which was in many ways more vociferous than those staged by either Eisenhower or Stevenson. Furthermore, in 1948 there was a head-on ideological clash, symbolized by the Taft-Hartley Act, a clash as bitter as any policy disputes between Eisenhower and Stevenson. Yet in 1948 voter turnout was low. The sound and the fury in October do not ensure public involvement in November.

However, two important conditions must be fulfilled in advance to produce a deviating election. First, there must be circumstances surrounding the election which give a rather unequivocal advantage to the minority party. Secondly, these circumstances must be sufficiently obvious to catch the eye of the floating voter who pays virtually no attention to what is going on in politics—developments as clear-cut as entry into war, the aims of which are too remote to be apparent; economic hardship experienced personally; convincing demonstrations of corruption, and the like.

Ironically, most circumstances dramatic enough to touch off electoral riptides and deviating elections in the past have been negative events which motivate the casual voter to punish the party in power. It is apparent that the public punishes more unerringly for disaster than it rewards for an era without disaster. At the moment there seem to be few gross events of the type which generate unusual tides. But even if there were, the negative flavor of most of these tides would be of little consolation to the Republicans in 1960, for they are at one and the same time the minority party and yet the party in the White House. Thus Republicans must hope for rewarding rather than punishing tides.

One possible source of such positive forces pulling toward the minority party is an exceptionally attractive minority candidate. Eisenhower's po-

sition in 1952 was enhanced by public concern involving the Democratic Party's behavior in power, but in 1956 he managed a decisive victory based more solely on his personal drawing power, prolonging the minority party control of the White House.

The study of political behavior is too young to make clear the ingredients of a successful candidate image. It is doubtful, however, that either Senator John Kennedy or Vice President Richard Nixon can achieve the tremendous advantage as a personality which Eisenhower held over Stevenson, and probably would have held over any other challenger. The deep popular affection for Eisenhower is not created by careful public relations alone. It is probably necessary to have played a central heroic role in a major national crisis to win this degree of esteem. These roles fall to few men in a century, and lie well beyond the reach of Madison Avenue technicians.

With the exception of the Truman-Dewey campaign, our Presidential races for twenty-five years have been dominated by the unusual popular hero. It is therefore easy to lose perspective on the fainter competitive impact which more "normal" political leaders can hope to muster during a campaign. Both Kennedy and Nixon are sufficiently attractive to have won their nominations, and both are well schooled in the care and grooming of a personal image. After the election it is probable that one or the other may be shown to have had a somewhat greater impact with the public on personality grounds alone. But it is doubtful that either can achieve the sort of competitive advantage in this area to attract large portions of the floating vote or to seduce many voters of the opposing party.

Two unusual aspects of the candidates rank as imponderables, however, and could hold the key to the outcome. The first is the possibility of a transfer of personal popularity from Eisenhower to Nixon. The attempt at transfer is being made, and the only clear parallel which might help us foresee its success occurred well before the birth of close-range voting studies. At the time of the 1908 election Theodore Roosevelt made a strong effort to pass on some of his great personal popularity to his protege, William Howard Taft. Taft won the election, but his margin fell five or six per cent short of the preceding Roosevelt victory, and does not appear unusual in an epoch of Republican majorities. Apparently the transfer attempt was not notably successful, although the evidence is entirely circumstantial.

The second imponderable concerns Kennedy's Catholicism. Once again, an instructive parallel is present in the results of the 1928 election involving Al Smith, but, as before, studies of voter attitudes are not available for that contest. The Catholic minority has become increasingly assimilated into American society in the past thirty years, so that any judgments about the religious factor based on 1928 would require some weakening if projected to 1960. It has been argued that the unusual voting patterns of 1928 were as deeply influenced by the Prohibition issue as by the Catholic question, and the raw vote statistics leave it impossible to separate the two factors.

Safer predictions can be made about the 1960 Catholic vote than about the possible *anti*-Catholic vote. We have observed the behavior of Catholic voters toward Catholic candidates for Congress sufficiently to have some idea as to the November vote division among Catholics themselves. Whatever Kennedy's public expectations, it is clear that he will gather a higher proportion of Catholic votes than any Democratic Presidential candidate since Roosevelt. The great unknown remains the size of the loss he will suffer among unattached and Democratic Protestants as a result of his faith.

The possibility of an anti-Catholic tide will be present in November even if the major party spokesmen on both sides avoid further mention of the religious problem. The faith of a candidate provides a fact which is readily grasped and evaluated by even the most casual voter. It demands none of the political background assumed in some of the more scholarly debates over policy. There is evidence that most of the electorate is already aware of Kennedy's faith, a fact surprising to analysts accustomed to the great gaps in information displayed by the public on political affairs. The matter of Kennedy's religion is, furthermore, the kind of information which may well receive its most undivided attention among just those floating voters whom Nixon must attract to win. For people with greater storehouses of political information, Kennedy's faith will be but one consideration among several. For many of the peripheral voters, however, little will be known about either candidate save that Kennedy is a Catholic.

This does not in itself guarantee that Kennedy will lose much or most of the Protestant portion of the floating vote. But the potential for severe loss is there. It is certain that some Protestant Democrats will undergo a conflict between their political and their religious allegiance. With his initial advantage in a Democratic majority, Kennedy can afford to lose some of these voters torn by conflict. But if a sufficient number resolve their doubts in favor of religious loyalty, his initial advantage could be fatally compromised.

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THE PROGRESSIVE Madison, Wisconsin

the *elusive* farm vote

by DONALD R. MURPHY

Is THE FARM VOTE still worth working for? Politicians of both parties seem to think so. Both Vice President Richard M. Nixon and Senator John F. Kennedy are striving mightily to capture support in the farmlands of America. Yet the U.S. Bureau of the Census reports that only ten per cent of the nation's people live on farms.

There are two reasons why this ten per cent is worth extraordinary political attention:

One—The farm vote is heavy in states and Congressional districts where close elections are likely to develop. In Iowa, Nebraska, and Kansas, for instance, almost all the Congressional seats in 1958 were won by a margin of less than five per cent of the votes. A recent example, remembered by all politicians, is the special election for Senator in North Dakota, where the farm vote proved decisive for the Democratic candidate.

Two—The farm vote does not stay put. In Iowa, farmers gave Eisenhower sixty-eight per cent of the vote in 1952 but only fifty-three per cent in 1956. In Wisconsin, William Proxmire, a Democrat, received less than thirty per cent of the farm vote when he ran unsuccessfully for governor in 1952. He won sixty-three per cent of the farm vote when he ran successfully for Senator in 1958.

Small towns in the Middle West usually vote Republican. Their votes do not change much. The city vote leans traditionally toward the Democrats, but with some shifting back and forth. The real puzzle is the farm vote. It jumps around from election to election, and often its relatively small proportion of the total vote proves decisive.

Professor Leon D. Epstein, a University of Wisconsin political scientist, studied the farm vote in his state. In his book, *Politics in Wisconsin*, he summed up the habits of the Wisconsin farm voter this way:

"If farmers are capable, in favorable circumstances, of being more Republican than any other group in the state, they can also, as in 1954, be much less Republican than voters in all groups of cities except those over 50,000 . . . The lavish attention which politicians of both parties give to farmers and farm issues [is based on] . . . the demonstrated capacity of Wisconsin farmers for wholesale switching of party allegiance."

If it is true that farm families in the Middle West do like to change their minds, what about the traditional talk of the "stable Republican farm vote in the corn belt"? This is an error which springs from the fact that the so-called farm county is rarely all or nearly all farm. A small county seat and several smaller towns may have more votes than all the farmers in the county. These small town people usually vote quite differently from their neighbors on the land.

One way of sorting out the farm vote is to find the townships in a given state or district that are classified by the census as eighty per cent rural-farm. In Wisconsin, these eighty per cent rural-farm townships add up to a total of 626 precincts which cast about 150,000 votes in 1956. This is only a sample of the farm vote, of course, but it is a big sample and widely distributed. It should provide a fair picture of voting attitudes.

What happened in 1952 and 1956, using this sample as a measure of the Wisconsin farm vote? Wisconsin farmers gave Eisenhower sixty-six per cent in 1952 and then dropped him sharply to fifty-five per cent in 1956. This shift, as in Iowa, went directly against the national trend and also against the trend in the small towns that sometimes dominate so-called farm counties.

The small town vote and the farm vote in a good many states habitually slant off in different directions. In Wisconsin, in the 1958 election for governor, this is the way the two-party vote divided:

	Nelson (Dem.)	Thomson (Rep.)
Farms	56.3%	43.7%
Small towns (2,500-9,999)	44.1	55.9
Cities (10,000 up)	58.5	41.5

Somewhat to the astonishment of both groups, farm and city voters tend to line up in much the same way. The small towns, however, look at politics differently.

Iowa shows the same picture. In the 1958 election for governor, this was the result:

	Loveless (Dem.)	Murray (Rep.)
Farms	55.0%	45.0%
Small towns	47.5	52.5
Cities	58.0	42.0

This is not a new development. In 1936 Iowa farmers voted 38.6 per cent Republican for President. Small towns were 52 per cent Republican, and cities were 43.6 per cent Republican.

Because the "farm counties" contain two quite different voting groups, political analysts are sometimes not quite sure what is going on in rural

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areas. Take Jackson county, Wisconsin. Most people would call it a farm county. The largest town is under 3,000. But in the Presidential election of 1956, the *farm* townships gave President Eisenhower 45.6 per cent, while the county seat, Black River Falls, gave him 65.2 per cent. Take another Wisconsin "farm county"—Polk. In 1956, the farm townships voted 43.6 per cent for Eisenhower, while one of the towns, St. Croix Falls, voted 80.1 per cent for him.

Taylor county, Iowa, is another example. The county seat gave Herschel Loveless, Democrat, 47.2 per cent for governor, while the farm townships voted for him by 60.8 per cent. In the special election in Iowa's Fourth Congressional District in 1959, the farm townships gave the Republican candidate 47.7 per cent, while the small towns gave him 59 per cent.

In Minnesota, an early 1960 poll by the Minneapolis *Tribune* showed the same division among farm, city, and small town votes.

	GOP Candidate for Governor
Farm	40%
Small towns	51
Cities	41

This is the pattern. It helps clear up the prevailing confusion over the "farm vote"; it also throws light on the notion that some state legislatures are "farmer dominated." In many cases, it is the courthouse crowd in the smaller county seats that exerts the most influence. Both city and farm representatives are often outvoted by the representatives of the towns.

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Why is there such a political difference between farm and small-town people in the same county? Some people think that there may be too many farm landlords around the square in the county seat and too many tenants out in the country.

Why the similarity in voting habits between farm and city people? Part of the explanation may lie in the changing work experience of farm men and women. Many of them have, or have had, city jobs. Many have relatives who work in the city. For instance, the *Wisconsin Agriculturist* Poll, in 1958, found that fifty-five per cent of the farm men, and sixty-two per cent of the farm women interviewed, had worked in town at some time. Of the men, twenty-three per cent had once been union members. This adds up to a considerable shift in the farm attitude toward labor unions. When the *Wisconsin Agriculturist* Poll asked all farmers, "Do you approve or disapprove of labor unions?," thirty-nine per cent said "Approve," and thirty-three per cent said "Disapprove." But men who had once been union members voted sixty-one per cent "Approve."

Economic difficulties seem to push cities and farm districts over to the Democratic side. When there is unemployment in the cities and low prices on the farms, there is usually a shift to Democratic candidates in both areas. Yet pocketbook voting doesn't always prevail. In 1952, for instance, Iowa farmers said, in several polls, that the Democrats would do more for farm income than Republicans. Yet they voted for General Eisenhower on the ground that he offered more hope for an end to the war in Korea than did the Democratic candidate.

The sharp decline in Republican farm strength in the Middle West from 1952 to 1958 is rooted in several causes. One is spelled Ezra Taft Benson. While the decline in farm income almost automatically made more farm Democrats, Benson's particular gift for rubbing farmers the wrong way undoubtedly helped this tendency.

Republican candidates in 1958 tried, often unsuccessfully, to escape the curse of Benson's approval. This year Nixon seems to be having better luck or more skill. While Democrats continue to quote Nixon's 1954 statements about Benson's virtues, many farmers seem convinced that Benson's day is over, no matter who wins. Benson, it seems, will not be so much help to the Democrats in 1960 as he was in 1958.

What will happen this year in the farm belt? In 1956, Eisenhower won a very thin margin in the farm vote in many Midwestern states. Will Nixon hold that margin?

The religious issue may help Nixon in many states. In Iowa, a recent *Wallaces Farmer* Poll showed some Protestants shying away from Kennedy. Among Protestants who voted for Loveless, Democrat, in the gubernatorial election of 1958, only half said they would vote for Kennedy in 1960. There are a number of undecided Protestants who may boost the Kennedy total a little by election time, but at the end of summer Kennedy looked weaker among Iowa farmers than Stevenson had been at the same time in 1956.

In Wisconsin last spring, an early poll by the *Wisconsin Agriculturist* showed religion playing a big part in the Presidential primary there. Catholics voted for Kennedy and Protestants for Senator Hubert Humphrey. There are more Catholic voters in Wisconsin than in Iowa, and Kennedy's chances therefore look better in Wisconsin.

The farm vote in Minnesota, according to a poll by the Minneapolis *Tribune,* is favorable, as of August, to the Democrats. Here Humphrey's popularity may be the key to the situation. He pulled sixty-seven per cent of the farm vote and may have helped to get Kennedy up to forty-eight per cent. This gave Kennedy a slight lead over Nixon both on the farms and in the state as a whole.

About one-fifth of the farm voters in Iowa say they have not yet made up their minds. Many farmers in other states say they are undecided. There can, therefore, be some last minute shifts, as in 1948, when low corn prices pushed the farm vote to Harry Truman, and, as in 1956, when the Suez crisis helped Eisenhower.

Which way will the shifts go this year? It looks as if trouble abroad would help the Republicans. Worry about farm prices and unemployment would help the Democrats.

The impact of crisis overseas is shown by the shift in the Iowa farm vote in two weeks this summer. It was at the time of the Congo outbreak and the Powers' trial in Moscow. The Iowa Poll (conducted by the Des Moines *Register* in late July) gave Democratic candidates a higher farm vote than did the *Wallaces Farmer* Poll conducted two weeks later when front page headlines emphasized tension abroad. Apparently, Nixon profited by increasing popular concern about trouble overseas.

A crisis in farm affairs may change the picture. Shortage of wheat storage space in the Great Plains, or a sharp drop in hog prices—these developments would help Democratic candidates. If they could just get Benson back in the public eye, it might help them a great deal.

The farm vote will continue to puzzle politicians and pollsters right up to Election Day. Farmers don't have to register in most states. Farmers who have not voted for years, and who originally did not intend to vote this year, may take a last minute notion to go to the polls. That is why Nixon made a speech at a plowing match at Guthrie Center, Iowa, and why Kennedy told about his farm program at another plowing match at Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Each will keep hoping to the last minute that the shifting farm vote will finally shift his way.

The Domestic Image of Soviet Foreign Policy

by SIDNEY LENS

Sidney Lens recently returned from a swing through the Soviet Union in company with nine other American trade union officials. He visited Moscow, Leningrad, Tashkent (Central Asia), Sochi (in the Caucasus), and Kiev. Mr. Lens is the author of several books, including The Crisis of American Labor *and* The Counterfeit Revolution. *His articles have appeared in many American publications, including* The Yale Review, The Harvard Business Quarterly, The New Republic, *and* Liberation.

WHERE THE TRAIN from Poland carried us across the border into the Soviet Union this summer, there is a bridge over the tracks displaying a large sign: *Mir*—Peace. Guarding the bridge, the sign, and the Soviet Union is a young soldier, rifle raised, surveying the visitors from the outer world. At the station in Brest, just inside the Soviet border, are more soldiers, some unarmed, others carrying their guns with careless abandon.

All over the Soviet Union there are thousands of similar signs—*Mir, Mir i Drujba* (Peace and Friendship), *Mir Miru* (Peace for the World). The soldiers seem less apparent in the interior, perhaps because they are engulfed by the streaming masses of civilians in the state stores, in the streets, and in the parks.

Which is the true face of Russia, the *Mir* signs, or the armed soldiers—or both?

Talking with Soviet leaders or reading the Soviet press helps little in resolving this question. There is always a feeling of careful manipulation. Everything is said or written for a purpose, and the immediate purpose may often be merely a fleeting and misleading deviation from a long term trend.

The atmosphere, relatively calm and relaxed before the abortive Paris Summit conference, was sharp and tense once again. Almost no conversation, with leader or worker, ended without reference to the U-2 incident. "Why do you send planes over our territory?" asked a woman at the Moskvitch auto plant plaintively. There was no anger or ill-will among the people, as contrasted with the leaders, only a sort of sadness and a desire to let things be.

During our stay the RB-47 incident hit the headlines. "Spontaneous" protest meetings were called in many factories, and each factory paper carried indignant letters. The tone of the Soviet press towards foreign visitors changed perceptibly. There were broad hints that not all the tourists were just tourists, and Russians were warned not to buy "dirty shirts" from foreigners. During this period the Soviet press was also sharply critical of the United States' role in Cuba, and that of the United Nations in the Congo.

There were worried faces in the foreign community. Were these incidents the prelude to intensification of the cold war? Was Nikita Khrushchev making a grand shift back to Stalinism? Or was it all part of a maneuver for position in a domestic political struggle or in a struggle embracing the far-flung outposts of Communism?

Looking at the face of Russia there was no ready answer to vexing questions. Why, after building up the Summit idea for years, did Khrushchev wreck the meeting in Paris? Was he under pressure from the secondary Soviet leadership? The army? China? Undoubtedly there were some pressures within the Soviet bloc against the Summit, but how they operated and who they involved were questions not easily answered.

Rumors in Moscow label the army a rigid opponent of every attempt at demobilization. Ordinarily Khruschev commands a sufficient majority in the councils of the Communist Party to carry the day. But the U-2 incident caused some of his followers to hold back and thus put his policy in jeopardy. Even as he was boarding the plane for Paris—so the story goes—Khrushchev had to go into session with Communist Party leaders to seek a formula for action. The forces were so evenly divided, however, that the Prime Minister was immobilized.

This estimate has a ring of truth to it, though one can never be certain. The dispute with China is more susceptible of verification. Polish Communists with whom I discussed it considered the conflict with Peking a fight to the finish. Within both Russia and China there are elements for and against the official view. Yet, one can not pinpoint these forces accurately, nor can one estimate their relative power. The power alignments in the Kremlin are just too difficult to penetrate—nor do they remain stable.

An example of their fluidity is the Malenkov-Molotov alliance of a few years ago. Malenkov stood for a relatively soft policy, favoring co-existence and a large increase in consumer goods; Molotov was a neo-Stalinist. When Khrushchev, in the center, isolated both, he forced them into an alliance for survival which completely blurred their political hostilities. This sort of blurring occurs repeatedly; any attempt to assess Soviet policy through the rising or declining fortunes of individual leaders must include this factor.

A much more informative guidepost to Soviet international policy is the internal policy of the Soviet government. Whether Khrushchev was set to pursue a hard line or a soft line toward the West would be revealed in the extent of the housing program, the availability of consumer goods, the nature of the seven-year plan, the "tightness" of the Communist Party, the line of propaganda. It is in domestic policy that foreign policy both begins and ends, and it is here that we must seek an explanation for Khrushchev's behavior, both before and after Paris.

The evidence in the area of internal policy is unmistakable. The internal orientation of Soviet life has remained unchanged in the face of the Summit collapse, the U-2 and the RB-47 incidents, and the loud diplomatic denunciations of the United States. The paced reduction of the work-week from forty-six to forty-one hours has continued without interruption. The drive to build millions of new apartments still has a top priority. Supplies of consumer goods continue a slow but steady rise. Khrushchev's special brand of Communism—so little understood in the West—stands intact.

The Soviet regime is still a dictatorship. The liberties we consider the essence of freedom are lacking. But within the context of Communism, the Soviet Union of Khrushchev persists as a radical departure from that of Stalin's time. Soviet society is in transition away from naked terror toward a degree of liberalization. When the Editor of *The Progressive* was in Moscow in 1956 he recorded the beginnings of this process; today it is much more clearly delineated.

In Warsaw, before I reached Moscow, I had a talk with a Polish revisionist. Though a member of the Communist Party, he was frankly critical. He conceded that the party's popularity was not high — if there were a free election, he believed it would do well to get ten per cent of the vote. While he favored the system generally, he felt it should be modified to include freedom of speech and press, organized factions within the party, and economic reform such as retail cooperatives and a free market in light industry.

"Are there any people like you in the Soviet Union?" I asked him.

He said he knew some personally, but he refused to give me their addresses "at this stage." "The closest thing to a revisionist you will find," he said, "is Khrushchev. He is a half-revisionist."

The term stuck with me throughout my trip. Khrushchev stands midway between Stalinism and freedom, neither with one nor the other, but definitely oriented in the direction of greater liberalism.

This is a theme that many Americans will find alien. We have become prisoners of our own cliches to the point where our image of the Soviet Union is at least a decade out of date. We cannot believe that Communism can—or will—change. After forty-three years the Soviet regime is for us a set, solid, impregnable fortress of dictatorship.

But this is a myopic estimate. Soviet society is dynamic. As the economy becomes more viable it generates important new pressures. This year steel production will rise to somewhere between sixty-one and seventy million tons—not much below the American level. By 1980, according to Khrushchev, it will soar to 240 million tons. During the present seven-year plan, which will end in 1965, the chemical industry—now second only to that of the United States—will triple its output. This will augment considerably the production of consumer goods such as cloth, plastics, and furniture. The supply of meat is expected to double, that of wool to increase by seventy per cent, shoes by forty-five per cent.

Russia's economy is reaching the stage that John Strachey calls "the

hump." Up to now it has deprived its people of innumerable necessities in order to form capital for heavy industry. Once it goes beyond the "hump," however, it can reverse the process. It no longer will have to squeeze its citizens so cruelly. It will be able to raise living standards and expand heavy industry at the same time. Whether the moment for this change is 1965 or 1970, there is clearly a movement in that direction. And Khrushchev's "half-revisionism" reflects this historical moment and the pressures that have generated it. It differs from Stalinism in much the way that Tito's Communism or Gomulka's differs from the original variety.

Since the execution of Beria, the secret police has been stripped of its economic function, and forced labor abolished. Instead, normal incentives are being used to open up virgin lands: higher wages, better quarters, promises of advancement, and the relentless propaganda of patriotism. In distant places wages are twenty-five to one hundred per cent higher than in Moscow.

The juridical structure has been drastically revamped. The purge trials, so characteristic of the 1930's and the period immediately before Stalin's death, are evidently things of the past. So are the thousands of secret trials in which special councils tried cases in the absence of the accused.

We were told by V. A. Boldirev, Minister of Law of the Russian Federated Republic, that under the new codes of Soviet jurisprudence the presumption of innocence is with the defendant. The accused has the right to subpena records and witnesses. No one may be arrested without a warrant. How far these guarantees are adhered to, I do not know. But knowledgeable Americans agree that the flagrant transgressions of justice in the past no longer occur; there is an increasing development in the direction of legality.

This juridical structure still lacks many of the safeguards so long established in the West. There is no bail. A warrant is signed by the prosecutor rather than a judge. A man can be held for investigation for as long as ten months. There are still some people in "forced residence" in Siberia. The basic freedoms of speech, assembly, and press are still absent. But these are the residues of an old policy, not the precursors of a new Stalinism. There is, most of all, a marked decline of fear in today's Soviet Union. People are speaking more freely than they have since the

1920's. A brilliant chemistry student, who did not say a favorable word for the regime after hours of conversation, ended with the surprising statement: "I must tell you the truth. I like this system. It gives us real security. The only thing is that the practice is not like the theory. If we could have some freedom it would be a good way to live."

The other side of this coin is the steady increase in living standards. For decades the Soviet citizen has been subjected to a shortage of consumer goods so that the state could build basic industry. This fundamental imbalance, carried over from Stalinism, is still visible. Russian steel mills, according to two American experts we met at the U. S. Embassy, are more modern than ours. Russian planes, sputniks, and other technical accomplishments suggest a high level of industrial development. But thousands of everyday goods just have not been available. The economy of scarcity is most glaringly visible in the severe housing shortage.

Now, however, the disparity is being remedied. Heavy industry is still the major preoccupation of Khrushchev's regime, but consumer goods and housing are slowly becoming available. During the seven-year plan fifteen million apartments will be constructed, and seven million people will be helped to build private homes. New quarters will be provided for fully one-quarter of the population by 1965.

The improvement of living standards is visible in two other areas as well—on the farms and in the stores. Collective farmers, who in 1953 were on the brink of disaster, have made a significant comeback. Khrushchev raised the state prices for produce and lowered the quotas that collectives were required to deliver to the market. Central machine stations were dissolved and collective farms were allowed to buy their own tractors and other equipment. Taxes on produce grown by the collective farmer on the small plot allotted for his private use have been abolished.

Equally heartening for the Soviet citizen is the increasing supply of consumer goods—not yet adequate by our standards but greater than ever before in Soviet history. Queues in front of butcher shops and food stores are becoming smaller. There is slightly more produce and fruits, though far from enough, and somewhat more cloth and footwear, but again far from sufficient. But there is more than last year, and last year there was more than the year before, and probably next year will see a still greater supply.

The liberalization of Soviet life—the "half-revisionism"—is visible in every sphere, even in the functioning of the Communist Party. After Khrushchev returned from Paris there were members who openly criticized him for not going through with the meeting. This could not have happened in Stalin's day.

The Communist Party is still a monolith. Organized factions are not permitted. But every foreigner we talked to conceded that there have been three important changes in the Party structure:

¶ The area of decision has been widened. Though Khrushchev is the party "boss," he does not rule alone; he must consult and be guided by a few dozen, perhaps a few hundred, others. There is no attempt to glorify

him as there was with Stalin. In our three weeks in Russia we saw thousands of pictures of Lenin, a dozen or two of Stalin, merely a few of Khrushchev.

¶ Party nuclei participate more in secondary decisions than they did before and are more informed of what is going on at the top.

¶ There is a tolerance for criticism —so long as it does not result in factionalism—that is far greater than in Stalin's day.

To many people this may sound like a "change without a difference." But the loosening within the Communist Party reflects itself in almost every facet of life, the unions, culture, the youth organization. None of these has changed fundamentally. The prime function of unions is still to boost production. Soviet culture still acts as an apologia for the system. And Komsomol, with its 18.5 million young members, is still the watchdog among the youth for the regime. However, the change in emphasis and detail is not without significance; it indicates the transition character of much of what is going on in Soviet Russia.

Student groups are not bombarded with political indoctrination nearly so much as they were a decade ago. Komsomol has become less political and more oriented to cultural activities and sports. Students in several cities confirmed this observation.

A new magazine, *Abroad,* came out recently with an uncensored reproduction of one of Adlai Stevenson's speeches and a moderate appraisal of Allen Dulles. For the first time in decades the Soviets have republished John Reed's *Ten Days that Shook the World* with glowing references to Trotsky intact. The minutes of early Bolshevik Congresses, all the way back to 1897, are being printed anew, giving intellectuals an opportunity to become acquainted with opposition and dissension. The new novels are no longer the "boy meets lathe machine, boy falls in love with lathe machine" type.

These are the indications of the current transition. Their essence is to be found in:

¶ The de-emphasis of terror in favor of "subtle persuasion."

¶ The attempt to build some kind of popular political base.

¶ The slow emergence of pressure forces that some day will play an independent role.

It is no longer fear of imprisonment that motivates Soviet conformity, but the more sensitive concern that "you can't buck the system." Everything the Russian citizen does and everything he needs depend on the good will of a small, tight body of men in the Communist Party. Tired after a long bout with privation and war, ever on the alert that Stalinism *can* return, he prefers to live cautiously.

The state now tries to apply mild pressures, to cajole. The recalcitrant Russian finds it difficult to get a new apartment, or a low-cost vacation in the rest homes, or a better job, or a scholarship. He may be called before a "comrades court" of his neighbors, or he may be given a long lecture by his union committee or the Komsomol. In some cases he may be ordered to have a psychiatric examination. But the new regime shies away from using total police power. It pacifies the population, instead, with consumer goods and wheedles it with incentives.

Khrushchev has started what may be an irreversible process. As he raises living standards, there is a relaxation of fear and a loosening of



controls. And as fear lessens, incipient pressures emerge from consumers, urging more concessions in the direction of legality and consumer goods.

What is the significance for the West of the Khrushchev transformations in Soviet internal policy? Translated into foreign policy, the new Soviet domestic reforms mean a sustained and long-term quest for a *modus vivendi* with America. Otherwise the present internal policy makes no sense.

If Khrushchev felt that war was inevitable he would not embark on so ambitious a program of providing consumer goods and housing. Russia is still a long way from the United States in its production of heavy goods. Its gross national product is only forty to fifty per cent of America's, and for an appreciably larger population. If the Russian leader felt that war was on the immediate agenda he would bend every effort to bridge the industrial gap. He would use whatever time still remained before hostilities to catch up with America's steel potential, aircraft industry, and machine-tool equipment, rather than building apartment houses. He would delay satisfying the needs of his people, just as Stalin did.

Stalin's hard policies after 1929, it should be remembered, were a result of his belief that war with capitalism was not only certain but near. To build the industrial machine required for military defense, he was prepared to sacrifice the living standards of his people. He sought to catch up with the West almost exclusively in heavy industry; the rest was irrelevant so long as war was imminent. The hard policy in external affairs thus tied in with the hard policy internally—the lack of consumer goods, police terror, purge trials, and the rest. The same can be said of Stalin's hard policy during the cold war. Strained international relations went hand in hand with strained internal relations.

Khrushchev's "half-revisionism," on the other hand, is a *soft* policy in both areas. Everything about Khrushchev's internal policy suggests the belief that peace is possible, that "time can be bought." And the drive to outstrip America in both industry and living standards requires time.

This thesis is strongly confirmed by the present ideological fight within the Communist world. The conflict with China is not a mere maneuver to deceive the West, but the most serious dispute in world Communist ranks since 1924. It is racking—and will continue to rack—every Communist Party in the world. Khrushchev claims that capitalism can now exist without war, that Leninism must be "up-dated" to include this concept. The Chinese insist that war is inevitable, that eventually the capitalist

world will take to rockets and hydrogen bombs.

In its own way this dispute is more important than even the Trotsky-Stalin conflict over "socialism in one country." For Stalin the theory of "socialism in one country" meant that nothing could be expected either from "world revolution" or an attempted understanding with capitalism. The only hope was to build heavy industry, and the devil take the cost. For Mao today the theory of capitalist inflexibility is an ideological underpinning for a similar internal course. Since war is inevitable, in Mao's thinking, the Chinese people must make their sacrifices to build a steel industry *now;* otherwise they will pay a greater price once hostilities begin.

Khrushchev's revisionism has precisely the opposite implications. Since war is *not* inevitable there is time to satisfy the pent-up hunger of his people. One can argue, of course, that this hunger is forcing some concessions, that it cannot be sidetracked longer. But this is a naive concept. Khrushchev, like Stalin, could let his secret police run riot—if his concept of the world outlook were the same as that of the late tyrant.

Before the present ideological conflict is over there may be much in the fabric of Khrushchev's Communism that will be unrecognizable. Tito's break with Stalin's "hard" policy also started as a small breach and widened with each succeeding year. It is entirely conceivable that Khrushchev may be forced into a similar path. Once a Communist concedes that capitalism can exist without war, he must alter not only his foreign policy but his estimate of capitalism's internal potential as well.

Thus Khrushchev's "half-revisionism" has, so far, far-reaching and self-propelling implications. The three facets of this "half-revisionism" mesh into a single new Soviet approach—more consumer goods internally, a foreign policy of co-existence, and a new theory of capitalism.

The people, of course, have had their fill of war. They remember the twenty-five million casualties, affecting one of every two families, of World War II. More important for the Russian Ivan, however, is the interlinking of peace and a higher living standard. He knows instinctively that if tensions relax he will get his new apartment, more meat, some furniture. For thirty years he has been waiting for the fulfillment of his leaders' promises of the good life. Now he thinks he sees it on the horizon. The economy is reaching the level where it *can* satisfy these pent-up wants. Ivan doesn't want this prospect squandered on military gambles and international tensions. Co-existence and consumer goods are interchangeable with him.



As for the regime, it too can only gain with time. It can accede to the pressures of its people for higher standards only if the cold war relaxes. Khrushchev's whole policy appears to be tied to these twin-objectives; if they become unrealistic he, too, must go down the drain of history. That is why, for all his crude diatribes in public, he leaves the door open for another Summit, and for further disarmament talks. That is why Powers was given a moderate ten-year sentence (in contrast to the thirty-year sentence for the Soviet spy Colonel Abel here in the United States).

Equally significant is the striking fact that the Soviets are winning major battles in the struggle of co-existence without firing a shot. Each national revolution tips the scale further away from the West. In a short three-week period recently, Cuba slammed the door on America, the Congo was poised to move out of the Western orbit, and Laos declared its neutralism. Why risk war when political victories come so easily?

Time is Khrushchev's greatest ally. The blunders of American policy not only strengthen his hand abroad, but internally as well. Every time an American general or politician emphasizes "positions of military strength" he alienates the Russian people, who are genuinely afraid of this saber-rattling, and consolidates the Soviet citizen behind the Soviet regime, achieving precisely the opposite result from the one intended.

Nothing impressed me more in my three weeks in Russia than the sheer uselessness—indeed, the self-defeatfeating character—of present American foreign policy. We do not grasp the inner motivations of Soviet behavior. Khrushchev undoubtedly intends to spread his social doctrine, but the wellsprings of Soviet life and the balance of terror created by rockets and H-bombs impel him to do this by essentially political means. Communism in the past has executed many zig-zags. But Communism, under Stalin, wasn't so concerned about popular support—it always was ready to use the police. Khrushchev, on the other hand, is building a popular base among the managerial element, the peasants, and heavy industry workers. If he were intent on war he would change his propaganda emphasis to carry these forces along with him.

That he does not is a good omen for the United States. It means that if we de-emphasize our saber-rattling in favor of a social and political approach to world problems we might exercise a deep impact on the Russian people. If we were to emphasize a policy of sustained aid to the national revolutions in Africa, Asia, and Latin America we could speed the process of relaxing tensions within the Soviet Union too. We would give impetus to those growing internal pressures in Russia calling for further relaxation and still more consumer goods. To the extent that we in America continue our preoccupation with military planning we feed the doubts of those who feel that the time for full relaxation is not yet here; we also give the regime an excellent "out" for keeping the tempo of relaxation slower than it might be.

If we were to abandon our rigid course of relying so heavily on armaments in our conduct of foreign affairs, we might not only begin to win some victories—for a change—in the underdeveloped areas; we might also help speed the process of revisionism in the Communist world as well.

TWO REVOLUTIONS

by ROBERT J. ALEXANDER

THE PYROTECHNICS of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro's running disputes with the United States have overshadowed a development which may have much greater significance for Castro's Cuba, all of Latin America, and the entire world. This is the rivalry between the Cuban revolution and a similar rebellion in progress in Venezuela. At stake is the leadership of the widespread—and growing—movement for social change throughout Latin America.

The Venezuelan revolution was launched a year earlier than Cuba's with the overthrow of dictator Marcos Perez Jimenez on January 23, 1958. As in Cuba, the end of the tyranny was the beginning of a broad process of economic, social, and political change, the first stage of which was undertaken by a junta of three military men and two civilians.

The junta, which conceived its basic job to be the establishment of a civilian constitutional regime, decreed a new election law, carried out a registration of all the country's voters, and presided over the election of December, 1958, in which a new president and congress as well as all state legislatures and municipal councils were chosen. The junta turned over the government to the constitutional authorities on February 13, 1959.

But during its year in power, the junta had achieved a good deal more than even this remarkable accomplishment. It had begun the process of social change which gained momentum after the establishment of constitutional government. The provisional government appointed an Agrarian Reform Commission, composed of peasant federation leaders, agronomists and other technicians, landowners, bankers, businessmen, trade unionists, and representatives of four political parties: Accion Democratica, the Catholic Social Copei, Union Republicana Democratica, and the Communists. Pending enactment of an agrarian reform law, the provisional government reactivated the Agrarian Reform Institute, which began the distribution of land confiscated from deposed dictator Perez Jimenez and his associates, as well as other government holdings—a partial answer to the problem of returning to the land many hundreds of thousands of peasants who had migrated to Caracas in recent years.

The provisional regime enacted emergency measures made necessary because the dictatorship had left a rifled and all but empty treasury, plus more than $100 million in debts. The situation was complicated almost immediately by a restriction of oil imports from Venezuela by the United States. To meet the unemployment which coincided with these problems, the government established a so-called Emergency Public Work Program, which consisted of employing some workers on actual construction and putting a larger number on a dole. The junta also enacted a change in the oil industry's contribution to the national treasury, through new taxes increasing from fifty per cent to sixty per cent the government's share of oil profits.

The provisional government carried out its job under great difficulties. It was under constant threat of subversion by military leaders who had profited from the Perez Jimenez regime and who resented the cutting off of fruitful sources of graft. They were opposed to turning government control over to an elected civilian administration. There were two serious revolts which were thwarted by loyal segments of the armed forces, backed by general strike movements supported by both organized labor and organized employers.

The election of December, 1958, was vigorously contested. Victory went to Romulo Betancourt, of the moderate leftist Accion Democratica Party, one of the most outstanding contemporary Latin American political leaders. Founder of Accion Democratica as spokesman for democratic social revolutionary forces, Betancourt served as provisional president after a military-civilian coup in October, 1945. His administration of two and a half years and the short-lived rule of his elected successor, Romulo Gallegos (also of Accion Democratica) were outstanding in honesty and remarkable in their efforts to increase the government's oil revenues for the purpose of developing the economy and improving the people's living standards.

Betancourt spent nine years in exile after a military coup had deposed Gallegos in November, 1948. He used this period not only to lead from abroad his party's struggle against the tyranny, but to study deeply his country's problems. He returned to Venezuela convinced of the basic soundness of the kind of program his government of the 1940's had advanced. But he was also aware of the need for an attitude of greater mutual tolerance among the political parties. He was still a convinced democrat.

After Betancourt's election the three major parties—Accion Democratica, Copei, and the Union Republicana Democratica—agreed on a coalition government. The formula was worked out only the day before Betancourt took office. It was agreed that Accion Democratica, although the party with the greatest plurality, would have only two ministers, Copei and URD would have three each, and

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the remaining cabinet posts would be filled by independents.

The first year of the new regime was spent laying the groundwork for the forthcoming democratic administration's program. An important step was the enactment of an agrarian reform law, based on the report of the commission established by the provisional regime. This law, which is now in effect, is the result of many months of study and debate, and is designed not only to redistribute the country's land, but to reorganize completely the nation's agriculture. Social justice, increased production, and greater diversity are its three objectives.

Under the law, government land will be distributed, as will unused land of private owners, which is to be expropriated and paid for by government bonds. The price of the expropriated land will be decided by negotiation between the National Agrarian Institute and the landholders. Large landholdings which are being efficiently used by modern methods will not be touched.

Land subject to the reform will be distributed to landless peasants and those with holdings too small to be efficient. The new owners will get full title to the land and will pay for it over a period of twenty to thirty years, with the annual payment limited to no more than five per cent of the gross value of the crop.

One of the purposes of the law is to create an individual, independent peasantry. However, if groups of peasants so wish, they may establish cooperative farms. The beneficiaries of the agrarian reform will be granted necessary credits by the government's Banco Agricola y Pecuario, whose resources are to be expanded.

Land granted the peasants cannot be mortgaged or otherwise encumbered. The peasant may sell his land before he has completed payments, but only to someone who is entitled under the Agrarian Reform Law to receive land, and only after having first offered to sell it to the National Agrarian Institute.

Finally, the government undertakes in the law to carry out a general agricultural survey to determine what parts of the country are best adapted to what types of production. It will then specify that the land be used for that particular purpose, and extend necessary financial and technical aid to peasants who must change their type of cultivation.

Another fundamental aspect of the Betancourt regime's program is economic development. An extensive planning apparatus has been established, within the President's office, to coordinate the activities of the Venezuelan Development Corporation, the government banks—Banco Central, Banco Agricola y Pecuario, and Banco Industrial—as well as various ministries working in the economic field. All of these institutions have been given extensive additional resources. Early in 1960 the planning board presented a program, which the government accepted, for economic development during the last four years of Betancourt's presidency.

Betancourt hopes to use both government and private capital resources in this development program. The half-finished steel plant and the semi-completed petrochemical industry will remain in government hands, and there will be established a new national oil company to exploit some of the country's untapped petroleum reserves. But the government welcomes efforts of private entrepreneurs, both domestic and foreign, to establish other new industries. Tariffs have been increased to encourage such investments, and the government is negotiating a revision of the existing commercial agreement with the United States to permit more extensive tariff changes.

This program is in conformity with Betancourt's economic philosophy. He has consistently argued that a sensible policy of nationalism should accept foreign investment—but under careful control. Foreign firms should be encouraged only in those fields which the government feels are necessary, and the state should fix the conditions of their entry. However, Betancourt realizes that foreign investors must have opportunities to make reasonable profits if Venezuela is to attract capital.



In conformity with this philosophy, Betancourt has opposed the idea of nationalizing the oil industry, the principal source of Venezuela's foreign exchange. He has argued that it is more intelligent to allow foreign companies to continue to exploit oil, while seeking to gain for Venezuela the largest possible returns. He supplements this approach with the idea that the income thus acquired should be invested to diversify the economy, so as to make Venezuela capable of standing on its own feet after petroleum resources have disappeared. But Betancourt also feels that part of the oil industry should be taken over by the government through the establishment of a government oil firm which could exploit areas not granted as concessions to foreign firms.

In foreign relations, the Betancourt regime is following the policy of asserting the right of Venezuela to chart its own course. At the same time, it is making clear that Venezuela stands basically with the West. Betancourt has sought friendship with the United States, but only on the basis of full recognition by the United States of the sovereignty, political and economic, of Venezuela. He has exerted great pressure against the still existing dictatorships in Latin America.

Betancourt's regime faces two principal risks. First is the military, which is still not only restless but reluctant to permit a civilian administration to govern. The government must be constantly on the alert for attempts to overthrow it. The military menace also forces unity upon the three major parties, and intensifies the quarrels concerning matters of program, as well as questions of patronage which are inherent in a coalition government. There is always the lurking danger that if one of the parties goes into opposition, it will begin to plot with discontented military men, as at least one of them did during the Accion Democratica regime of the 1940's.

The other difficulty is on the civilian front. It comes from the extreme nationalist elements, including politicians who are sincere and also those who seek to use extreme nationalism as a facile way to power. The latter

are aided and abetted by the Communist Party. Much of the Union Republicana Democratica is found in this element, as was a faction of Betancourt's own Accion Democratica which was expelled early in April, 1960. The Communists are trying to encourage attacks on the principal leaders of Accion Democratica by the dissident elements recently expelled from that party, as well as by the URD. The Communist Party itself is becoming increasingly violent in its vituperation against government leaders, particularly Betancourt, a former Communist himself and its strongest adversary.

The current hero of the extreme nationalists is Fidel Castro. From their point of view, he shines because he violently thumbs his nose at the United States. This has great appeal because of the widespread dislike of the United States now current in Latin America. Castro is also dramatizing the social revolution he is carrying out in Cuba much more effectively than are the Venezuelan leaders their own process of social transformation.

The progress of the Betancourt regime in Venezuela and the Castro government in Cuba is being watched carefully in many countries. The Castro regime is carrying out most of the same basic reforms as those in Venezuela, though in a very different way, and in an increasingly dictatorial atmosphere. There is widespread frustration at the apparently slow progress of democratic social reform in Latin America, a frustration which has found expression in enthusiastic support of the Castro regime. The Venezuelan revolution may determine whether necessary social changes can be brought to Latin America while still preserving political democracy.

There are many parallels between Venezuela and Cuba. Both governments are popular regimes following brutal military dictatorships. Both offer a broad series of reforms. Castro, like Betancourt, has instituted agrarian reform. His law provides for expropriation of all landholdings over 990 acres, no exception being made for economically managed units. The land may be distributed either directly to individual farmers, or it may be organized into cooperatives. In practice, almost all of the Cuban land has been placed in government-run so-called cooperatives, with managers named by the Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria. The Instituto has been given overriding control over all Cuba's agriculture. It has a monopoly on purchase and sale of virtually all agricultural produce. It also controls all rural credit, and determines the country's industrialization effort.

Economic development is the same kind of key to Castro's program as it is to Betancourt's. But economic development in Cuba is being carried out in a completely different fashion from that in Venezuela. In Cuba, all private investment is discouraged, at least for the present. All new industries are under the Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria, and the only foreign funds used are those borrowed by the government from the countries of the Soviet bloc.

Foreign private investments in Cuba are being expropriated. No foreign firm is to be allowed to own a sugar mill. All foreign-owned sugar lands are being expropriated. The U.S.-owned telephone and electric companies have been "intervened" and probably will be expropriated. Foreign-owned industrial plants may well be next, and the three foreign oil refineries have already been seized. Castro and his aides have made it clear that they do not want, and do not feel they need, foreign private capital for Cuba's economic development.

The emphasis of Cuban social reform is on speed—in contrast with Venezuela, where careful planning is preceding each major reform move. In Cuba there is an air of improvisation about everything. At the same time, there is undoubtedly a feeling of exhilaration, adventure, and Goliath-killing in Cuba which is absent in Venezuela.

The Cuban regime has carried on an increasingly violent attack on the U.S. government and press. Although there is ample justification in past history for anti-U.S. government feeling, and in current events for the Cuban government's resentment towards the press, there is evidence that the attacks on the United States are not just an emotional reaction but the result of a deliberate policy decision by the Castro regime. In the first seven or eight months after Castro's ascension to power, his regime seemed to be seeking a rapprochement with the United States, but in late 1959 there was a sudden switch in policy, signaled by the launching of violent attacks on the United States.

Subsequently, the Castro regime has sought close relations with the Soviet Union. The two countries have exchanged visits by high-ranking officials. A commercial and economic aid agreement was signed in March, 1960. Local Cuban Communists have been given an increasingly prominent part in the operation of the regime.

The Cuban shift in foreign policy coincided with an alteration of internal policy, with a definite abandonment of whatever plans the regime first had for reestablishing democratic, constitutional government in the proximate future. During the first six months of 1960 all freedom of press was destroyed, autonomy of the universities was suppressed, and the trade unions were submitted to virtually military control. All political leaders who had fought Batista, but had not been members of the Castro 26th of July Movement and were not willing to submit to all of the policies of the regime, were either jailed, went into exile, or were forced to be silent.

The contrasting paths taken by the social revolution in Venezuela and Cuba are of key importance for all Latin America. If the democratic, slower paced, moderate Venezuelan way fails and the fast-moving, tightly controlled approach succeeds, the Cuban pattern may well be followed widely elsewhere in Latin America, to the grave detriment of all hopes for political democracy in the region, as well as to the future relations between Latin America and the United States. On the other hand, if the Venezuelan experiment in democratic social revolution is successful, there may still be a chance—given a new and far-sighted orientation of United States policy in the area—for a genuine new beginning in establishing a solid basis for cooperation between the two parts of the hemisphere. The fruit at the end of the vine is the achievement of social justice, political democracy, and economic development throughout the New World.

the White Noose of the Suburbs



by MARGARET H. BACON

IN COMMON with most major American cities, Philadelphia has experienced a tremendous outward expansion since the close of World War II. Stretching out into the five counties surrounding this historic City of Brotherly Love are ring after ring of suburbs, composed mainly of new housing developments, virtually all of which are closed to Negro families.

Within the city itself the immigration of Southern Negroes—another national postwar trend—has brought the Negro population up to twenty-four per cent of Philadelphia's 2,208,000 residents. As more and more white families move out to the all-white suburbs, the proportion of Negro to white in the city grows daily greater. And because much of the new Negro population is in the unskilled class, the result is an increase of density of population in the slums, a drop in tax revenue, and a sharp rise in racial tension, all of which menace Philadelphia's ambitious urban renewal program. Mayor Richardson Dilworth has described his City of Brotherly Love as a city slowly being strangled by a "white noose."

The future health of Philadelphia and its dependent suburbs demands that the strands of this noose be frayed. The solution, many people feel, is to help those middle class Negroes who share the station-wagon, ranch-house aspirations of their white peers to find houses throughout the suburban areas. The present situation, in which Negro lawyers, doctors, teachers, and businessmen can live only in Germantown or in Yeadon, a Delaware county suburb, will lead only to the creation of more ghettos.

The Philadelphia suburbs are not alone in facing this challenge. Sparked in part by the National Council of Churches, volunteer groups are active in New England, in the Midwest, and all along the West Coast, trying to find houses for middle class Negroes in traditionally white areas. In the Philadelphia suburbs volunteer efforts led, more than three years ago, to the creation of a unique business enterprise, Friends Suburban Housing, Inc., a conventional real estate firm with the unconventional aim of making sales to anyone with the taste and the pocketbook for suburban living.

The inspiration for Friends Suburban Housing seemed to come from several directions at once. In the fall of 1955 a Swarthmore group under the chairmanship of Mike Yarrow of the American Friends Service Committee began meeting to discuss how best they might desegregate their all-white neighborhoods. At about the same time Margaret Collins, a Bryn Mawr decorator, began to talk with her Main Line friends about the same problem. Meanwhile the recent establishment of Concord Park, Philadelphia's first integrated suburban housing development, had sharpened the interest of some parents in raising their children in integrated neighborhoods.

During the winter of 1955 all these rivulets of interest began to run together into a series of informal meetings which came to fruition in June, 1956, in the formal organization of Friends Suburban Housing.

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FSH differs from other real estate brokers in that it accepts only listings which are open to all. (It once turned down a house because the owners wanted to sell to Negroes only.) In all white neighborhoods it gives preference to Negroes, while in fringe areas, or blocks in transition, it looks for white buyers in order to stabilize the situation. Although it shows houses openly to either white or Negro buyers, it does not poll the neighborhood for its reaction. After a minority family has moved in, FSH follows up with efforts to promote the successful integration of the family into the community.

While all this sounds simple enough, in practice few of the firm's more than thirty sales have moved along without difficulty. Suitable listings have been hard to find; buyers have sometimes proved excessively particular; mortgage money has been scarce; community reaction—stirred often by some prejudiced individual—has several times flared to the danger point. In one Delaware county community an industrial designer, a Negro who had bought a modest home for his bride, was pressured into immediate resale by threats of mob violence, while in a similar area a skilled Negro worker found his home a mass of smoking ashes the day before he was to move in. The industrial designer withdrew in the face of hostile reaction, but the skilled worker stubbornly stood his ground. He applied for a permit to rebuild, took the case to court when the borough refused him a permit, and after a long series of delays and disappointments rebuilt a better house on the ruins of the old.

This contrast in reactions to hostility points to one of FSH's most interesting findings. The middle class Negro, having fought so hard to win status and respectability, seems unwilling to risk the indignities which might result from moving into a hostile neighborhood. As badly as they want suburban homes for their children, Negro doctors, teachers, and engineers will often withdraw from a contemplated sale if there are signs of adverse community reaction.

The sensitivity to community reaction that makes the middle class

Negro timid causes the middle class white to fear the hostility of his neighbors if he lists his house for sale with the non-discriminatory service. Many persons basically sympathetic with the FSH program have hesitated to use the agency themselves for fear of community or job reprisals. Others who have listed their houses for rent or for sale have withdrawn the listings when the neighbors objected.

It takes courage, the FSH experience has revealed, for a white person to sell his suburban house to a Negro. The fear of reprisal is not entirely imaginary. One man prominent in the organization was called into the office of the large industrial firm for which he worked and told he had no further chance of promotion with the company because of his interracial activities. A college professor moving to a distant city learned that the neighbors had written to his new dean complaining about his listing his house for open occupancy.

Neighborhood hostility is far more liable to be crystallized on the seller than on the buyer. Of the twenty-eight houses sold to Negroes by FSH, in twenty-three cases there was no discernible community reaction, while in the remaining five most of the opposition was expressed before the new family moved in. It has proved true, too, that once a Negro is living in a neighborhood, traditional American patterns of friendliness and fair play are shortly at work to counteract the original fear and suspicion. Nor is there a drop in real estate values, unless a wave of panic selling gets started.

THE CRUEL DECEPTION OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE

by ROBERT MEYNER

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This much-debated point is rarely accepted by realtors, who genuinely feel that they must keep minority groups out of suburban areas in order to protect property values. It is this conviction that has kept Philadelphia area realtors from welcoming FSH with open arms. The new service has been ignored generally, although a few firms have fought FSH over particular listings, even stooping occasionally to the practice of soliciting the neighborhood for a cash subsidy to help a white family outbid a Negro buyer.

But if realtors have been cool, prospective buyers have not. In the course of three years more than 300 qualified Negro families have applied for houses in the suburbs in the $10,000 to $30,000 bracket.

Under the pressure of a constant backlog of eager applicants, FSH has had to go far afield in its search for suitable houses to sell, picking them up wherever it may in the suburban area. As a result, the organization has turned increasingly to community-wide agencies to help with the job of community education that must parallel the real estate work. The Friends Race Relations Committee of the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting employs a full-time community relations secretary who will work closely with FSH in a community in which a sale is being made.

The validity of teaming up community education with the sale of a house to a Negro in an all-white area is amply demonstrated by experience in Levittown, Bucks County. When the first Negro family bought a house entirely on its own in this huge all-white community, mob violence resulted on such a scale that the story was nationally headlined for days. But when two other Negro families subsequently bought houses through FSH, and the way was carefully prepared in cooperation with interested groups in the area, moving day in each case was entirely without incident.

It is rarely at the completion of a sale, but rather in its initial stages, that FSH runs into trouble. A woman decides to list her house with the agency, but withdraws the next day because the neighbors have complained. After months of searching, a Negro couple sees their dream house, only to find out that it is not for sale to them. Always the story is the same. "It's not that I'm prejudiced myself, but my neighbors would never stand for it."

"It's time that we all quit hiding behind one another's assumed prejudices," a church official recently said in calling on church members to sign "open occupancy covenants." One of the most encouraging findings of FSH, its friends believe, is that once he stops worrying about what the neighbors will think, or what will happen to property values, the average suburban home owner is able to forget his stereotypes and see his new neighbor as a human being with the same wants, interests, and tastes as himself.

This form of basic neighborhood education is the essence of the FSH program, the very reason for its existence. Even in those cases which do not proceed smoothly, and no sale is made, homeowners and their neighbors have been confronted, perhaps for the first time in their lives, with the fact that there are families of the same economic status as themselves who want green grass and fresh air for their children just as much as anyone else, but who are denied these things because of the color of their skin.

FSH plans to continue its operations as long as it is the only real estate firm in the area to practice non-discrimination. The day that other realtors adopt this practice is perhaps still distant, but possibly a little closer since FSH has been on the scene. "You're here," the head of a realty board recently said to some FSH board members, "so I guess we had better learn how to cooperate with you rather than fight you."

Into the small FSH office come many letters from other groups interested in housing desegregation, asking detailed questions about methods of organization and operation. Whether any of these groups plans to pattern itself eventually after FSH, incorporating as a real estate firm, nobody knows. But it is clear at least that Philadelphia's interracial housing experiment is not alone, and that all across the land is a stirring which must result someday in breaking everywhere the "white noose" of the suburbs.

the NEW NEGRO on screen

by MARTIN S. DWORKIN

This is the first of two articles surveying the role of the Negro in recent and current films. The second article by Mr. Dworkin will appear in the November issue.—THE EDITORS.

IN 1949, at a strategic moment of the postwar revival of serious themes in the popular arts, a young film producer, working swiftly and secretly, brought out a modestly-budgeted movie, *Home of the Brave*, that bravely dramatized the problem of anti-Negro prejudice. The producer, Stanley Kramer, was hardly thirty-six years old, and already spotlighted in the growing industry trend towards independent production, following the minor and major successes of his *So This Is New York* (1947) and *Champion* (1949). While not the first film to treat Negroes seriously or with sympathy, *Home of the Brave*, which like *Champion* had been directed by Mark Robson, was unmistakably of a new order. In its story of a hospitalized Negro soldier reenacting the psychic causes of his paralysis, racial friction was viewed through eyes that had seen world depression and war, according to the fashionable framing and perspectives of sociology and psychoanalysis. The Negro, James Edwards, was represented as superior in intellect and training to many of his white comrades. Prejudice itself was not black or white, like traditional movie evils, but a matter of individual and social pathology, to be cured by mental and political hygiene.

The film had evident punctuality, but it was not truly Kramer's part to pioneer. Several studios had already announced films on the Negro problem. The new concern was the direct and even logical extension of the continuing wartime patriotism regarding matters of race and religion. Films made during the war had carefully included Negroes, often in principal roles, and unmistakably revealed a new temper of representation—for example: *Casablanca* (1943), with Dooley Wilson at the cafe piano as "Sam"; *Sahara* (1944), with Rex Ingram as a noble Sudanese sergeant-major; *Lifeboat* (1944), with Canada Lee as a heroic merchant seaman. Apart from entertainment films, Negroes had figured in numerous service training films, and in several official documentaries made specifically as patriotic propaganda, including *The Negro Soldier* (1944), *The Negro Sailor* (1945), and *Negro Colleges in Wartime* (1945).

Immediately following the war, several Continental and British films portrayed colored people favorably or heroically in arguing generally for peace and brotherhood—and in more than incidental awareness of the changes in the relations of races that the war had accelerated. The Negro soldier, James Kitzmiller, of Luigi Zampa's *To Live in Peace* (1946), during the first flush of Italian neo-realism, was made to represent all Americans, and even the Allies, in his good-humored fraternizing with an equally war-weary German. A Negro, Robert Adams, played a leading role in Thorold Dickinson's British film of race relations, *Men of Two Worlds* (1946). It was said by Peter Noble, author of several studies of Negroes in the movies: "This film made history as the first important feature-length production to give a colored actor a co-starring part with a white star; it was a lesson to Hollywood . . ." Both judgments are dubious. And in the case of the latter, it is more accurate and less partisan to say that the ferment of attitudes of the war years affected Hollywood much more profoundly and permanently than the example of a single British film that was seen by few people in the United States.

The momentum of wartime attitudes impelled the production of films such as *Crossfire* (1947) and *Gentleman's Agreement* (1948), dealing, respectively, with the pathological and genteely hypocritical aspects of anti-Semitism. But if the changes in American life and attitudes following the depression and the war made possible, if not inevitable, an open attack on the particular prejudice against Jews, they more surely and inexorably drove towards a confrontation of race prejudice in its most widely visible form. And while Kramer could not be credited with lonely prescience, he did perceive the force and direction of the incipient trend, and did manage to outspeed the others. For this, he was sneered at as an opportunist almost as much as he was admired as a prodigy and as an entrepreneur with something more than profit as his goal. It seemed quite in keeping with the fabled Hollywood sense for following the fastest buck that *Home of the Brave* had transformed the original theme of Arthur Laurents' stage play from one of anti-Semitism —already passing as profitably "controversial"—to anti-Negroism, which so many were betting on as the coming cause.

The sort of cultured cynicism that affects suspicion of any motive for making movies other than that of economic suicide could find corroboration in the short spin of the first Negro screen cycle. *Home of the Brave* was followed shortly by two films concerned with the problem of Negroes "passing" as white: *Lost Boundaries*, produced independently by Louis De Rochemont, and *Pinky*, directed by Elia Kazan, who had made *Gentleman's Agreement*. They did well at the box office. But the best film of the 1949 Negro cycle,

Clarence Brown's *Intruder in the Dust*, from William Faulkner's novel, did not. By the time it arrived, and by the time of *No Way Out* in 1950, the cycle had spent its force to attract audiences—not only in the United States, but almost everywhere. For the great public, perhaps, there had been too much dead earnestness, administered too quickly. The films themselves, with their worthy but slightly sugared solutions of somehow equivocated issues, surely carried their own letdown for people reentering the world outside the theaters. Kramer, it could be said, had got his quickie in while the getting was good. There appeared to be no more to the Negro films as signs of serious intentions in the movies than the catchpenny conscientiousness of a new "Boy Wonder" racing to anticipate the hardened philanthropists of Hollywood.

But if it were true, as the worldly innocents would have it, that Stanley Kramer saw no scandal in putting money in his purse in the movie business, it grew clearer, as his career progressed with such films as *The Men* (1950), *Death of a Salesman* (1952), *High Noon* (1952), *The Defiant Ones* (1958)—perhaps the most effective dramatization of the new Negro on screen since the war—and *On the Beach* (1959), that he did belong among the small but ultimately influential group of film makers who try to associate success and serious purpose. Moreover, and more to the general point, for all the selfishness that may start or ride a rush of films following one theme or another, the motive is always based upon a sense of what people care about enough to want to pay to see. And the deep currents of feelings that the films of the postwar Negro cycle touched and released were not simply evaporated after the transient saturation of the screen. Movie cycles by their very nature are wasteful of the enthusiasms they are meant to encourage and take profit from. The conventions of show business exploitation, however, never quite exhaust the subliminal urges, good and evil, that are roused to seek fulfillment, complete and symbolic, in the forms of entertainment made famous and available.

The fad for specifically Negro themes on the screen passed in less than a year. But the feelings presumed by the fad persisted. The changes in the relations of the races on the job and in the neighborhood that had evoked the feelings continued their subtle revolutions. The screen of the 1950's came to reflect new and different images of Negroes and of the fatally interconnected lives of white and colored people. Instead of sporadic bursts of pro-Negro sentiment, as noble and as evanescent as surges of conscience, there came on screen a gradually growing realism in depicting colored people—and most significantly a heightening dramatic stature.

In overview, the converging forces of the century have imploded nowhere with greater meaning than in the changing imagery of the popular arts. In the movies, and especially since the addition of sound, the blackface and dialect comedians, the grotesquely accented gangsters and villains—even the conveniently inarticulate Red Indians—have gradually been neutralized under the plural pressures of groups all equally jealous of their hard-won equalities. In the first impact of talking pictures, the universality of the silent era had been fragmented. The early emphasis

upon speech encouraged the expansion of national industries, sounding the particularities of spoken languages. But, after all, the appearance of the new, particular movie heroes and heroines made the possibility of heroism newly universal.

At least until redubbing began to supplant subtitling in the late 1940s, audiences everywhere heard actors of any country speaking their own languages. Only wartime war films perpetuated the spurious speech of caricatured foreignness—American and British films, for example, indulging in the various accents of that special movie dialect we may call "Villain-English," to represent Germans or Japanese talking to each other. In postwar war films, even the enemy came more and more to speak his own language, and audiences understood that he was saying something that someone could seriously understand. In general, the movies began to manifest at least as much sensitivity toward the dignities of differentiated linguistic and racial characteristics as, say, the growing number of international assemblies, from the Nuremberg Trials and the United Nations to congresses of salesmen and philatelists, that adopted the earphones of simultaneous translation systems which are becoming little symbols of our times.

Negroes, the last to arrive at the love-feast of popular pluralism, continued to appear chiefly as servants in the movies. But more and more they served the requisites of simple realism about orders in society, rather than of comic disparagement. The transition, to be sure, may say something about the general elevation of the modern menial, as well as about the rising position of colored people. Continental distances extend from the shuffling, g'whining retainer of Stepin Fetchit or Willie Best, to the shrewdly self-confident, intelligently picaresque "Rochester" of Eddie Anderson, to such a dignified, dramatically important figure as the butler of Juano Fernandez in *Ransom!* (1956). In this film of a kidnaping, in which the embattled father's stubborn refusal to pay ransom to immorality is understood only by the butler, the Negro servant figure is still sentimentally drawn. But the wishful imagery more than ever expresses respect, and another order of commitment. Involved is a transformation of that perennial character of Occidental narrative: the faithful Negro retainer, typically gigantic if male, and buxom and motherly if female.

Except in historical dramas, where traditional figures of Nubian slaves or plantation-house darkies may appropriately appear, the Negro as servant or laborer is becoming more and more clearly an employe. In fact, the more virtue accrues to those acts beyond the strict call of the job which are the mark of his romanticized devotion—because they are the more clearly voluntary in this age of the rights of labor and of social security,

rather than feudal paternalism. In the panic of the sinking of the great ocean liner in *The Last Voyage* (1960)—for which Andrew and Virginia Stone actually scuttled the grand old *Ile de France*—it makes all the difference for the sharpening of suspense that one employe of the ship is a Negro. The frantic father, Robert Stack, seeking to rescue his little daughter and his wife, Dorothy Malone, who is pinned under a crumpled bulkhead, is surrounded by people concerned with the safety of the whole ship, or of themselves. Until nearly the end of the film, he can find only one crew member to take this single case of emergency into account: the giant, superbly muscled Woody Strode. In the separate climactic moments when the Negro shows that he has committed himself to these people, both abandoning other duties and risking his own life, there is added to the drama elements that would not have been present if the particular character had been a white man. With so much less expected of him as a free agent; with his own safety so easily attainable by means of his superior strength, the Negro's decision to be loyal is quite distant from the old conventional devotion of darky retainers, so precious a fiction for the benignly prejudiced.

The films of the 1950's reveal a willingness—or, at least, a readiness—to picture and to accept the Negro as a figure of strength, decency, or even a wishfully superior attainment. Amid the mannered violences of *Blackboard Jungle* (1955), for example, Sidney Poitier's Negro was deliberately realized as the boy with the best mind and strongest character. Again, in significant scenes of a modest boy-and-dog film, *Goodbye My Lady* (1956), the backwoods Southerner, Walter Brennan, and his grandson, Brandon De Wilde, resort unhesitatingly to the information and guidance of a young Negro, again played by Poitier. Significantly, the Negro is consulted on a matter of such traditional backwoods expertise as the breeds and characteristics of dogs. But was it only coincidence, or the conscious, romantic symbolism of a politically liberal imagination that the dog herself, amazingly superior in endurance, hunting prowess, and intelligence, turned out to be a Basenji, imported from Africa?

THE PEOPLE'S FORUM

Nixon Comforts Khrushchev

Dear Sirs:

When Vice President Richard Nixon and Premier Nikita Khrushchev were arguing the relative accomplishments of our respective economies during their famous "kitchen debate" in Moscow, Nixon said substantially the following:

"You are ahead in some things, we in others. For instance, you are ahead in the thrust which you can apply to your rockets. We are ahead in color television."

Hardly a more damaging commentary could be made on the difference in emphasis between the two countries. Nixon unwittingly made just the point that many of the critics here at home have been making for several years. This rejoinder must have amused Khrushchev—and comforted him.

PAUL TILFORD
Massapequa Park, N.Y.

Tweedle-Jack, Tweedle-Dick

Dear Sirs:

In 1944 one of your inspired contributors said that the difference between the Presidential candidates was the difference between "tweedle-Dewey and tweedle-Delano."

In 1960 there is even less difference. One candidate has said, "We must be able to stand up to the Russians," and the other, "We will not be pushed around." Either is a continuation of the chip-on-the-shoulder attitude that has characterized so much of our foreign policy of late years.

Flexibility in the face of changing conditions does not necessarily mean appeasement. Why do we have to wait for the other side to issue ultimatums which offer either war or a disastrous loss of prestige? Why could we not initiate new steps to settle the Berlin question, or the Quemoy question, instead of adamantly sticking to formulas which seemed right in 1945?

The United Nations is proving itself more and more capable of handling delicate situations involving international complications. Let's give the United Nations more and more opportunity to show its usefulness.

E. WHEALDON
Anderson, Calif.

Technicians' Campaign

Dear Sirs:

In one respect, I believe the forthcoming political campaign will prove to be the most unusual in our history. It will be as if the giants of advertising, B.B.D. & O. and J. Walter Thompson, decided to engage each other in mortal combat—or analogous to the spectacle of the Winston Man dueling the Marlboro Man with sharpened lances rather than cigaret filters.

It is apparent that our neatly packaged and antiseptic Presidential candidates are entirely devoid of that aura or mystique, real or imagined, that has cloaked the vast majority of our previous nominees. For this reason, I feel that much public apathy will be the result at the polls this November.

Frankly, I am frightened. In a world situation as desperate as the present, there is a crying need for at least one candidate with color and stature. Instead, we selected two skilled political technicians; men who would be most suitable junior executives in the employ of a giant corporation, but certainly unthinkable as leadership symbols for the destinies of 180,000,000 Americans.

GORDON D. FRIEDLANDER
West Plains, N.Y.

Questions Catholic Candidate

Dear Sirs:

The Progressive deserves to be congratulated for its September editorial, "The Quiet Campaign." Although *The Progressive* did not support Senator John F. Kennedy among the Democratic contenders, it would have been easy, after the Los Angeles fiasco, to give a blanket endorsement of Kennedy. Instead, you have maintained your integrity and sense of values by pointing out that neither candidate has offered an imaginative and creative approach to the pressing problems of the country.

While "Dicky-boy" was touring the South giving non-political political speeches, "Sonny-boy" was telling the Veterans of Foreign Wars convention that "Khrushchev understands only power. . . ."

Some of us had had misgivings about a Catholic candidate for President, but I had admonished myself for these feelings, believing that Kennedy was quite emancipated in his thinking. Now I can only wonder if adherence to an institutionalized ideology such as the Catholic church may not have its effect upon a man's thinking. Can an individual submit whole-heartedly to the powerful superego principle present in institutionalized values and still meet flexibly and creatively the rapidly changing values of a world in revolution?

It is little wonder that the liberal and independent element of the American pub-

lic is bewildered and apathetic. It is so clear that neither party picked its best man.

E. R. ZIETLOW
Seattle, Wash.

Confidence in Kennedy

Dear Sirs:

It now seems likely that a Catholic will be the next President of the United States. If this comes about, it will be because many liberals have decided to gamble on what kind of a man Senator John F. Kennedy really is.

I, for one, reject the "wolf in sheep's clothing" thesis and am willing to place my confidence in Kennedy. It is a part of the liberal tradition to have a reasonable amount of faith in any person until he proves himself unworthy.

Whether Kennedy really has courage remains to be seen. Certainly it will take courage to continue to stand up to the Catholic hierarchy in the daily conduct of domestic and world affairs. Possibly this will be a more difficult problem for Mr. Kennedy than dealing with Khrushchev.

I hope that we can have, among American Catholics, a clear repudiation of the Franco pattern. I hope that the sphere of the priests can be limited to the metaphysical realm and that our practical affairs can be conducted on an entirely secular basis.

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MADISON, WISCONSIN

If American Catholics—and especially Mr. Kennedy—have the courage to repudiate the Franco pattern, it may be that a new example can be set here which will be of interest to our Latin American neighbors. Probably the greatest issue in the world today is between authoritarianism and democracy. It is to be hoped that, during the months and years ahead, American Catholics will stand up and be counted on the side of freedom.

ALFRED E. KUENZLI
Alton, Ill.

Strong Democratic Ticket

Dear Sirs:

As a Democratic liberal and a politician who held a county elective office for twenty-four years I disagree on several points with the editorial in your August issue, "Democrats' Dilemma."

First, your statement that the Democrats didn't select the best available man—meaning, of course, Stevenson: Politics is above all practical; of what avail would it have been to select a man who couldn't be elected? Furthermore, after having been enthusiastic for Stevenson eight years ago and four years ago disappointed in him, I have finally come to the conclusion that he wouldn't make a good President in these perilous times because he lacks decision. I think his function is to keep the ideal in front of our eyes, to be the prophet of the party. The job of making or attempting to make the ideal a reality is one for a younger, tougher man.

In the second place, you underrate Kennedy. I have been studying him ever since he became a possible candidate. In fact when I heard him speak as a very young Congressman I put him down then as a young man with a future. I was interested first of all in a man who could be a strong, decisive President, one who could lead the people to make ours a stronger, better nation, even though it entails sacrifice; a man with the wisdom and courage to deal with our friends and our enemies in the world. I wanted a candidate who could defeat the inevitable Republican candidate, Nixon.

I decided that John Kennedy possessed these qualifications to a far greater degree than any of the other possibilities. Then when I saw him in person and heard him speak the day of the West Virginia primary, when he must have been bone weary, I was wholly convinced that he is the man. Nor has he impressed me as being cold just because he doesn't wear his heart on his sleeve.

Finally, you took the position that he was compromising principles in choosing Johnson for Vice President. Again I say that his first hurdle is to be elected.

I believe we Democrats have a very strong ticket, one that can fight and win, and after winning give us the kind of Administration the country sorely needs.

JESSIE S. MCCORMICK
Latrobe, Pa.

Stevenson 'Mystique'

Dear Sirs:

Milton Mayer's August article on the Democratic convention was titled, "The Big Word Was 'Win'." What's wrong with winning? Would Mr. Mayer seriously prefer a Stevenson defeat to a Kennedy victory? There seems to be a "lost cause mystique" about Stevenson similar to that held by some Southerners about the Civil War. The loser acquires an aura of glory which the victor, because of his efficient practicality which leads to victory, can never have.

It is an irrational mystique, for the issues of the struggle (or in this case, lack of issues) are irrelevant to it. The comparatively slight differences between Stevenson and Kennedy provide no basis for this unwavering devotion to Stevenson.

ELEANOR HALL
Lawrence, Kans.

Dear Sirs:

Milton Mayer sounded bitter in "The Big Word Was 'Win'." I notice he, like Harry Truman, made the charge that Senator Kennedy bought the nomination. Maybe next month he'll go into more detail and inform us just how Kennedy bought eight hundred delegates.

As for your own editorial, you blast Kennedy for choosing Senator Johnson as his running mate. Stevenson picked Senator Sparkman of Alabama in 1952. So why not drag Stevenson off that pedestal you have put him on?

BERT CORLEY
Redding, Calif.

Dunce Cap for Kempton

Dear Sirs:

Murray Kempton, in "The Uncommitted," *The Progressive*, September 1960, is vaguely troubled by Senator John F. Kennedy's prose style, although he admits that it is tidy and even graceful. He thinks that he has discovered the defect:

"I remember reading all the way through his acceptance speech at Los Angeles and wondering at a certain wrongness in every line. That wrongness yielded its secret when I put my face in a corner and tried to read the speech aloud. It could not be read aloud. It was absolutely tone-deaf. The periods balanced neatly enough to the eye; but there was nothing remotely suggestive of a cadence to the ear."

This is the stupidest sort of criticism. Take, for example, this sentence in Kennedy's speech:

"My call is to the young in heart, regardless of age; to the stout in spirit, regardless of party; to all who respond to the scriptural call: 'Be strong and of good courage; be not afraid, neither be thou dismayed.'"

The man who can find no tone in that sentence—and there are many others as good—must be deaf. For the picture of Kempton in the corner reading Kennedy's speech, I suggest a dunce's cap.

GEORGE W. WHITING
Houston, Tex.

Disputes Lens' Logic

Dear Sirs:

This is picking an old bone with *Progressive* readers, but Sidney Lens, in writing

SURVIVAL!

Survival of The Progressive is the great issue in our Membership campaign this fall.

Your magazine is faced with a grave financial crisis. Without your help, The Progressive cannot survive the coming year. Like other publications in the field, The Progressive cannot pay its way entirely from regular income. In our case, more than eighty per cent of the past year's expenses were met by operating income—a phenomenal record when compared with other magazines. The Progressive's record-breaking circulation growth promises to narrow the financial gap still more.

But unlike other publications, The Progressive cannot turn to a wealthy "angel" to make up its losses. The Progressive's life depends on thousands of little angels, loyal readers all over America, whose contributions to the nonprofit foundation that publishes The Progressive are the life-line of the magazine.

Right now they are building a $30,000 fund to see The Progressive through the coming year. They need the support of every reader—your support—to keep The Progressive alive.



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The Progressive MADISON, WISCONSIN

an excellent article about labor in the August issue, has done it again and simply must be taken to task once more.

Lens is as good a writer as he is a bad logician. After approvingly describing an aspect of institutionalization, he negates everything said before by condemning institutions as bad. And after praising a form of labor idealism for several pages, he asserts flatly that labor does not have what he has just described.

In his writings (and I enjoy them) Lens has yet to define "idealism" to prove whatever-it-is he thinks labor once had has declined. Nor has he proved the case against institutions. He owes his readers an explanation of why he persists in tossing off his Lensian dicta but does not take the trouble to back them up with evidence.

I suggest that Lens is a victim of current myths and prejudices which a number of labor leaders cling to uncritically. Here are a number of them:

"The loss of attendance at union meetings shows labor has lost its idealism."

Translation: They don't come out anymore to applaud my monthly one-hour lecture on why they are bums for not listening to me harangue them.

"These youngsters today don't have the fight or spirit we had twenty years ago."

Translation: I don't understand the modern use of brain instead of brawn.

"We need an ideology like the one we had in the Thirties."

Translation: Modern problems are too complex for me. Why don't we return to our simple slogan, "Organize the unorganized"? Even I can understand this.

"We need a labor party."

Translation: Why don't those fools draft me to run for public office?

"It's a crying shame labor has become an institution."

Translation: How can I pay off my second car if the union raises my dues again?

Lens is an articulate labor spokesman with a wide and enthusiastic following. Being the provocative person he is, he has raised a number of questions which should be answered.

WILLIAM ABBOTT
Akron, Ohio

Japanese Protests Explained

Dear Sirs:

We in Japan have just passed a critical point in our postwar development. Tensions still remain, but with the automatic approval of the new Mutual Security Pact with the United States on June 19, they have been temporarily reduced. But basic problems underlying recent events have not been resolved and the tensions which afflict our nation will remain for some time to come.

The popular protests which forced the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit to Japan were directed against the disdainful Kishi government which, while conforming in the main to democratic protocol, has reminded us of all that is obnoxious in Japanese bureaucracy and, by its attitudes and actions, called up widespread fears of militarism and the police state.

The movement in opposition to the Revised Mutual Security Pact seemed to have slackened by May 19 when the government party chose to close discussion on the bill. People believed that this action was taken in order that the pact would be ready for signature thirty days later when President Eisenhower was scheduled to arrive in Japan.

The government party sought to extend the Diet session. The opposition socialist party, which wished the Diet dissolved so the will of the people on the treaty could be expressed in new elections, was angered. Outnumbered in the Diet, they seated themselves before the speaker's door so that he could not reach the Diet chamber. The government called in 300 police, who removed the socialists bodily and cleared a path. Within twenty-five minutes the majority party had both extended the session and ratified the security treaty (an item not even on the agenda). This was done in total absence of the socialist representatives, who had boycotted the session.

Some Japanese favor the new pact; some are opposed to it. Many do not understand what it involves. But a great many were deeply offended by the Kishi government's maneuvers. Such people saw these maneuvers as unmasking the fundamentally anti-democratic attitude of the Kishi government.

From that day on the move to induce resignation of the Kishi government mushroomed. People observed on their TV sets the Prime Minister's insolent refusal to answer opposition questions: His indifference to popular feeling and bureaucratic arrogance antagonized many besides leftists. People felt that such anti-democratic manipulation of democratic processes should not pass without protest. Since protests in the Diet were not being honored, people went into the streets to let their will be known.

This was the turning point. Popular demand for the resignation of the Kishi cabinet soon far exceeded opposition to the security treaty. The Communist far left, though not many in number, was exultant at the turn of events and saw its own ends being realized. The neo-Fascists also fed on the popular confusion and sought to incite conflict.

The threat of violence was imminent. Most Japanese and all Christians deplored this trend. All the newspapers and most of the people therefore called for Kishi to step down before violence occurred. But he refused. Demonstrations consequently became more and more aggressive, and violence appeared in some quarters.

Under these conditions Japanese did not feel capable of receiving President Eisenhower. The President's visit was intended to celebrate the one hundredth anniversary of Japanese-American relations. However, after May 19, the opposition came to believe that Kishi had timed the ratification of the treaty so it could be accomplished on June 19, the day of Eisenhower's arrival. Thus they believed Kishi intended to use Eisenhower's great popularity in Japan to strengthen his own shaky political position and to gain support for the Security Treaty.

These people are not Communists; nor are they following Communist leadership. They did not participate in violence, although several were injured by attacks from rightist groups while standing quietly near the Diet building. Those who participated did so as individuals, not as representatives of their schools or churches. The common bond uniting them with other demonstrators was opposition to war and rearmament, and to what they considered the undemocratic behavior of the government.

SHIRO ABE, Director
Yokosuka Christian Center
Yokosuka, Japan

KENTARO BUMA, Director
Japan Church World Service
Tokyo

KIYOSHI II, Pastor
Reinanzaka Church
Tokyo

SHINJI IWAMURA, Pastor
Omori Megumi Church
Tokyo

KIYOSHI OGAWA
Executive Director
Audio-Visual Aids Committee
National Council of Churches
Tokyo

YOICHIRO SAEKI, Pastor
Shinagawa Church
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University of Tokyo

YOICHI TAKIZAWA
Assistant Professor
Tokyo Union Theological Seminary

MASAO TANAKA, Professor
Wasena University
Tokyo

MAKOTO TSUMORI
Assistant Professor
Ochanomizu Women's University
Tokyo

Mayer's Nazis

Dear Sirs:

In the People's Forum of the September issue, a reader quotes the Manchester Guardian to contradict my assertion that "there are no former Nazis in high public office in the German Democratic Republic." I shall try to pursue the issue in detail; meanwhile, let me say that the difficulty lies in the word "Nazi." By "Nazi" I do not mean any former member of the N.S.D.A.P. Perhaps I should have said "Nazi criminal."

MILTON MAYER
Carmel, Calif.

Liberty Endangered

Dear Sirs:

In October the U.S. Supreme Court will again review the convictions under the "membership provision" of the Smith Act, and the order to register issued against the Communist Party under the McCarran Act. This will be the third argument on the

"membership" cases and the second on the McCarran Act.

A study of both cases reveals why the Supreme Court has tried in the past to side-step the basic issues. The implications of both laws are momentous; should one or both be upheld as constitutional, American democracy will indeed be facing a crisis.

Nor is this a remote possibility, in view of the majority decision of the high court last year on the Barenblatt case, which, in the opinion of Justice Black, foreshadowed the outlawing of the Communist Party. "Once we allow any group," he stated, "which has some political aims or ideas, to be driven from the ballot and from the battle for men's minds because some of its tenets are bad and some of its tenets are illegal, no group is safe."

The Chicago Committee to Defend Democratic Rights has just published a review of both of these cases and of the basic issue of "guilt by association" involved in each. The years of delay in the appeals on these cases have dulled the recollection of even those civil libertarians who were aware of the dangerous anti-civil liberties sweep of both laws. Even for the well-informed, this brief pamphlet may prove to be a valuable refresher.

Single copies are available for five cents each; bulk order rates are $15 per 500, plus shipping costs.

RICHARD CRILEY, Executive Secretary
Chicago Committee to Defend
Democratic Rights
189 W. Madison St., Suite 811
Chicago 2, Ill.

Flip-Top Age

Dear Sirs:

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., is indeed correct when he says, in the September *Progressive*, that "a future Gibbon will regard the Eisenhower-Nixon era as the downward turning point when he comes to write about the Decline and Fall of the American Republic."

Perhaps a future Mencken will call the suffocating opulence of the Fifties The Age of the Flip-Top Box.

REXFORD S. WHITE
Sheboygan, Wis.

More WILPF Defenders

Dear Sirs:

Elsie Johnson's letter in the August *Progressive* is part of her long one-woman campaign to undermine faith in the integrity of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. The WILPF expects to formulate a comprehensive answer to these attacks and this will soon be available on request to WILPF, 2006 Walnut Street, Philadelphia 3, Pennsylvania.

Mrs. Johnson apparently thinks that Jane Addams would be disappointed that her WILPF does not specifically denounce Communist nations and their violations of freedom. It is significant that, although the WILPF was founded in the heat of World War I, Jane Addams never denounced Germany, which was then considered as much a devil-nation as Russia is now. The newborn organization in 1915 denounced neither side but sought to end the war by means of mediation and just peace terms which could eventually reconcile the belligerents. It opposed all settlement of disputes by war and pledged itself to attack the economic and political causes of war and to try to substitute law for war.

The WILPF is still faithfully following this course. What useful ends are served by denunciations? Will they stop the spread of Communism or cause it to disappear? And even if Communism evaporated overnight, would not widespread poverty, international anarchy, and armaments breed new totalitarianisms and new threats of war?

The WILPF's answer to Communism is the *equal* emphasis we have always given to peace and freedom. We oppose all totalitarianism of the Right or the Left and conditions which foster it at home or abroad. We actively support the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights and the proposed Covenants of Human Rights applicable to *all* nations.

As for Mrs. Johnson's specific charge that the WILPF did "nothing more" about the Hungarian tragedy than to urge that the United Nations deal with it—that is the WILPF approach to *all* international disputes and charges of aggression. The only alternative to channeling these through the United Nations is armed intervention inviting the onset of World War III. Is that what Mrs. Johnson would recommend?

DOROTHY HUTCHINSON, Chairman
Policy Committee
United States Section
WILPF
Philadelphia, Pa.

Dear Sirs:

Before Mrs. Johnson became a member of WILPF we had numerous resignations because we would not take a "firm stand" on Hitler. In World War I, Jane Addams and others were branded pro-German and later Bolshevik. So Mrs. Johnson is not the only one who has wanted WILPF to forget the peace and emphasize the freedom in our name.

The U.S. Section of WILPF is celebrating the one hundredth anniversary of Jane Addams birth with the construction of an apartment house, named after her, in Austria, to house a few of those unfortunates who survived the Hitler and Hungarian terrors. I'm wondering just what Mrs. Johnson and all those others are doing!

MARIE HODGSON
Leonia, N.J.

Dear Sirs:

As an active member and officer of the Wisconsin state branch, I would like to state that, from the vantage point of many years of work in the WILPF, the aims of peace and freedom set forth in the broad and wise principles and policies of the U.S. Section are unequivocal. There is no stronger aspect of the WILPF's program than its clear insistence upon freedom.

There is also just as clear a recognition that unless the world finds a way to keep peace, there will be neither freedom nor men to enjoy it. This poses an enormous challenge. We are convinced that the effectiveness of the WILPF lies in working where we can make the greatest contribution, within our own governmental process, where our voices are heeded.

The rapid growth and renewed enthusiasm of the U.S. Section is a clear indication that many American women are eager to become active in an organization which offers them a constructive program to strengthen peace and freedom at home and all over the world, and to further honor our great founder, Jane Addams.

AGNES HOLE
Madison, Wis.

Salute to Rabbi Goldburg

Dear Sirs:

Bravo for Rabbi Goldburg's open letter (August issue) to Frank Sinatra! I wish that this might be printed in pamphlet form and signed by every writer in America—for the writers of America are in for increasingly grave trouble if they do not speak out more loudly and clearly than they have in the past decade.

For shame, Sinatra, and a salute to you, Goldburg of New Haven!

KAY BOYLE
Rowayton, Conn.

Call to Greatness

Dear Sirs:

"I'm an enthusiast over biological and chemical warfare. I think it's great stuff. It's more humane than anything else we've got." The revolting enthusiasm of Colonel Joseph C. Prentice of Dugway Proving Ground makes one suspect that the basic qualification for work in this field is first of all a subhuman callousness.

On the subject of "painless death" here

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by ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR.

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is the incredible conclusion reached by the Chemical Corps Scientists:

"In sufficient quantity GB [German type B nerve gas] induces death in a matter of minutes after the victim first suffers a chest tightening, salivation and perspiration, vomiting, pin-pointing of the eyes, convulsions, and finally death from a filling of the lungs with fluid." We should all hope to die so painlessly!

In his article in *The Progressive* last December Representative Kastenmeier stated: ". . . by 1925 most nations had signed a treaty renouncing both chemical and biological weapons . . . the United States did not sign this treaty." The intervening thirty-five years have seen a ghastly increase in the scope and variety of such weapons. We must put pressure on our legislative representatives to insist that we sign this treaty of renunciation.

Further, when conferences are resumed at Geneva, it is vitally important that we press this issue as equally important as the issue of nuclear weapons. In Lewis Mumford's *Atlantic* article "The Morals of Extermination" he writes:

"If we rallied the forces of mercy, humanheartedness, and morality with the vigor with which we have marshaled the dehumanized forces of destruction, what government could stand against us and face its own people, however strong its cynical suspicions and misgivings."

In so doing we would don a mantle of greatness to win the respect and support of an anxious world.

MURIEL I. SYMINGTON
Brooklyn, N.Y.

Corrects Quotation Source

Dear Sirs:

In your September editorial you use Sinclair Lewis' phrase, "men of measured merriment," which you attribute, through Eric Sevareid, to Thomas Wolfe. Lewis may not have originated the phrase, but he wrote it before Wolfe. I think it appears in *Arrowsmith*.

This may be a mere trifle, but in these times when everything is so cushy and nice, we who remember and honor Lewis' hard truths find ourselves touchy even over trifles.

CONNER REED
Seattle, Wash.

Stevenson for State

Dear Sirs:

May I offer a belated thanks to *The Progressive* for the way you stayed with the best man, Adlai Stevenson?

The selection of Henry Cabot Lodge as the G.O.P. Vice Presidential candidate makes it imperative that the Democrats offer in their proposed administration a man of even greater stature in foreign affairs. While I shudder at the thought of "Revolving Richard" in the White House, this lifelong Democrat will be forced to go fishing next November unless Senator Kennedy gives a flat, irrevocable pledge to choose Stevenson as Secretary of State if he is elected.

MARTIN KLEIN
Cambridge, Mass.

BOOKS

The Modern Quest

by RUSSEL B. NYE

THESE REFLECTIONS have their source in a conversation I had last year with a university student, who asked my advice about what he might read in order to know something about the modern novel. With the feeling that this was pretty easy, I recommended Hemingway, Faulkner, Fitzgerald, Dos Passos, Thomas Wolfe, Sherwood Anderson, and a variety of others. "Oh," he replied, "I've read them. I meant the *modern* novel."

When the shock of contact with such utter youth had worn off somewhat, I was forced to admit that I knew what he meant. The "modern" novelists I mentioned were modern when I was in college; what I conceived of as the "modern" novel was that of my own generation and assuredly not his. Hemingway, Faulkner, and Company, I realized, were no longer young men (nor was I), and by the same token their novels not so modern as they once seemed. Hemingway and Faulkner are in their sixties, Fitzgerald and Wolfe have been dead for about twenty years, Dos Passos and Farrell hardly heard from. What interested me, and what seemed to me modern, was all pre-1940—which to the present-day college student is almost as distant as the Norman Conquest.

I decided to catch up a bit on modern fiction. I read, whenever I could, the work of novelists under thirty or so, with occasional excursions into the fortyish bracket. It was a salutary experience, and I am sure that there must be others who, like me, have not been watching the clock. For this reason I pass on a few reflections.

First, the gap between the fiction produced by the generation which wrote before World War II, and that which wrote after, is wide. It is as wide, perhaps, as that which separates the novel after 1910 from the novel of 1870. Anyone who reads American novels today must be prepared to listen with an open mind to what the young writers have to say, and to accept their right to choose their own ground from which to say it. One must understand that they do not necessarily revere the old gods as their fathers do; they simply accept them as part of their heritage, without surprise, piety or excitement. The Hemingwayesque prose, the Dos Passos "Camera Eye," the Faulknerian rhetoric, the Joycean labyrinth—things which not more than a few years ago were daring and new—are to them as normal as television. They simply do not remember when such things were not, which makes a tremendous difference in the psychological attitude with which they approach fiction. The experimentation of the Twenties and Thirties is to them tradition. They are frighteningly skilled in technique and terribly knowledgeable about it—after all, they cut their teeth on *Ulysses* and *Mrs. Dalloway* and *The Golden Bowl*, which we struggled through so laboriously.

The majority of younger writers wish fervently that critics and readers would stop comparing their work with the work of their grandfathers, with the expectation that they must equal or exceed it. For the most part they are polite about it, avoid the

question, or answer with care and respect. If pressed, they may stick a few pins in some old, sacred balloons. Were the good old days really so good? Were they that much better?

I found this harder to answer than I first thought. Nobody will argue about the achievement of *USA, The Sound and the Fury, The Sun Also Rises, The Great Gatsby, Studs Lonigan,* and three or four others. But then what? It is convenient to overlook Faulkner's *Mosquitoes,* Hemingway's *Torrents of Spring* or *Across The River,* Fitzgerald's *This Side of Paradise,* Dos Passos' *Number One,* Farrell's *Bernard Clare,* and others which are by no means distinguished books. *Grapes of Wrath* was and is a powerful book, but what has come since? What has O'Hara done since *Appointment in Samarra* or *Butterfield 8*? Where are the World War I novels that can match Mailer's *Naked and the Dead,* Heym's *The Crusaders,* Alfred Hayes' *All Thy Conquests,* Anton Myrer's *The Big War,* or Shaw's *The Young Lions*?

It is easy to point to *The Old Man and the Sea* and turn away. However, I have the strong feeling that *The Old Man,* beautifully constructed artifact that it is, doesn't say anything that Hemingway didn't say equally well or better in *The Undefeated* or *Fifty Grand* thirty years ago. I have the uneasy suspicion in reading it that Papa was going through some skillful motions that he had practiced a long time. After Faulkner's *The Mansion* I had the feeling that Faulkner was getting a little slower in disentangling himself from those dependent clauses. *The Hamlet* is still a better book, and I would rather leave *A Fable* out of this argument.

I don't mean disrespect for my betters, but I simply have the sensation that I have heard it before, as I have heard Marquand and Cozzens before, and a good many others. O'Hara's last few novels are little more than *Peyton Place* in a Brooks Brothers shirt. Farrell is still writing about Studs, whatever his current name may be, and has never really left that New Year's Eve party in Chicago. What it feels like to grow up in Chicago is being said a good deal better, perhaps, by Willard Motley.

The period from 1919-1939 produced eight or ten landmarks of fiction, which is a real achievement for any period. No modern novelist will deny this. What he does resent is that this fact is often used to control the judgment of some excellent novels produced after 1939. Vance Bourjaily, a young novelist teaching in the Midwest, expressed the attitude of his generation rather well in an essay which he called "No More Apologies," published in *Discovery* in 1953. "Ours is as talented and vigorous a generation of writers as any," he wrote, "and especially as the one before it, against which we are often measured. I would maintain that much of our work has been extremely good, some of it extraordinary, and the potential mountainous."

I am on Bourjaily's side. We have bowed far too long in the direction of the Twenties. We have allowed our veneration for the accomplishments of our own generation, which were admittedly great, to obscure its failures, which were real. Unfortunately, the critics seem not to have given us much help. Edmund Wilson, our senior critic and probably our best, busies himself with General Grant, New York State Indians, and Pasternak. *The Kenyon Review* and *The Partisan Review,* both distinguished critical journals, more or less keep track of things, but now and then sound as if they were edited from another planet. *The Partisan Review* tends to get lost in what Rahv thinks of what Trilling said about a review by Howe; *The Kenyon Review,* though it makes valiant efforts, often gets bogged down in such things as "Ritual Elements in Faulkner" or "Myth in the Novels of Robert Penn Warren." About all you can count on for help are Maxwell Geismar and gallant old Granville Hicks, who still enjoy reading books—which is more than a number of modern critics apparently do.

This leads to my second reflection: that whatever the critics say or fail to say, the novel is probably the most vital, energetic, and stimulating form of artistic expression today, matched only by painting. The *level* of attainment is probably higher today in the novel than at any other time in our literary history. The reader who looks around him with some care and perception, and who isn't misled by the lurid covers of paperbacks, will find himself in the middle of some interesting and exciting fiction. Let me list a dozen such novels published within the past few years: Nelson Algren's *The Man With the Golden Arm;* Norman Mailer's *The Naked and the Dead;* Saul Bellow's *Henderson the Rain King;* J. D. Salinger's *The Catcher in the Rye;* John Howard Griffin's *The Devil Rides Outside;* Ralph Ellison's *The Invisible Man;* Vance Bourjaily's *The Violated;* Herbert Gold's *The Man Who Was Not With It;* Mark Harris' *Bang The Drum Slowly;* George Elliott's *Parktilden Village;* Robie Macauley's *The Disguises of Love;* or William Styron's *Lie Down in Darkness.*

These are arbitrary choices, naturally. The list could just as easily include Paul Bowles, Virgil Scott, Willard Motley, Bernard Malmud, Harvey Swados, James Agee, Truman Capote, Frederick Buechner, Jack Kerouac (whatever you think of *On the Road, Doctor Sax* is a *tour de force* of fantasy), or the short fiction

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DOUBLEDAY

of Flannery O'Connor, J. F. Powers, or John Cheever. This is admittedly an uneven list, but the level of achievement is amazingly high. There is more vitality here, and more genuine potential in language and form in the novel, than there has been in any literary art form since Eliot's *The Wasteland* exploded on the poetic landscape.

What, then, are the recent novelists doing with the novel form, and what of its content?

First, if there is a discernible trend in the form of the modern novel, it is toward the concept of the novel as a series of moments, rather than as a planned progression of events or incidents, moving toward a defined terminal end. Recent novelists are following out in effect some of the experiments in structure which began forty years ago. These novelists tend to explore rather than arrange or synthesize their materials; often their arrangement is random rather than sequential. In the older tradition, a novel was a formal structure composed of actions and reactions which were finished by the end of the story, which *did* have an end. When Frederic Henry kisses Catherine goodbye and walks back to his hotel in the rain, *Farewell to Arms* is indubitably finished. The modern novel often has no such finality.

Saul Bellow's *Augie March* is really a series of incidents which follow each other in chronological sequence, but which lead to no particular denouement at the end of no particular plan. William Styron's *Lie Down in Darkness* is built out of episodes which expand from and contract to a central moment. Algren's *Walk on the Wild Side* is a wildly off-center picaresque. Kerouac's *On the Road*, of course, lies at one extreme boundary of this kind of random, unplanned confusion; Burrough's dizzying *Naked Lunch* crosses it.

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NORTON

The trend toward the dissolution of formalized structure in the novel was evident before World War II, foreshadowed in such works as Nathanael West's *Balso Snell* or *Day of the Locust*, among others. But its progress has markedly accelerated since 1948. There are probably several reasons for this, but two can be identified with some accuracy. One is the decline of naturalism, which dominated American fiction for more than a half-century. Naturalism, focusing on society and social problems, encouraged novelists to be reportorial social critics, dealing with the factual and external. The naturalistic novelist felt constrained to construct his novel in imitation of life (as the once-popular phrase, "slice of life," expressed it), but the newer novels are much more concerned with the individual, much less with society. Their problem is not social. It is as Herbert Gold wrote in his introduction to *Fiction of the Fifties*, to find an answer to the question, "Why do I live, struggle, love, defy age and history? Why must I die and for what? *Who am I?*"

Such novelists have more in common with Twentieth Century poetry than with the naturalistic novel tradition, a greater kinship with Eliot or Dylan Thomas than with Dreiser. They experiment with time; they integrate symbols, Eliot-fashion, into their materials; they search for the internal and subjective. John Berry, whose *Krishna Fluting* won the Macmillan Fiction award, said that he began his novel as if he were organizing "a two-year expedition into the interior." Herbert Gold's *The Man Who Was Not With It* is almost allegory; Nelson Algren's *Walk on the Wild Side is* allegory; Bellow's *Henderson the Rain King* is magic fantasy. Ralph Ellison's *Invisible Man* is built about a central metaphor as surely as an Eliot or Pound poem.

To see this kind of questioning subjectivity in operation, you might try comparing Farrell's *Studs Lonigan*, which is about a boy growing up in Chicago, with Willard Motley's *Let No Man Write My Epitaph*, which is also about a boy growing up in Chicago. Or Hemingway's Nick Adams stories of adolescent initiation with Jean Stafford's *Mountain Lion*, James Agee's *A Death in the Family*, Truman Capote's *Other Voices, Other Rooms*, or Carson McCullers' *Member of the Wedding*, which are initiation stories too, of much more sophistication and dimension.

A second reason for the recent disintegration of structural firmness in the novel is inherent in the contemporary view of life itself, as the novelists see it. The older writer worked within a set of unquestioned values, which he built into the very structure of his novel. Hemingway, Cozzens, Faulkner, Fitzgerald, Farrell, Marquand (and for that matter younger men in the same tradition, such as Wallace Stegner or Walter Van Tilburg Clark) had and have a framework of values. They believe life is thus and so; they might differ as to what it is, or they might not like it, but life has a design and their novels do too. However, a number of recent novelists have parted company with most of the traditional value-systems. Their fictional world reflects an actual world of ambiguity, uncertainty, and anxiety, an inconclusive world without identifiable central authority or reasonable coherence.

Hemingway still has clear and cogent ideas about what life is like; he *knows*, and therefore in *The Old Man and The Sea* he presents us with a tightly-built novel which says so, with a central character who moves through an expertly-designed sequence of events to a definite conclusion. Herbert Gold, in *The Man*

Who Was Not With It, sees no such coherent pattern in the world about him; his novel is a tentative pattern of moments in the lives of people who search rather unsuccessfully for some kind of personal fulfillment. Cozzens' *By Love Possessed* is a big, efficient novel about love, a subject on which Cozzens has some clear and decisive statements to make. Compare its structure, however, with Norman Mailer's *Deer Park,* which is also about love, and anxiously explores a number of not very successful lives trying to find out something meaningful about love in them, and ends in puzzlement.

As one trend in the recent novel is toward a kind of structural disintegration, so its major theme is this generation's search for personal identity. In novel after novel the question recurs: "Who am I, and where do I belong in a world that seems hostile or indifferent, chaotic and disjointed? What are my relationships?" This is not a new theme, of course. It is an eternal human question, but one given new urgency by the issues of mid-Twentieth Century life. This is the first generation of writers in history who feel, as Evan S. Connell, Jr., recently wrote, that "our very lives depend upon the capacity of our nerves to withstand the thought of instantaneous annihilation."

The question of identity, some social psychologists believe, is the major modern problem—to find "a coherent sense of self," a relationship to "the supporting framework of life," according to Allen Wheelis' sociological study, *The Quest for Identity.* Vance Packard's *Status Seekers,* David Riesman's *Lonely Crowd,* William Whyte's *Organization Man,* C. Wright Mills' *White Collar,* Peter Viereck's *Unadjusted Man,* and others like them offer testimony to contemporary man's attempt to locate himself somewhere, as it has led also to the tremendous popularity of such men as Billy Graham, Norman Vincent Peale, and Bishop Fulton Sheen. And the novelist too is involved with this search, perhaps more deeply and achingly than anyone else in contemporary life.

They have given so far a variety of answers. A few, such as Jack Kerouac, find a solution in simple disaffiliation. More general, however, is the acceptance of a loose, permissive philosophy of disengagement, a "choosing not to choose." As Nelson Algren once said, many novelists feel today that "it is better to be on the lam than on the cover of *Time.*" Others, like J. D. Salinger, find their answers in some kind of personal mysticism (such as Zen Buddhism). Still others find fulfillment in "kicks," in the euphoric hedonism of hipsterism. There are those too, of course, who find their answers in "gung ho" commitment to the corporation, the Navy, the Marines, or monolithic conservatism, such as Herman Wouk or Sloan Wilson. These books, of course, sell the most copies and make the most money. But to the serious young writer today the keynote of the novel is search—search for personal identity within a framework of values, for a sense of placement and continuity.

There are a number of good and provocative recent novels which illustrate this theme. George Elliott's *Parktilden Village* is a study of the moral confusion of a group of nice people in a suburban housing development who get tragically involved with each other for the mere reason that they have no guidelines to follow in developing their relationships. When it is all over, one of the characters, surveying the wreckage of four lives, cries out, "None of us did the right thing!" And yet pathetically enough, nobody knows the "right thing," even then.

Vance Bourjaily's *The Violated* concerns four young people who reach maturity during World War II and their bewildered search for something to tie to, in a rootless, fluid world that offers them nothing. Herman Mailer's *Deer Park* is a study of corruption and decadence in Hollywood, where (ironically) our scheme of values seems most likely to be made. The Deer Park, of course, is Louis XV's famous bosky dell of sophisticated vice, the classic symbol of moral rot. Bud, the protagonist of Gold's *The Man Who Was Not With It,* finds the world of the carnival, with its grifters, drifters, fakes, and perverts, a much more solid place than the non-circus world, which is confused and sick. And in Saul Bellow's *Henderson the Rain King,* an

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Editor at War

THE MAGNOLIA JUNGLE, by P. D. East. Simon and Schuster. 243 pp. $3.95.

Reviewed by

Marion A. Wright

BOOKS ON THE South's racial problem roll steadily from the press. Many of them are statistical, scholarly, informative, and profound. All these types of books are needed. They furnish the necessary factual basis upon which editors, students, and commentators may rear the structure of their own thinking. Against the solid facts of such books impressions and preconceptions may be tested.

Without for one moment disparaging the great value of these books, they lack the emotional impact of the personal narrative. The story of one man—his reactions, his pain, his adjustment, his growth under the stresses and conflicts of the times—reaches the lower cerebral centers. It causes hackles to rise and spines to tingle. Dabbs' *The Southern Heritage* and Golden's *Only in America* derive much of their power from this autobiographical quality.

To that distinguished company must now be added P. D. East's *The Magnolia Jungle*. It is pure autobiography with hardly a statistic in the entire volume. Dabbs approached the racial problem as an historian and philosopher with a plantation owner's background. Golden approached it as a gentle humorist from New York's East Side. P. D. East approaches it as a brilliant satirist from the Mississippi pine lands of which he writes.

In *The Magnolia Jungle* there is no detachment from subject matter. If there are poverty and hate and ignorance and depravity in the book, they have been seen, felt, tasted, and breathed from infancy by the author. Tar paper shacks in a succession of saw mill camps and cross road villages housed the family during all of his boyhood. He worked for a brute of a man in a country store for fifty cents a week. For two years he wore the same pair of tennis shoes to school and church. Always he was witness to the cheating and violence practiced upon the Negro.

Weaker men succumb to their environment, are caught up by it and become part of it. East fought back. When his foster mother sought to stop him from playing and fishing with Negro friends, he rebelled. Early battles were with fists. Later and until the present, tongue and pen have been his weapons. *The Petal Paper*, which he founded and miraculously keeps going, is the vehicle. No one since Voltaire has more effectively used ridicule and satire to expose hypocrisy in church and state.

The amazing thing is not only that *The Petal Paper* keeps going but that East keeps alive. In a state which has three hundred chapters of the White Citizens Council, in which Emmet Till was done to death, and violence is the substitute for due process of law, he survives. Fighting segregation in every issue, the paper has not a single subscriber in the town of Petal, and its local advertising is nil. But circulation and advertising from abroad keep it afloat. East, a former Methodist and Kiwanian, is completely ostracised. But at least he is not under ground. William Faulkner, Hodding Carter, and P. D. East, all from Senator Eastland's Mississippi, prove the invincibility of the human spirit.

The impression should not be gotten that *The Magnolia Jungle* is all blood and brimstone. Gentle characters, well delineated, give balance to the book. P.D.'s foster father, quiet, patient, understanding; a country doctor whose therapy of sympathy preserved the author's sanity, and a woman school teacher who forced books upon him—these and others to some extent counter-balance the book's prevailing somber mood.

Few more honest books have been written. Nothing is glossed over. The wild and lawless escapades of his youth are recorded. Even his dubious legitimacy is brought into the open.

The Magnolia Jungle restores confidence in the limitless potentialities of human nature. It pictures a man at war with the society in which he lives. He may not change that society. But, thank God, that society has not bent him to its will.

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RUSSEL B. NYE, professor of English at Michigan State University, is a Pulitzer-prize winning historian. His newest book, "The Cultural Life of the New Nation, 1776-1830," will be published this month. MARION A. WRIGHT is a Southern lawyer and a former president of the Southern Regional Council. W. B. McCANN reviews paperbacks regularly The Progressive. He edited the paperback, "Ambrose Bierce's America."

Paperback Plums

by William McCann

BOOKS ABOUT ART and artists constitute a sizable portion of an avalanche of recently published paperbacks. Especially noteworthy are the following titles in the Great American Artists Series (George Braziller, Inc. $1.50 each volume): *Jackson Pollock*, by Frank O'Hara, *Stuart Davis*, by E. C. Goossen, and *Winslow Homer*, by Lloyd Goodrich.

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